



Democracy: Angola's elite dilemma

VASCO MARTINS
Researcher, IPRIS

The world expects Angola's impressive economic growth to one-day blossom into a very promising democratic society. The international media celebrate this growth with little or no criticism towards the country's regime. In fact, the media passes the idea that Angola is a thriving country on its path towards becoming a regional power. The existent research however, proves otherwise.

It has been commonly accepted that once a country's economy starts growing and diversifying, the rising economic forces will pressure the government by trying to influence decision making, ultimately leading to a democratic transition. This idea has been widely embraced in the 1990s and continuous to operate in the 2000s under the development label. However, empirical observation proves otherwise.

Angola will not become a democracy in the coming years, its chance seems to have passed. The Angolan leadership, led by MPLA's José Eduardo dos Santos for 31 years, missed the op-

portunity to democratize because it did not implement the necessary reforms when the time was right. A window of opportunity appeared when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed in combat, thus transforming the party into a non-armed, major opposition political party, while awarding complete victory to the MPLA. By then, José Eduardo dos Santos should have prepared to reform the country. Efforts should have been directed at strengthening judicial competences, improving the multi-party character of the system - even if it required restructuring the MPLA itself - reinforcing an independent police and fully restructuring the military. Afterwards, he should have stepped down from his post and called legislative elections under international observance.

This conduct has been recurrent throughout history. It can be found from Russia to Zimbabwe, the continuous gripping of power when in fact decentralization is required. Boris Yeltsin paved the way for autocracy, leaving no other choice to his successors even if they were committed to liberalism. The same applies to Robert Mugabe's iron fist in Zimbabwe, ever since achieving power and especially after the last elections, which besides all events, failed to reach a successful power sharing agreement between ZANU-PF and opposition party MDC. Hence, when the opportunity to de-

democratize is missed, the only option autocratic leaders have left is to continue to centralize power around the leader and his 'family', while managing the opposition and avoiding domestic and international criticism.

Afterwards, the system progresses naturally. As economic growth provides the state with more resources, the leadership will use these to maintain its grip on power. The lack of constitutional checks and balances, of a committed liberal opposition ready to denounce illegalities, and of institutions capable of controlling the use of public funds, will ensure that state resources will be used to strengthen the regime and suppress any opposition, while keeping the status quo intact. Moreover, the lack of openness of the regime stops any liberal technocrats from emerging and changing it from the inside. Universities fail to nurture this idea, because students targeting the administrative state apparatus are unable to find employment unless they comply with the regime's standards. The situation is presented with the regime dictating the rules and gaining power from the country's immense growth, leaving no room for alternatives to emerge.

As a result, these missed opportunities transform the state design into a fragile system entailing a high risk of conflict, majorly spurred by intense nepotism in the higher echelons of power. Letting this golden chance slip



away will have immense costs, with Angola becoming more prone to conflict and internal dispute, as the government's autocratic centralization of funds and the lack of a solid middle class will eventually awake the giant sleeping in the lower stratum.

The best solution lies in a commitment to educate the younger generations, in order to bring about change in the country. But the real challenge will be to change the way of thinking in the higher stratum. Commonly elites staunchly hold on to power, even if it means going through a civil war or foreign military intervention. However, following Ghana's former President John Kufuor's example is the best option not only for Angola, but for the whole of the African continent. Upholding the constitution and the rule of law builds on democracy and values of social development. John Kufuor has changed his country and the way to think about African politics. His socio-economic policies, based on the pillars of private sector development, human resources development and good governance are the conditions every African leader should adopt, especially in a rich country like Angola.

Brazil's American challenge

JEFFREY LAURENTI

Senior fellow and director of foreign policy programs at The Century Foundation

The leaders of Brazil and Turkey did not get where they are in politics by being political *naïfs*, but they learned a hard lesson in international power realities in the United Nations Security Council this month. For all the welcome mats officiously being laid out for 'rising powers', it is clear that they still do not have the clout to challenge the Council's inner circle of major powers when global security interests are at stake. The P-5 brush-off was a particular blow to Brazil, a country that sees

itself emerging as a global heavyweight entitled to permanent status on the Security Council and able to bargain with the biggest boys as an equal, as President Luís Inácio 'Lula' da Silva did with Barack Obama at the collapsing climate conference in Copenhagen in December. Well, not exactly an equal – Lula had to be part of a four-country team along with South Africa's Jacob Zuma, China's Hu Jintao, and India's Manmohan Singh. And the bloc of developing countries for whom these four presumed to negotiate – led by friend and neighbor Venezuela – refused indignantly to accept their hard-won accord.

Turkey too is a member of the Group of 20, but aspires only to regional leadership. In its region, Iran's runaway nuclear program is genuinely a major crisis. Brazil's leaders thought that on Iran they could provide a global alternative to a United States that is, in their view, too often frozen by domestic politics into failed or counterproductive policies. But they did not appreciate how widely shared are the security apprehensions about Iran's nuclear program, they have not had to calibrate dozens of countries' concerns into their negotiating posture as the Americans do, and their meager experience of Middle East bargaining did not alert them to the danger of buying a threadbare rug that had already been sold.

The Iran sanctions fiasco is only the latest disappointment in a relationship with Obama's America that began so promisingly at the hemispheric summit in Trinidad in April 2009. Seemingly ceding Latin American policy to the 'centrist' camp in his party, Obama has not pressed to change the hostile U.S.-Cuban relationship as Lula da Silva had urged. His wobbly initial reaction to the Honduras *golpe de estado* and ultimate capitulation to Washington's unreconstructed apologists for rightist coups dismayed many in Brazil.

Obama's support for US use of military bases in Colombia has been particularly disquieting there, described by foreign minister Celso Amorim as

"well beyond what might be needed inside Colombia". At least in the region, Obama's 'change' seems less than meets the eye.

Still, even these irritants pale next to the rocky relations Brazil experienced in the early years of George W. Bush's presidency. In 2002, Bush's top arms 'diplomat', John Bolton, engineered the ouster of Brazil's José Bustani, director-general of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; the government of Fernando Cardoso kept silent, reportedly calculating that as "a multilateral issue it was not worth a bilateral showdown with the US". Bush's allies in Congress reacted with near-hysteria to Lula da Silva's election later that year, citing his "admiration for the Communist dictator and sponsor of terrorism Fidel Castro".

Yet the same self-isolating belligerence gave Lula da Silva the political opening to claim a more assertive role in the region. With Bush's Washington obsessed with Hugo Chávez, even Lula da Silva seemed tolerable. Amorim, a UN ambassador before Lula da Silva appointed him Foreign Minister, recognized in the multilateral arena a strategic opportunity that Brazilian diplomacy had traditionally neglected – and worked it hard.

Soon Bush was forced to bow to a Brazil-forged coalition intent on installing Chilean socialist José Miguel Insulza across the street from the White House as head of the Organization of American States. Brasília similarly succeeded in driving a stake through the heart of Bush's plan for a hemisphere-wide free trade agreement.

Still, while Brazil can knit together winning coalitions to contain US power in the Americas, it is far less capable of projecting power of its own on the global stage. On complex issues like trade and climate, Brazil has helped frame the global debate, but failed to clinch a deal.

Brazil's readiness to commit substance to peacekeeping in Latin America and Africa have given it considerable weight in UN peace opera-



tions – but that scarcely impresses Washington’s conservative power elites, since by definition if they are UN operations they are not strategically important to the United States. On the other hand, Brasília’s strategic silence in the face of the developing world’s most repressive regimes has deeply discouraged Western human rights groups that had long battled Bush’s abuses.

These occasional strains do not bespeak estrangement. Bush himself was said to respect Lula da Silva, and Obama looks optimistically to narrowing the gaps in world wealth and power relationships. Brazil is now punching above its weight on the world stage – but remains a middle-weight contender.

Portugal and Spain: Are their backs still turned to one another?

PAUL CHRISTOPHER MANUEL

Research Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs at Georgetown University

Given the close nature of the Portuguese–Spanish bilateral relationship under José Sócrates and José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, are we on the verge of a new wave of pan-Iberism? What will the effects of this close personal relationship be on current and future Portuguese foreign policy? Is a united Iberian foreign policy in the works?

To long-time observers of the Portuguese–Spanish relationship, it was somewhat startling to see the two leaders at campaign stops in Coimbra and in Valencia last year, urging voters to back Socialist candidates in the European elections. They were

together again a few weeks ago celebrating the signing of the accession treaty to the European Union twenty-five years on, with joint appearances at Madrid’s Royal Palace and at the Jerónimos Monastery in Lisbon. There were plenty of smiles and congratulations all around, although the two countries had actually competed twenty-five years ago over which would be the first to enter the European Union.

This is, of course, not the first time that two concurrently serving Iberian leaders shared similar visions. Twin Iberian dictators António de Oliveira Salazar and Francisco Franco shared a similar political ideology and a cordial relationship for decades. Later, following the democratic transitions in Portugal and Spain, both countries were led by Socialist Prime Ministers: Mário Soares in Portugal and Felipe González in Spain. Both leaders faced similar challenges and adopted similar policies. More recently, each country was ruled by center-right politicians: José Manuel Durão Barroso in Portugal and José Maria Aznar in Spain. These leaders shared similar conservative views and also enjoyed a collegial working relationship. They notably met with American President Bush and British Prime Minister Blair in March of 2003 for a one-day emergency summit in the Azores to discuss the possibilities of war with Iraq, underlining their joint commitment to the transatlantic relationship, and a shared understanding of the supposed threat posed by Saddam Hussein.

Yet, this current Sócrates–Zapatero relationship feels different. These two leaders seem to genuinely enjoy spending time together, and in the process there seems to be an improved understanding of bilateral issues. At the very least, their close personal relationship seems to be taking the edge off of traditional Portuguese *méfiance* of perceived Castilian arrogance and imperial intentions.

Lisbon also appears to be able to engage Madrid with greater confidence than ever before. Former Portuguese Prime Minister Durão Barroso has

ably served as President to the European Commission since 2004, and this success has certainly helped Portugal gain influence and visibility in greater Europe; perhaps engendering some greater confidence in Lisbon as it deals with its large and powerful neighbor.

There are significant points of foreign policy convergence for Portugal and Spain these days: both countries have been allies in their efforts to direct EU funds to Iberia, they are cooperating in the fight against drug trafficking, and they are providing each other with logistical support to put out forest fires, which are rampant in Iberia during the summers. Further, as each country deals with their looming debt crisis, a cooperative relationship between both heads of state can certainly be an asset.

There remain several policy differences between the two Iberian nations as well, including the unsettled territorial dispute over Olivença and over alleged illegal fishing by the Spanish in Portuguese territorial waters off the Savage Islands. But these are not the flashpoints they might have once been during an acrimonious phase in the bilateral relationship.

International relations are still predicated on the demands of the sovereign state. Although small, Portugal is much more than another Iberian cultural entity: it has a slate of singular national foreign policy interests to deal with, including the transatlantic relationship, the Portuguese diaspora, the community of Portuguese-speaking countries, the on-going well-being of Timor Leste, as well as relations with Spain and Europe.

Before getting too caught up in the Sócrates–Zapatero close personal relationship, and its potential implications for a united Iberian foreign policy, Lisbon would do well to remember two basic facts: first, there is no guarantee that a close personal relationship will continue on with the next round of Iberian leaders; and more importantly, good relations with Spain, while important, represent only one element of a robust, comprehen-



sive national foreign policy agenda for Portugal.

Perhaps there still remain some advantages to standing back-to-back with Spain.

The empiricist metaphysic and Justice for Timor Leste

CLINTON FERNANDES

Senior Lecturer, Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW@ADFA

During the campaign for independence, the Timorese and their supporters were constantly told that the Indonesian occupation was irreversible. For example, Australia's Foreign Minister Gareth Evans informed a Portuguese audience in 1992 that "the Indonesian annexation and acquisition of sovereignty is irreversible – however regrettable it may be..." He said that it was "irreversible so far as the attitude of the Indonesians is concerned" and "irreversible in effect so far as the international community is concerned". Even the Vatican – an organization known for its belief in miraculous events – took the view that "the Indonesian takeover was irreversible both internally and diplomatically".

Those who used the thesis of the irreversibility were not only wrong, but they were weakening international support for independence by their declarations that the independence struggle was a lost cause. Although framed as a neutral analysis of the reality of the international environment, their declarations were in fact a discursive strategy employed to lend analytical legitimacy to an unjust

situation. There was, as Timor Leste's liberation showed, a flaw in their idea that the analyst and the policy-maker were merely analyzing a sequence of events that they were powerless to change. In Ernst Gellner's terms, the flaw has its source in an "empiricist metaphysic" which sought to establish the "autonomy of fact" by proposing a dichotomy between reality and interpretation, and between subject and object. This empiricist metaphysic allowed analysts to pretend that they were merely describing an international system that was imposing its pessimistic reality upon them.

Today, those who persist with this empiricist metaphysic say repeatedly that there will never be justice for the people of Timor Leste. But previous international tribunals have come into existence although analysts dismissed their prospects at first. New York University's Professor of Law, Theodor Meron, once wrote in *Foreign Affairs* magazine that a Yugoslavia tribunal "will not be very effective". Less than a decade later, he was president of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The UN Secretary General identified a prosecutor, who was formally appointed but resigned before beginning work. When the ICTY began, it had no high-profile defendants in custody, no cooperation from regional governments and little assistance from NATO-led troops on the ground. One suspect, Dusko Tadic, was arrested in Munich, and prosecution began before Germany's national courts. Although Tadic was an insignificant personality, the ICTY Prosecutor was desperate for a case to prosecute, so he invoked primacy over German courts and demanded that Tadic be tried at the ICTY. Some years later, however, the ICTY's caseload was so heavy that the Prosecutor was trying to refer cases to national jurisdictions rather than have them dealt with at the ICTY!

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) also ran into serious difficulties at first. The new Rwandan regime – which was then a

non-permanent member of the Security Council – was the only Security Council member to vote against the resolution that established the ICTR. Administrative difficulties and corruption were encountered, and at one point the UN had to fire the two most senior officials of the Tribunal, the Registrar and the Deputy Prosecutor. Even the Rwandan government threatened to block all access of ICTR officials to its territory, a move that would have ended the institution. Yet it did its job, prosecuting many leaders of the 1994 genocide. Indeed some of its jurisprudence has entered the High Court of Australia, the Supreme Court of Canada, and courts in the US and Switzerland.

Today, analysts who advise the Timorese people to move on without justice are contributing to a narrative frame that affects the prospects for justice or injustice. Yet, just like the independence struggle, the prospects for justice are not separable from comments about it because comments can strengthen or weaken international support for the issue. The world of international relations is always an interpreted construct; it requires analysis based on personal and social responsibility. One cannot evade this responsibility by pointing to objectified sources like international reality, the national interest or human nature. Analysts who say there will not be justice are really saying that they will continue to oppose it by their silence – and by their analysis.



Cape Verde's role as a bridge builder: Is there political substance beyond the rhetoric?

PAULO GORJÃO AND PEDRO SEABRA

Researchers, IPRIS

Introduction

Cape Verde is a member of the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank (AfDB), as well as several other multilateral institutions. Moreover, as far as bilateral relations are concerned, Angola, Brazil, China, Cuba, France, Portugal, Russia, Senegal, Spain and the US have diplomatic missions in Cape Verde; and, for its own part, Cape Verde has diplomatic missions in 15 states – all of the above excepting Spain, plus Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Ethiopia. In other words, Cape Verde is becoming an assertive political player, represented in several multilateral institutions, and maintaining bilateral relations with almost all relevant players in the international system, including several Security Council permanent members.

Bearing in mind its profile – an archipelago of ten islands, located off the west coast of Africa, with around 500,000 inhabitants and with 1.557 square miles of land – Cape Verde is clearly aiming to punch above its political and diplomatic weight. Indeed, Cape Verde's President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister – Pedro Pires, José Maria Neves and José Brito, respectively – never miss a chance to emphasize the role that, owing to geographic, historical and political reasons, Cape Verde can fulfill as a privileged bridge builder between Africa, Europe, and South and North America.

Yet, one should question if this true. Is this just rhetoric, or is there some substance in it? Is the role sought on the world stage by Cape Verde an achievable one and, if so, what is the best strategy to attain it? To answer these queries, this article will look at Cape Verde's diplomatic failures and successes regarding the EU, NATO and ECOWAS. It will also pay special attention to economic,

political and diplomatic relations between Cape Verde and Portugal.

Cape Verde and the EU

In the last half-decade, Cape Verde's foreign policy goals regarding the EU have greatly evolved. In May 2005, surprisingly, the Cape Verdean government did not rule out a formal request to join the European Union, as Prime Minister José Maria Neves pointed out.¹ Indeed, like Portugal's Azores and Madeira Islands, and Spain's Canary Islands, Cape Verde belongs to the Macaronesia chain of islands. Thus, if being part of Macaronesia was a criterion for EU membership, Cape Verde should also conceivably be able to accede to the Union.

Moreover, in May 2004, Cyprus became an EU member, despite its location straddling Europe and Asia. Similarly, Turkey is also a Eurasian country, mainly located in Western Asia, but geography will not determine whether or not it one day becomes an EU member.

In other words, geography did not work against Cape Verde's intents of becoming an EU member. The decision, though, was political. Confronted with little enthusiasm in Brussels, as well as among EU member states, Cape Verde soon realized that it had to downsize its aspirations. Thus, Prime Minister José Maria Neves had to give up his plans, and the formal request was never made.

Still, Cape Verde's political and diplomatic efforts continued to be fully oriented towards the European Union. The EU was *primus inter pares*, as far as Cape Verde was concerned. Thus, sometimes Cape Verde did more to reposition itself than was required. For example, in January 2007, Cape Verde announced its desire to loosen its attachment to ECOWAS, even if deeper diplomatic relations with the EU did not demand it.

¹ In May 2005 Prime Minister José Maria Neves admitted that Cape Verde could make a formal request to join the European Union in that same year. See "Cape Verde could seek EU membership this year" (*EUbusiness*, 7 May 2005).

Yet, while Cape Verde wished to join the EU, the EU did not wish to be joined by Cape Verde. A special partnership status was as far as the EU was willing to go. After successful negotiations, Cape Verde and the EU established a special partnership during the Portuguese presidency of the Council of the EU in November 2007.² The special partnership was not a minor agreement. Cape Verde is the only country in the Sub-Saharan Africa with a special partnership with the European Union. For example, South Africa, Nigeria and Angola have – or will have – different agreements, but none of them have a special partnership with the European Union.³

Thus, in the end, although membership was not achieved, Cape Verde was able to secure a unique relationship with the European Union. As it was described above, between 2005 and 2007, Cape Verde's foreign policy towards the EU had to be adjusted. Since then, joining the EU is no longer a goal. In a sense, the special partnership brought Cape Verde as close to the EU than ever before. Yet, at the same time, it became more distant. Fully aware of this, in 2008 Cape Verde's foreign policy needed further adjustments.

Cape Verde and NATO

As happened with the EU, in the mid-2000s Cape Verde also looked to strengthen its relations with NATO, and eventually to become a member.⁴ Under this strategic goal, in June 2006, Cape Verde hosted NATO's military exercise *Steadfast Jaguar*, the organization's first military exercise in Africa. The *Steadfast Jaguar* operation aimed to test NATO's ability to project NATO's Response Force (NRF) at a strategic distance from mainland Europe.

2 See Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira and Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira, "The European Union-Cape Verde Special Partnership: The Role of Portugal" (*Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, Spring 2009): 42-50.

3 Since 2008, South Africa and the EU maintain annual summits of heads of state and government. In June 2009, Nigeria and the EU adopted a strategy to enhance their relations – the "Joint Way Forward" (JWF) – under the Africa-EU strategic partnership launched in Lisbon in December 2007. A similar JWF strategy is currently under negotiation between the EU and Angola. The negotiations began under the Swedish presidency of the Council of the EU, in the second semester of 2009, mostly due to Portuguese diplomatic backstage work.

4 See Diogo Freitas do Amaral, *Quinze Meses no Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros* (Lisbon: Almedina, 2006): 58-59. A month before NATO's *Steadfast Jaguar*, the Portuguese Foreign Minister Diogo Freitas do Amaral said that Cape Verde was "interested in joining both NATO and the European Union" (*Reuters*, 19 May 2006).

Cape Verde saw in this NATO military exercise a unique opportunity not only to promote its diplomatic approach towards NATO, but also to emphasize its credentials as a strategic bridge between Africa, Europe and the Americas. Following *Steadfast Jaguar* and giving political continuity to Cape Verde's diplomatic strategy, in May 2007, Cape Verde's Foreign Minister Victor Borges visited NATO headquarters in Brussels and met NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer.

However, Cape Verde's goal of joining NATO, or at least to strengthen relations, was coldly received in Brussels, as well as among NATO member states. Unlike what transpired with the EU, NATO did not provide an alternative to full membership. In fact, NATO membership was no more than Cape Verdean wishful thinking. Moreover,

contrary to what happened with the EU, in this case Portugal was unable to lobby in favor of Cape Verde.

Thus, between 2005 and 2007, Cape Verde became fully aware of the limits of its *European Strategy*. Since both the EU and NATO were beyond Cape Verde's reach, alternatives should be sought elsewhere.

Cape Verde and ECOWAS

In June 2008, Cape Verde's new foreign policy equilibrium was sealed with the government's reshuffle. In the Foreign Ministry, José Brito replaced Victor Borges, and a new *African Strategy* was set in motion. In a sense, the Foreign Minister's personal preferences did not matter. The fact is that he was

compelled to adjust Cape Verde's foreign policy, since the previous path had fallen apart, and whatever was possible to achieve regarding the EU and NATO had been done by then. Thus, with the previous diplomatic path exhausted, José Brito had to find an alternative and to make the necessary adjustments. As a consequence, the days when Cape Verde wanted to loosen its attachment to ECOWAS were gone. Now Cape Verde wanted to be once again an active member of ECOWAS. Indeed, this renewed commitment – together with Cape Verde's increasing prestige within West Africa – explains the reason why the next ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State and Government will take place in July in Cape Verde, as well as the first ECOWAS-Brazil Summit. Equally important, under the new African Strategy, at this stage Cape Verde wants a seat as Vice President in the ECOWAS Commission, a goal unthinkable between 2005 and 2008.

Although membership was not achieved, Cape Verde was able to secure a unique relationship with the European Union. In a sense, the special partnership brought Cape Verde as close to the EU than ever before. Yet, at the same time, it became more distant.

In fact, the more relevant Cape Verde becomes within ECOWAS, the more it will increase its bargaining capacity. Indeed, Cape Verde could become a strategic partner between the EU – as well as between the CPLP – and ECOWAS, thus helping to pave the way for deeper bilateral and multilateral relations between them. In other words, the more relevant Cape Verde is within ECOWAS, the more interesting it becomes as a partner from the point of view of Brussels, Lisbon, Washington, and other governments.

In short, Cape Verde's upgrade within ECOWAS reinforces its credentials as a bridge between Africa, Europe, and South and North America. Indeed, Cape Verde can be the main player within ECOWAS, leading West Africa's diplomatic approach towards Brazil and South America. In turn, Brazil could work the other way around. The diplomatic, political and economic interest of Brazil in Africa under President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva has been quite clear since he took office as President in 2003.⁵

The same is true regarding Portugal and the EU, with whom Cape Verde can be a mediating agent regarding ECOWAS and West Africa. Instead of putting all its eggs in the same basket, i.e. in the relations with the EU, Cape Verde today is paying much more attention to ECOWAS and to its regional integration. The result is a more balanced foreign policy, allowing it to better fulfill the role of bridge builder between Africa, Europe, and South and North America. By rebalancing its foreign policy in the last few years, Cape Verde became a more relevant player.

Cape Verde and Portugal

Portugal is the most important partner of Cape Verde, both from economic and political points of view. And Portugal, too, attributes to Cape Verde a surprising relevance. It should be noted that Portuguese exports to Cape Verde are higher than to each one of the Maghreb countries – Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, and Tunisia – all of them now a priority in Lisbon's foreign policy. Among the Portuguese-speaking countries, only Angola

⁵ The list of examples confirming it is endless. To name just a few: in April took place the fourth IBSA – India, Brazil and South Africa – Summit of Heads of State and Government in Brasília. As it was mentioned earlier, Brazil will have the first summit with the ECOWAS in earlier July in Cape Verde's Sal Island. Also in July Brazil will be represented at the highest level in the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) Summit of Heads of State and Government that will take place in Luanda. Moreover, at bilateral level, unlike his predecessors, Lula da Silva made several official visits to African states in the last few years.

and Brazil surpass Cape Verde as an export destination. Unexpectedly, Cape Verde is even ahead of Mozambique. Moreover, although exports to Brazil are higher than to Cape Verde, the fact is that they are not that much higher. Last but not least, Portugal exports less to Russia, India and China – three BRIC members – than to Cape Verde. Thus, in the context of Cape Verde's small size and GDP, it is quite surprising to find it as Portugal's 15th largest export destination, well ahead of the countries above. Furthermore, there is potential for additional growth in Portuguese exports to Cape Verde, thus guaranteeing further relevance and continued political attention.

Still, despite the importance of the exports to Cape Verde in the overall Portuguese ranking, the most relevant issue from the point of view of Lisbon's diplomacy is the political relationship between both countries. Cape Verde regards Portugal as a useful ally within the EU, while Portugal sees in Cape Verde a relevant and useful ally,

Cape Verde regards Portugal as a useful ally within the EU, while Portugal sees in Cape Verde a relevant and useful ally, not only within CPLP, but also regarding the ECOWAS and West Africa.

not only within CPLP, but also regarding the ECOWAS and West Africa. In other words, Lisbon admits that Cape Verde could fulfill the potential role of intercontinental bridge builder.

Consequently, the deepening of their bilateral relations was just a matter of time, and in fact it did not take long. On 9 June 2010, Cape Verde and Portugal held in Lisbon their first high-level bilateral summit.

From now on, summits between both countries will take place every two years on a rotating basis.⁶ The first Portugal–Cape Verde Summit provided the opportunity to sign several agreements between the two countries, namely in the fields of energy, economy, defense, culture and science. However, the most relevant agreement was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, replacing the previous one signed in 1975. It was a "historic summit", according to Cape Verdean Prime Minister José Maria Neves. It marked "one before and one after" the Summit, in the words of Portuguese Prime Minister, José Sócrates. Indeed, the upgrade in the political bilateral relationship was quite obvious, showing that both countries see additional advantages in upgrading their relationship, since it will allow them to further explore their cultural, economic and political interactions.

⁶ Portugal and Mozambique are also negotiating the institutionalization of similar high-level annual summits. The first one could take place in 2011.

Portuguese Exports

| | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 |
|-----------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Spain | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Germany | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| France | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Angola | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 8 | 6 | 4 | 4 |
| United Kingdom | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 5 | 5 |
| US | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 8 |
| Brazil | 15 | 23 | 19 | 17 | 14 | 17 | 13 | 11 |
| Cape Verde | 17 | 21 | 21 | 21 | 19 | 18 | 18 | 15 |
| China | 28 | 17 | 26 | 20 | 18 | 24 | 27 | 16 |
| Morocco | 23 | 22 | 20 | 24 | 22 | 21 | 17 | 17 |
| Algeria | 38 | 39 | 41 | 40 | 36 | 37 | 28 | 21 |
| Mozambique | 35 | 33 | 34 | 36 | 35 | 35 | 35 | 27 |
| Tunisia | 39 | 37 | 36 | 41 | 40 | 39 | 39 | 28 |
| Russia | 40 | 40 | 38 | 33 | 30 | 27 | 25 | 31 |
| India | 55 | 52 | 55 | 50 | 48 | 52 | 48 | 48 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 42 | 45 | 51 | 54 | 49 | 51 | 54 | 51 |
| Libya | 88 | 103 | 67 | 77 | 95 | 79 | 68 | 52 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 51 | 54 | 57 | 51 | 51 | 50 | 51 | 53 |
| Mauritania | 102 | 102 | 103 | 116 | 76 | 96 | 90 | 74 |
| Timor Leste | 130 | 82 | 122 | 121 | 110 | 132 | 123 | 81 |

Source: AICEP/INE

Conclusion

In 2009, Cape Verde ranked 2nd out of 53 African states in the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and was ranked 46th out of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index, making it the third-best performer in Africa. Moreover, since 2007, the UN ranks Cape Verde as a developing country, leaving behind the status of least developed country – this was only the second time that the UN has done so.

Other states with a similar profile, in Africa and elsewhere, should look to Cape Verde's success story, both regarding its democratic regime, and its foreign policy. Indeed, from the point of view of the international community, Cape Verde is a success story that should be emphasized and pointed out as an example in Africa. Moreover, Cape Verde's success story as a democratic regime fully consolidated, as well as its good governance credentials bring with them deserved rewards. As far as Portugal is concerned, Cape Verde will receive a total of €70 million, between 2008 and 2011, channeled through the Indicative Cooperation Program (PIC) of the Portuguese Institute for Development Assistance (IPAD). Moreover, Cape Verde will also receive €51 million, between 2008 and 2013, from the EU under the European Development Fund (EDF). Last but not the least, the US will continue to support Cape Verde through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Cape Verde was eligible to receive \$110 million from the MCC during five years, and in December 2009 was the first MCC partner country to be selected as eligible for a second Millennium Challenge Account (MCA).

In turn, Cape Verde's democratic regime, together with its good governance credentials, reinforce their foreign policy credibility, thus creating opportunities that otherwise

would not come up. In August 2009, US Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton visited Cape Verde – a visit that probably would not have taken place if Cape Verde was an authoritarian regime, or if it had poor governance credentials – and praised it as “a model of democracy and economic progress in Africa”.⁷ Marianne M. Myles, the US Ambassador to Cape Verde, followed the same line, emphasizing that “Cape Verde enjoys a stable democratic system, high transparency, and low corruption”.⁸ Indeed, from the point of view of the US, Cape Verde is a success story that should be emphasized and pointed out as an example in Africa.

The fact that Cape Verde is a consolidated democracy, as well as its good governance credentials, create foreign policy opportunities that the government exploits in a skillful way. Domestic stability reinforces foreign policy credibility and, in turn, foreign policy results contribute to domestic stability. The overall result is a virtuous cycle allowing Cape Verde to claim the role of bridge builder. Thus, although Cape Verde might not be an indispensable bridge builder, nevertheless it is certainly a player valued by ECOWAS, the EU, and the United States, and is seen as a valid and useful interlocutor between them. The decision to rebalance Cape Verde's foreign policy was the correct strategy to promote its role as a bridge builder, allowing it to fulfill many of its ambitions of greater international economic, political and diplomatic relevance.

⁷ Jeffrey Gettleman, “Clinton Ends Africa Tour, Vowing to Stay Involved” (*New York Times*, 14 August 2009).

⁸ Marianne M. Myles, “Travel Diary: Cape Verde Prepares for Secretary Clinton” (*DipNote*, 13 August 2009).



Timeline of Events

Angola

4 June (Luanda):

US Ambassador Dan Mozena gave an interview to the newspaper *Novo Jornal* on the eve of his departure. Mozena considered that the relations between the two countries vastly improved since his arrival in 2008, and deemed Angola's future to be bright, prosperous and strong.

5 June (Luanda):

The independent newspapers – *Semanário Angolense*, *Novo Jornal* and *A Capital* – were acquired by an unknown media investment group. Journalist and human rights activist Rafael Marques de Morais stated that political motivations were behind this move.

6 June (Luanda):

Brazilian ambassador Afonso Cardoso said that his country's investments in Angola will amount to US\$4 billion this year – a figure already reached in 2008 – and will grow further in the future.

10 June (Washington):

President Barack Obama presented Christopher J. McMullen to the Senate as his choice for the new US ambassador to Angola. McMullen is a career diplomat and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

11 June (Cabinda):

André Zeferino Puaty, one of the human rights activists who were arrested following the attack on the Togo football team bus last January, was sentenced to three years in prison for crimes against the state. Former vice-governor of Cabinda Martinho Nombo denounced this first trial as "a sham".

11-13 June (Johannesburg-Pretoria):

President José Eduardo dos Santos traveled to South Africa to observe the Football World Cup opening game. During his stay political affairs were also part of the agenda, as dos Santos took part in two tripartite meetings: one with his South African and Mozambican counterparts, another with his South African and Congo-Brazzaville peers. José Eduardo dos Santos also discussed with South African President Jacob Zuma the security situation in Southern Africa within the SADC framework.

15 June (Paris):

UNICEF announced that Angola has made considerable improvements on five of the eight Millennium Development Goals.

16 June (Washington):

In its Regional Economic Outlook for Southern Africa, the IMF confirmed its 7.1% and 8.3% economic growth predictions for Angola for 2010 and 2011, respectively.

20-22 June (Accra):

President José Eduardo dos Santos visited Ghana for the first time in an official visit. He held talks with his counterpart, John Evans Atta Mills, which were intended to reinforce existing relations, already termed as excellent. Two cooperation accords were signed to facilitate permanent consultation in various fields.

22 June (New York):

Human Rights Watch (HRW) called for the suspension of the Cabinda trials. HRW labels them as politically motivated. The trials are supposedly related to the January attacks on the Togo football national team in the oil-rich enclave, but links between those accused and the events are tenuous.

22-24 June (Brasília):

President José Eduardo dos Santos traveled to Brazil. Following bilateral meetings, José Eduardo dos Santos and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva signed a financial cooperation accord and a strategic partnership. Altogether, Angola may be able to gather up to US\$1 billion in Brazilian development funds. Moreover, José Eduardo dos Santos publicly supported Brazil's ambition for a permanent Security Council seat.

29-30 June (Kinshasa):

Angolan Vice President, Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos, led an official delegation, which included Foreign Affairs Minister Assunção dos Anjos, Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem, and Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces Francisco Pereira Furtado, to the celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the Democratic Republic of Congo's independence.

Brazil

4 June (Brasília):

Brazilian state-run oil company Petrobrás announced that it found as much as 380 million barrels of oil equivalent in a deep-water well in the offshore Campos Basin area at a depth of 4,460 meters.

9 June (New York):

Through its UN Permanent Representative, Maria Luiza Viotti, Brazil voted against UN Security Council Resolution 1929, regarding new sanctions on the Iranian regime.

12 June (Salvador):

Former Governor José Serra formally became the presidential candidate of PSDB.

13 June (Brasília):

Dilma Rousseff, former chief of staff of President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, officially became the presidential candidate of PT.

14-15 June (Geneva):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the 99th International Labour Conference. Macroeconomic policies and the Millennium Development Goals were high on the agenda. Amorim also presided over the Conference on Disarmament, intending to revive the aging multilateral forum, and met with WTO Director General Pascal Lamy.

16 June (Manaus):

President Lula da Silva met with his Peruvian counterpart Alan Garcia to discuss bilateral issues, such as the Energy Integration Agreement and the political situation in South America, including the Honduran case.

16-17 June (Tallinn):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Prime Minister Andrus Ansip and his local counterpart Urmas Paet in order to boost bilateral economic ties as well as political consultations between Estonia and Brazil.

18 June (Warsaw):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Vice Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak, Defense Minister, Bogdan Klich and Senate President, Bogdan Borusewicz, during the celebrations of the 90th anniversary of Brazilian-Polish bilateral relations.

19 June (Sarajevo):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his Bosnian counterpart Sven Alkalaj in order to assess trade and bilateral cooperation as well as international security issues, since both countries currently hold non-permanent seats in the UN Security Council. Amorim also took the opportunity to meet with rotating Presidents Haris Silajdzic, Zeljko Komsic and Nebojsa Radmanovic.

**20 June (Belgrade):**

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his Serbian counterpart, Vuk Jeremic, discussing agriculture, energy and trade issues. Amorim also later met with Serbian President Boris Tadic.

21 June (Vienna):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with President Heinz Fischer, Prime Minister Werner Faymann and his Austrian counterpart, Michael Spindelegger. Finding ways to enhance bilateral relations was part of the agenda.

22 June (Bucharest):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his Romanian counterpart Teodor Baconschi. Trade, energy and technological cooperation were discussed.

23-24 June (Brasília):

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos – accompanied by his Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos and Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem, among other officials – met with his counterpart Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva, seeking to boost bilateral relations. A strategic partnership was among the agreements signed by the respective authorities.

25-27 June (Toronto):

Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega represented President Lula da Silva in the G20 Summit, where the international economic crisis was discussed, seeking to find a balance between a fragile economic recovery while also cutting massive government debt levels. Pressing security affairs like North Korea and Iran were also addressed.

28-29 June (São Paulo):

Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi met with President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, in order to boost Italian investments in the country. Berlusconi, accompanied by a delegation of 60 businessmen also participated in an economic seminar.

30 June (Brasília):

Argentine Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman met with his Brazilian counterpart, Celso Amorim, with bilateral trade, Mercosur, Unasur and Haiti high on the agenda.

30 June (Brasília):

Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad met with his counterpart, Lula da Silva, and with the presidents of the Federal Senate and of the Chamber of Deputies, in order to boost bilateral relations. Health, judicial cooperation, education and the political situation on the Middle East were high on the agenda.

Cape Verde

8-13 June (Lisbon):

Cape Verde's Prime Minister, José Maria Neves, attended the inaugural Cape Verde-Portugal Summit. Several agreements between the two countries were signed, including the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Neves took the opportunity to meet with several dignitaries, including his counterpart José Sócrates, President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, and Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama.

16-17 June (Praia):

President Pedro Pires met with his Equatorial Guinea counterpart, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, seeking to strengthen cooperation between the two countries on air transport, telecommunications, information and communication technology and tourism. Cape Verde's support for Equatorial Guinea's CPLP membership and AU chairmanship in 2011-2012 were also discussed.

28 June (Praia):

Brazilian ambassador Maria Dulce Barros announced that Brazil is to sign an agreement with Cape Verde canceling the country's US\$3.5 million debt during President Lula da Silva's upcoming visit.

30 June (Praia):

Cape Verde, through its Foreign Minister, Carlos Brito, hosted the ECOWAS Ministers Council, where the organization's structures were discussed along with the political situations in Guinea-Bissau and Guinea-Conakry, seeking to lay the ground for the upcoming regional 38th meeting of Heads of State and Government.

Guinea-Bissau

3 June (Bissau):

ECOWAS' six-day fact-finding mission concerning the coup of April 1st came to an end. The report elaborated by the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff from Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia and Togo, based on meetings with major local officials and players, will be released by the end of the year.

4 June (Bissau):

Colonel Antero João Correia was designated as director of the Military Intelligence Service, thus replacing Colonel Samba Djaló who remains under custody since the coup of April 1st. Previously, Correia was arrested in June 2009 for his supposed involvement in an alleged coup attempt.

4 June (Dakar):

Drug trafficking returned to the spotlight with updated information released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime West Africa Bureau. While the mainland coastal areas of Guinea-Bissau have been somewhat cleared of trafficking

after international interest, the Bijagós archipelago witnessed increased trafficking activity.

6 June (Paris):

Following his participation in the 25th France-Africa Summit, President Malam Bacai Sanhá met with Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior. President of Cape Verde Pedro Pires, and the French Foreign Office mediated this meeting. Carlos Gomes Júnior has not yet returned to Guinea-Bissau since the April 1st coup, and his absence was read as a sign of political fragility.

8 June (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior came under intense pressure following the inconclusive meeting in Paris. President Malam Bacai Sanhá failed to show clear support for the Prime Minister. The ruling PAIGC felt the need to publicly praise Carlos Gomes Júnior – its own leader – but this seemed somehow hollow and ill-timed.

9 June (Bissau):

All investigations of Bubo Na Tchuto's involvement in a 2008 alleged coup attempt have been definitively dropped by the Military Supreme Court.

14 June (Bissau):

After over a month of absence, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior returned to Guinea-Bissau.

15 June (Bissau):

Upon his return to Bissau, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated he would not resign. This statement was delivered after a meeting with António Indjai, one of the April 1st coup leaders. Indjai reassured that no problems existed between them and that they would work together. Even so, Carlos Gomes Júnior was placed under police protection.

16 June (Lisbon):

Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado, argued, in a Parliamentary speech, that the international community has not abandoned Guinea-Bissau and that it keeps monitoring the situation on the ground.

18 June (Bissau):

An IMF mission arrived in Bissau to discuss with the government reforms of the public and military sector, as well as improvements for private investment, policies which could lead to the canceling of its US\$1.5 billion debt.

23 June (Bissau):

The political scene in Bissau was agitated by Carlos Gomes Júnior's return. The nomination of a new Armed Forces Chief of Staff and a governmental reshuffle were pointed out as two factors that would decide the Prime Minister's future power position.

24 June (Bissau):

International pressure rose to push Bissau-Guinean authorities to commit to the agreed



reform processes in a period perceived as crucial for the local power balance. Joseph Mutaboba, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, urged the country's leaders to maintain engagement with the Security Sector Reform.

24 June (Bissau):

Amine Saad, Guinea-Bissau's Attorney General, received a US Justice Department delegation aiming to provide closer support to the investigations on the assassinations of João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira, Gen. Tagme Na Waié, Hélder Proença and Baciro Dabó.

24 June (Dakar):

The US embassy in Dakar issued a strong statement indicating that the US would not be able to assist Bissau-Guinean authorities if those involved in drug trafficking would remain in public positions or if any of those involved in the April 1st coup attempt – a reference to António Indjai – would be named for public office.

25 June (Bissau):

Ending months of uncertainty but reaffirming the status quo, President Malam Bacai Sanhá, with the government's agreement, named Major-Gen. António Indjai, one of the April 1st coup leaders, as new Armed Forces Chief of Staff. The former mutineer thus replaces Gen. José Zamora Induta, whom he arrested and still remains under custody.

25 June (Bissau):

The Council of Ministers, headed by Carlos Gomes Júnior, recommended the liberation of Gen. José Zamora Induta, stating that such a gesture would promote internal reconciliation and generate confidence in the international community.

26 June (Bissau):

The international community's reaction to António Indjai's nomination was swift. Portugal, the EU and the US were irritated by the announcement, which affronts their recommendations and rewards a coup leader, while neighboring countries recognized the move as corresponding to the situation on the ground.

29 June (Bissau):

General António Indjai was officially inaugurated as the new Armed Forces Chief of Staff, despite the international community's vocal discontent. While no Western representative attended the inauguration ceremony, former navy chief José Americo Bubo Na Tchuto – named by the United States as a drug kingpin – was present.

29 June (Dakar):

The US embassy in Senegal released a statement saying that, as a result of António Indjai's appointment, the United States would "not support the security sector reform process" in the country and classifying Indjai as "unfit to lead the country's Armed Forces" due to his "acts of insubordination, indiscipline and mutiny".

Mozambique

1 June (Nice):

President Armando Guebuza denied that members of al-Qaeda – and training camps – were present in Mozambique.

11 June (Maputo):

According to the Finnish ambassador to Mozambique, both countries will cooperate in the area of science, technology and innovation under terms of a program to be implemented over the next five years and budgeted at €22 million.

12 June (Pretoria):

President Armando Guebuza attended an extraordinary SADC summit, alongside his counterparts from Angola, Congo-Brazzaville and South Africa, respectively José Eduardo dos Santos, Dennis Sassou-Nguesso and Jacob Zuma. The current political situation in throughout Southern Africa was high on the agenda.

13 June (Maputo):

Brazilian Camargo Corrêa reached an agreement to buy a 51% stake in Mozambican cement company Cimentos de Nacala (Cinac).

16 June (Maputo):

Finnish ambassador Kari Alanko, outgoing chairperson of the G19 donor group, announced that Mozambique's Program Support Partners are to contribute US\$675 million to the country's state budget (US\$412 million) and to sector programs (US\$263 million) in 2011. Germany, Denmark and Portugal are awaiting authorization from their respective governments or parliaments to announce their positions, whilst Switzerland, Sweden and the World Bank have reduced their contributions, apparently because they are not satisfied with performance in some areas of governance.

16-20 June (Beijing):

Prime Minister Aires Ali, accompanied by several cabinet members – including Finance Minister, Manuel Chang – visited China to negotiate financing of US\$2 billion for 26 priority projects. Aires Ali also met with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao and signed several agreements to increase bilateral cooperation in energy, mine exploration and agriculture fields.

21 June (Maputo):

The director of the German development bank (KfW) in Mozambique, Ralf Orlik, and the governor of the Bank of Mozambique, Ernesto Gove, signed a financing contract, through which Germany will hand over €18 million to Mozambique, in direct budgetary aid, under the terms of the previous commitment made by the 19 program support partners.

Portugal

1-2 June (Rabat):

Prime Minister José Sócrates participated in the 11th Portugal-Morocco Summit and met with his counterpart, Abbas El Fassi. The deepening of bilateral relations, including several economic opportunities, was high on the agenda. Sócrates also later met with King Mohammed VI, while Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his counterpart, Taib Fassi Fihri.

2 June (Sarajevo):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the High Level EU-Western Balkans meeting organized by the Spanish EU presidency to reaffirm the EU's commitment to the region.

3 June (Brussels):

Interior Minister Rui Pereira attended the EU Justice and Internal Affairs Council, where European internal security, the fight against terrorism and cooperation with the US were discussed.

4 June (Lisbon):

Congolese Foreign Minister Basil Ikouébé met with his Portuguese counterpart, Luís Amado. The reinforcement of political and economical ties, the relevance of the Portuguese language in the African country, EU-Congo relations and the development of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) were high on the agenda.

8 June (Dushanbe):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho met with Tajikistani President Emomali Rakhmonov and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hamrokhon Zarifi.

9 June (Lisbon):

Prime Minister José Sócrates, Foreign Minister Luís Amado and Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva met with Cape Verdean Prime Minister Pedro Pires under the auspices of the inaugural Portugal-Cape Verde Summit. Besides the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, several other agreements were signed in the energy, economy, defense, culture and science areas.

10-11 June (Brussels):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the Formal Meeting of NATO's Defense Ministers. The restructuring of NATO commands and the upcoming new Strategic Concept were high on the agenda.

12 June (Lisbon-Madrid):

Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Zapatero attended the ceremonies of the 25th anniversary of the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EU, alongside his counterpart José Sócrates, President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão



Barroso and former Prime Ministers Felipe González and Mário Soares.

14 June (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), as well as the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Meeting. The current situation in Gaza was the main topic.

15 June (Lisbon):

Mauritanian Foreign Minister Naha Mint Mouknass met with Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado. Bilateral political, economic and cultural ties, as well as EU-Mauritania relations, the situation in the Maghreb and the Middle East's Peace Process were high on the agenda.

17 June (Brussels):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the European Council. The need for a European economic government in light of the ongoing international crisis was high on the agenda.

18-22 June (Lisbon):

Fernando Chui Sai On, Chief Executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region, visited Portugal, seeking to boost economic and political ties. He held meetings with Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates, and Foreign Minister Luís Amado.

21-22 June (Lisbon):

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Timor Leste Ameerah Haq, met with several Portuguese officials, including Home Affairs Minister Rui Pereira, Foreign Minister Luís Amado, and President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, in order to discuss Portugal's participation in Timor Leste's development.

21-22 June (Lisbon):

German Foreign Minister Werner Hoyer met with his counterpart, Luís Amado, and with Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourenço to address the stabilization of the Euro Zone and the developments of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

25 June (Maputo):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the 35th anniversary ceremonies of Mozambique's independence. Amado also took the opportunity to meet with President Armando Guebuza.

27 June (Kabul):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva, alongside the Head of the Armed Forces General Staff, General Valença Pinto, visited the Portuguese contingent in Afghanistan and underlined the need for local good governance. As of October, the Portuguese mission will consist mostly of training local Afghan forces.

São Tomé and Príncipe

17 June (São Tomé):

Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Minister Carlos Tavares and the EU's ambassador, Thierry Mathisse, signed a convention through which the European Union grants more than €17 million to São Tomé and Príncipe to finance projects in the transport and business sectors in the next three years.

20 June (São Tomé):

According to the head of the African Development Bank's economic sector, I. Koussoubé, the AfDB will grant São Tomé and Príncipe

US\$11 million in support for the 2010-2011 period. The first amount of US\$3.7 million is meant to fund the program for capacity building in the planning and finance sector and to pay for production of the second Poverty Reduction Strategy document. The second financial package of US\$7.4 million will be used to finance a food security project and to restore production support infrastructures in the agriculture sector.

Timor Leste

1 June (Díli):

Timor Leste's government reaffirmed that an onshore-liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in the country was the only way forward to develop gas from the Greater Sunrise field, in opposition with the Woodside consortium's intentions to build a floating LNG platform.

21-28 June (Sydney):

President José Ramos Horta met with Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Governor General Quentin Bryce, to assess bilateral relations and the ongoing presence of Australian troops in Timor Leste. Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa, traveling in the presidential entourage, also met with his counterpart Stephen Smith.

28-30 June (Manila):

President José Ramos Horta attended the inauguration of newly elected Filipino President Benigno Aquino III, alongside other 16 foreign authorities and representatives.

EDITOR | Paulo Gorjão

ASSISTANT EDITORS | Pedro Seabra • Kai Thaler

DESIGN | Atelier Teresa Cardoso Bastos PRINTING | Europress

Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)
Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa
PORTUGAL

<http://www.ipris.org>
email: ipris@ipris.org

IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin is a publication of IPRIS.

The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of IPRIS.