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CPLP and the politics of language

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The VIII Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) hosted this July in Angola, failed yet again to reach tangible, concrete results. The CPLP is an international organization of countries who share a common language, Portuguese. Sharing a language underpins a common tie, an intense historical background, a sense of natural courtesy and interest. However, language is indubitably not enough if the CPLP, and especially Portugal, desire to keep this relationship special and sustain the advantages it entails.

An international organization whose members attempt to cooperate in different spheres but is solely underpinned by a common language will not thrive in the future. Other similar institutions like the Commonwealth of Nations, although created around a common language, have broadened their area of responsibility by including free trade and environmental issues into their framework of action.

Nonetheless, as the CPLP remains focused on a language-only association, the benefits of this organization will soon start to wane, as some of its members continue to grow – especially Angola and Brazil.

Brazil has long been focused on itself, on enhancing its position in the world, and consequently is not worried about cooperation with other Lusophone countries. Angola is also becoming less interested in doing so, especially when countries outside the CPLP continue to nurture its economic development with immense quantities of foreign investment. As for Portugal, had it invested as much in the CPLP as it did in the EU and NATO, its presence in world affairs would be much more active and important than what it is today.

Nevertheless, Portugal has one of the very last chances to deepen cooperation with its CPLP partners. Despite having lost substantial influence, mainly due to its association with the EU, Portugal is still by far the most developed country in the entire Lusophone organization. Its systems of health, education, communication, sports, media, technology, education and culture must be allowed to participate directly if the CPLP is to thrive in the coming future.

Portugal must propose the creation of a committee to coordinate and promote cooperation and exchange at the grassroots level between the civil societies of each CPLP member. By allowing a bottom-up approach in-

stead of their current painfully slow, bureaucratic, top-only approach producing meager results, governments would have fewer responsibilities in the process of integration while the benefits for each civil society would be enormous. Organizing quarterly meetings of ministers, municipalities, NGOs, national companies and small business should be the key priority for the coming years, now with Angola leading in the CPLP.

Although small in size and impact, there have already been such initiatives in the past. Most recently, the Portuguese Hospital of the University of Coimbra has made deals to help assist the Angolan Hospital of Lubango in fighting rare diseases, an effort largely implemented by First-Lady Maria Cavaco Silva. Hence the political stratum shows it is already aware of the possibilities of city-to-city partnership and assistance.

Yet promoting civil society exchanges requires certain policies which are crucial for successful interaction. Specific conditions for business must be met, ideally based on EU standards, such as denouncing corruption and reviewing tariffs on trade of goods and services. Moreover, visa facilitation is the one instrument all members must agree on, as it not only facilitates business but also promotes cultural awareness. Another point of interest would be to have privileged student exchange programs, targeting all areas of higher education.



Hence, the only option available to keep the CPLP breathing is to promote exchange and collaboration between different societies. This would give an entirely new meaning to the word Lusophone and to the balance between language and foreign policy. Shifting from this language-centric stance towards economic, business, political and social collaboration and participation, with civil society at the center, is the empowerment Portuguese language and the CPLP need to create a comfortable, win-win situation to all of its members. Failing to do so will result in the drifting away and loss of interest of its most promising members.

Portugal has much to lose if it does not play its cards right. Whatever preference CPLP members might have for working together is waning due to lack of attention and interest, big foreign investment and a larger capacity for economic intervention by other countries. The creation of a legally binding committee of interaction between peoples is the only option to lift the CPLP from the quagmire it is sinking into. Portugal, as a historical leader and western country, must propose a substantial resurrection by firstly understanding that language alone is not enough to bind peoples in years to come.

Brazil: The need for trade reform

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President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva has presided over an era of impressive advances in Brazil. As a general illustration: GDP growth averaged over 4% from 2005 to 2008, compared to just under 2% from 2001 to 2004; meanwhile, more than twenty million people emerged from poverty between 2003 and 2008. More specific examples abound.

Even during the global financial crisis, Brazil's economy was irrepresible. Among the BRIC, only Brazil's stock exchange experienced a milder decline than the S&P 500. Not only was Brazil the first Latin American country to exit recession last year, but according to a report recently published by the World Bank, its growth in 2010 is expected to be a "particularly robust" 6.4%, well ahead of the Central Bank's forecast of 5% just a few months ago.

What then, could be wrong? Brazil's growth appears assured for the next few years, largely thanks to ongoing Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities. But Lula da Silva, for all his policy successes, has failed to craft an effective trade policy for Brazil.

Coming in to office in 2003, Lula da Silva inherited an economy poised for growth, in part because of the dramatic reduction in tariffs enacted during the 1990s. He soon oversaw a foreign policy of "autonomy through diversification". Unlike other nations that sought to develop by tethering themselves – economically and politically – to the United States or EU, Brazil would avoid excessive reliance on one or two foreign partners. Brazil curried ties with a medley of African, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations. The strategy has worked wonders for Brazil's "soft power," helping it become a powerful voice in the dialogue between developed and developing nations.

But it has been less of a winner in securing Brazil's economic future. In ferreting out new partners, Brazil passed up an opportunity to deepen trade bonds with its neighbors, and other major trade partners. "Autonomy through diversification" came to be equated with shunning bilateral trade deals with the United States and EU. And in an indication of what *The Economist* recently dubbed Lula da Silva's "soft spot for leftist strongmen", President Lula da Silva backed Venezuela's full membership into Mercosur in 2005. Absent a strong commitment by Brazil, Hugo Chávez quickly tried to recast Mercosur as one of his anti-American pet proj-

ects, turning defunct what was for a time the world's third-largest trade bloc. Now Brazil lacks for membership in significant trade agreements. A study by the Inter-American Development Bank notes that Brazil is "far less equipped" than countries such as Mexico and Canada to capitalize on the "global value chains" that free trade agreements deliver, and which the bank identifies as a key determinant of stable growth for countries in the years ahead.

Chiding rich nations, especially the United States, to "stop the hypocrisy" regarding free trade won President Lula da Silva tremendous support over the years, both within Brazil and throughout the developing world. When it comes to agricultural products in particular, Washington has a habit of not practicing what it preaches by insisting on subsidies to cotton farmers that prevent Brazilian cotton from being competitive in the United States, high tariffs on Brazilian ethanol, orange juice, and other goods. But America is not the only one going out of its way to protect domestic industry – Brazil is also guilty.

On average Brazil's tariffs stagnated over the last decade, whereas most nations reduced theirs. As a result, Brazil's average tariff rates are among the highest of any nation in the Western Hemisphere. Brazil's tariff rates have not just marked time, but in some cases they have gone up. For example, tariffs on shoes and clothes were allowed to creep up during Lula da Silva's first term, reaching 35% in 2007. The real problem with this is not that Brazil's neighbors have lower tariffs, it is that high tariffs nurture low worker productivity, which spells a loss of Brazilian competitiveness to East Asian manufacturers in the long-term.

Though it can be hard for politicians to tinker with an economy that is not evidently broke, Lula da Silva's successor will need to address trade reform. Policymakers should impress that Brazil's recent fortunes owe to a generally permissive global economy. Things may not always be so easy. Tackling trade



reform will help to lock in and optimize the benefits of free trade that Brazil has enjoyed over much of the last decade.

Mozambique: Can Indian investments promote growth for both countries?

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As the balance of world power shifts eastward, most international attention has focused on the rise of China as a diplomatic, economic, and, potentially, military counterbalance to the traditional powers of Europe and the United States. However, India, China's partner among the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) group of countries has its own grand ambitions for the expansion of influence and exploitation of resources, leading it to a similar strategy of seeking development opportunities in Africa. In early July, Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna, accompanied by 26 businessmen, made his first visit to Africa since taking office over a year ago, visiting Mauritius and Mozambique to discuss trade relations and geostrategic concerns. Krishna's trip marked the first bilateral visit to Maputo by an Indian foreign minister in many decades, and was highlighted by meetings with President Armando Guebuza and Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi. India has been growing into a steadily more important trading partner for Mozambique, now registering among the top five by value. India also invested over US\$500 million in Mozambique in 2009, and according to Ma-

homed Rafique, director general of the Center for Investment Promotion (CPI) in Maputo, Indian investments may soon top US\$1 billion. While this estimate may be overly optimistic, the Indian government and Indian businesses are eager to forge stronger ties with Mozambique as they seek to fuel their country's growth and feed its hunger for resources.

Until recently, while India has been one of the leading exporters of iron and steel, machinery, and pharmaceutical products to Mozambique, it has received in return mainly agricultural products, specifically cashew nuts and cotton. However, this is beginning to change as Mozambique's previously untapped mineral wealth is being discovered and exploited. Mozambique's economy has managed to continue to grow despite the global economic crisis, expanding 9.5% in the first quarter of 2010, due mainly to exports of aluminum produced at the Mozal smelter outside Maputo and exports of titanium ore. India's Tata Steel is also reportedly interested in new investments in Mozambican mines as part of its current restructuring of mining and production operations.

The greatest potential for growth, however, lies in the energy sector. Mozambique has for many years been an exporter of electricity thanks to the Cahora Bassa dam, but its wealth of fossil fuels is just now beginning to be tapped. India is most interested in exploiting Mozambique's coal reserves. During External Affairs Minister Krishna's visit, he stated that "Greater cooperation between the two countries in the energy sector, particularly with respect to coal, is very important". Toward this end, he announced an Indian grant of US\$40 million to set up mining education organizations under the auspices of the state-run Coal India Limited to train Mozambicans in coal exploration and extraction. Krishna said, "Mozambique has been blessed with very rich coal resources and for India, which is growing at 8% every year, energy becomes critical in our develop-

ment agenda". This rhetoric has been backed up by Coal India Limited's recent purchase of mining rights for two coal blocks in Mozambique. In addition to these investments in the coal sector, India's Bharat PetroResources is looking to import natural gas from Mozambique's Rovuma Basin, which, with 8-10 trillion cubic feet of gas is considered one of the largest of recent gas discoveries.

While India does appear to be getting the better end of the bargain in its relationship with Mozambique, it has also been active in helping to promote development in the African country. Since 2003, India has provided over US\$115 million to Mozambique in credit, with the recent addition of a US\$25 million credit line to help promote rural electrification. Krishna also announced the provision of a US\$5 million grant for the development of the education and health sectors in Mozambique.

Security ties were also discussed during Krishna's visit, with aims at safeguarding trade between India and Mozambique and combating piracy in the Indian Ocean. The military relationship between the countries does have potential for growth, but fundamentally, the priority remains trade. Rafique presented Mozambique as offering India a gateway to the markets of the other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries, while Krishna stated that "The present level of trade doesn't reflect the potential, and thus we would like to have greater strategic partnerships with Mozambique". Discussions are already under way for President Guebuza to pay a visit to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in the near future, so further trade agreements are likely soon.

Indian investment can help Mozambique in its development process and in building further political ties abroad. However, the government of Mozambique must be cautious and steadfast in ensuring that only the natural resources, and not the country itself, are exploited.



Timor Leste: The ongoing struggle for a balanced foreign policy

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Having apparently overcome some of the internal strife that scarred its nation-building process in 2006 and in 2008, Timor Leste now appears to experience a period of relative political stability and social order, despite several past and unresolved issues still looming in the horizon. Nevertheless, in this relatively steady context and for the past couple of months, Timor Leste has increasingly become more vocal on a range of topics that could bring about significant implications regarding the country's foreign agenda. This could possibly indicate there exists the political will to enhance and/or diversify the country's role in the regional scene, with unpredictable results.

Accordingly, this article will start by attempting to understand the current context of Timor Leste's foreign policy, identifying its main external partners and goals since it officially joined the international community, with a natural focus on four actors: Australia, China, Indonesia and Portugal. It will then be followed by a comprehensive exposition of the latest episodes regarding Timor Leste's newfound bravado, and by a prospective analysis highlighting the country's options in the middle term. Conclusions will then be drawn regarding Timor Leste's current regional stance and the road ahead.

Starting from zero

After the post-referendum destructive violence of 1999 subsided, the UN multinational forces were suddenly in charge of a massive nation-building program seeking to create the institutions necessary for a viable state – despite common belief that international assistance would be needed for years to come.¹

¹ The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) was established on June 11th, 1999, to organize the national referendum, followed the UN-authorized peacekeeping mission International Force East Timor (INTERFET) deployed on September 20th, 1999, to restore local order. On October 25th, 1999, the United Nations Transitional Authority for East Timor (UNTAET) was established. On May 17th, 2002, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) replaced it.

Despite this righteous commitment made by the international community, certain foreign hurdles still threatened to taint prospects of internal and regional stability. Right from the start, relations with Indonesia were key: after more than two decades under their authoritarian rule and the tumultuous and violent secession process, Timor Leste now faced the crude reality of a necessary working bilateral relationship with its former ruler if it was ever going to succeed, both internally and externally.

Realizing this difficult situation and in the interest of state survival, Timorese authorities – including its most prominent independence leaders, such as José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão, José Ramos-Horta and Marí Alkatiri – opted to normalize ties with Indonesia.² At the top of their mutual agenda, human rights violations perpetrated by the Indonesian military in 1999 were the most sensitive issue. But through the establishment of a bilateral Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF) in 2005, the respective authorities sought to turn a page in their troubled common history. Recommendations for a full reconciliation between both parts soon followed.

On the other hand, constant visits by the highest authorities of both countries were also a sign of bilateral goodwill. For example, the visit by current Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2005 to the Santa Cruz Cemetery – where in 1991 dozens of protesters were shot and killed by Indonesian troops – gave added symbolism to the desirable reinforcement of ties between both parts.³

Furthermore, Indonesia's fear of having Timor Leste become a launching pad for extra-regional powers was also appeased when the government declared their intention to seek full membership of the Association of

² Xanana Gusmão became President in 2002, having stepped down in 2007 to run for Prime Minister, and currently holding that position. José Ramos-Horta held the Foreign Ministry until 2006, when he briefly assumed the office of Prime Minister, followed by the Presidency in 2007, still ongoing. Mari Alkatiri was the first Prime Minister, until his resignation in 2006.

³ "Yudhoyono prays at site of Dili massacre" (*Associated Press*, 9 April 2005).



Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indeed, this demonstrated Timor Leste's willingness to participate in the region's leading integration process, potentially opening new relations with vibrant and prosperous economies as well as contributing to neighborly stability. Nonetheless, such goals have been limited to a mere observing status since 2002, due to some members' doubts. Burma in particular, keeps blocking its bid, essentially due to Timor Leste's public support of Aung San Suu Kyi as Burma's rightful leader and its ongoing criticism of the military regime. The membership to the ASEAN Regional Forum in 2005 ended up being a consolation prize, while the country waits for further developments on this front.

But while Indonesia and ASEAN are crucial to Timor Leste's security and political stability, its other predominant neighbor, Australia, is also granted equal attention and focus. Given its contribution to the independence process – through the leadership of the Interfet forces – and the geographic proximity between the two countries, Australia has come to regard Timor Leste as within its natural sphere of influence, which has occasionally tensed up their relationship. One particularly difficult issue concerns the exploration of the vast natural resources lying beneath the Timor Sea and regulated by the Timor Gap Treaty of 1991 between Australia and Indonesia – the latter having been replaced by the newly independent Timor Leste as a contracting part in 2002. But although an agreement was possible regarding the sharing of the proceeds from the Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), the same cannot be said about the sovereignty and definite maritime boundaries between the two countries. An agreement has simply been postponed in the name of the likely revenues that both parts can withdraw for the time being.

Additionally, beyond the significant amount of development aid in the last few years, Australia also still continues to play a decisive role in Timor Leste's internal security. In the wake of the 2006 crisis, peacekeepers were once again needed to pacify the country and Australia promptly contributed with 1,000 men, 650

of which are still presently stationed in Timor Leste, working alongside a small policing force collaborating closely with the UN.

On the other hand, Portugal also has a special bond with Timor Leste. Since the Indonesian invasion of 1975, Portugal has always fought for the Timorese cause – although at different paces – and became a decisive actor during the referendum and independence process. Indeed, during the roll of UN-led operations, Portugal consistently stood as the second highest contributor of troops on the ground. And similarly to Australia, when violence erupted in 2006 Portugal joined the International Stabilization Force (ISF) with 120

gendarmes, reaching a present total force of 198. Furthermore, Portugal has also maintained its international commitments, having disbursed more than €400 million in aid from 1999 to 2006 and continuing to support the teaching of the Portuguese language throughout the country.⁴

Albeit with significantly lower amounts – when compared to Western donors – China has also increasingly positioned itself as a reliable aid partner for Timor Leste. The construction of the presidential palace, the Foreign Ministry, the vast complex of the Ministry of Defense and Security or the headquarters of Timor Leste's Defense Forces (F-FDTL), are just a few visible examples of Chinese presence in the country. Coupled with scholarships and training programs for civil servants – and bearing in mind it was the first country to officially recognize Timor Leste's independence – it is possible to acknowledge that China is sending a very public message regarding the seriousness of strengthening bilateral ties with this South-Eastern nation.

Finally and although on a different scale, it is also worth mentioning the European Union (EU), the US and Japan (all major contributing donors), as well as Malaysia and New Zealand (who have actively participated in preserving Timor Leste's security) as Timor Leste's other relevant foreign partners.

⁴ The current Indication Cooperation Program for the 2007-2010 period comprises €60 million essentially channelled to three areas: Good Governance, Participation and Democracy; Sustainable Development and Fight Against Poverty; Cooperation Cluster.

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Increasingly vocal

Getting over the 2006 riots and the 2008 assassination attempts on both José Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmão has not been an easy task for the Timorese leadership, but 2010 appeared to hold a new year of relative stability and consolidation of state structures. Accordingly, it came as a surprise when local authorities began resorting to a noisy external approach, inevitably making waves among Timor Leste's neighbors in the process.

The most striking situation is that of relations with Australia, with a string of episodes straining existing ties. Firstly, both countries' attentions are essentially focused on the Timor Sea, more precisely on its Greater Sunrise block, with oil and natural gas reserves estimated at 5.13 trillion cubic feet and 226 million barrels respectively. Unlike the remaining area – regulated by the Timor Sea Treaty of 2002 – this particular section is under the Sunrise International Unitization Agreement (Sunrise IUA) and the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor Sea (CMATS), both ratified in 2007. These treaties state that any eventual revenues are to be shared 50/50 between Timor Leste and Australia.⁵ To that end, a joint-venture consortium – led by Australian Woodside Petroleum Inc. – was properly formed to expedite the planning and subsequent extraction of the natural resources.

However, in January 2010 every intended plan went off track when Woodside disclosed its intention to build a floating platform in order to pipe liquefied natural gas (LNG) to an existing plant in Darwin. Timor Leste's government bluntly opposed this idea, it would rather a new structure be built on its coastline. In their favor, Timorese officials pointed out the country's 30% unemployment rate and the economic activities and inherent social benefits an onshore solution would mean, while at the same time branding the Woodside project as "technologically untested" and as having "an unacceptable level of arrogance".⁶

5 However, it did not establish any local seabed boundary, whose definition was then postponed until the treaties' expiration in 50 years.

6 Xavier la Canna, "East Timor may derail Woodside project" [*Australian Associated*

Amidst all this, the Australian government itself was not exempt from criticism. Canberra was accused of not twisting the arm of one of its flagship companies harder in the pursuit of a mutually beneficial solution. Indeed, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão took the opportunity to dig deep into the past and escalated his rhetoric even further when, during an international donors' conference in April, he accused Australia of sacrificing the lives of 60,000 Timorese in World War II and secretly plotting for Indonesia to take over what was then Portuguese Timor in 1963.⁷

But if the strained relationship was already rocky at best, the recent change in leadership in the Australian government brought about another difficult topic for both countries. Indeed, among new Prime Minister Julia Gillard's

policy guidelines, the possibility of building an "asylum-seeker processing center" in Timor Leste immediately sprung a row of infuriating declarations. For his part, Deputy Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão promptly declared Díli was nobody's "puppet".⁸ The fact that Gillard only initially disclosed her intentions to President Ramos-Horta and not to Xanana Gusmão's cabinet, who holds the real authority, also did not help make her case.

Amid such disputes, another episode quickly got media attention for its alleged geostrategic implications. On May 20th Timor Leste finally received the two Chinese Shanghai III patrol boats – designed in the 1960s and equipped with 30-millimeter cannons – bought two years ago through a US\$28 million contract with

Poly Technologies, a defense company with close links to China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). Officially, they are needed to fight the illegal fishery activities in the country's exclusive economic zone – which is depriving the state of an estimated US\$45 million a year in revenues – and to provide some assistance in securing the 870 kilometers coastline against smuggling and drug trafficking. Indeed, seeking to fix Timor Leste's lacking naval capabilities, Portugal had already donated two ag-

Press, 30 April 2010).

7 Lindsay Murdoch, "Gusmao lashes Australia for duplicity" [*Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 April 2010].

8 "E. Timor deputy PM rejects Australian asylum fix" [*Agence France-Press*, 14 July 2010].



ing Albratoz-class patrolling vessels, armed with 20-millimeter cannons in 2002, although the growing need for repairs and the US\$500 thousand a year required to keep the boats running may have played a part in convincing the country to renew its forces. Nevertheless, the fact that such vessels are apparently ill-suited for the tropical climate and rough conditions common in the Timor Sea, combined with the presence of a Chinese crew to man the boats – while the Timorese counterparts are trained – results in doing little to prevent regional fears and distrust of China's influence in what is generally considered as Australia's natural turf.⁹

But apparently, Timor Leste is not afraid of picking new fights, even with actors who originally trusted in the country's viability against all odds. The latest example concerns the situation of Timor Telecom (TT) – the majority of which is held by Portuguese Portugal Telecom (PT) – who in 2002, despite post-independence instability on the ground, took the risk of investing in the burgeoning nation, in return for a monopoly on local telecommunications for fifteen years. Accordingly, markets were caught off guard when on May 15th – seven years before the contract expires – Vice-Prime Minister José Luis Guterres announced that the sector would be suddenly liberalized by the end of the year or at beginning of 2011.¹⁰ Timor Telecom's strategic plan of investments having been disclosed six months prior to this news, it is thus considered to be on hold, waiting for further official clarification.

What lies ahead?

With so many 'combat fronts', one is left to wonder if these latest episodes are in some way connected to an alleged grand design in the regional scenario or if they are only part of a natural process of the nation's assertiveness as a truly independent country, and in that way essentially harmless in the long run. However, a closer

look at these recent clashes might cast some worrisome doubts on most innocuous views.

The case for the Greater Sunrise exploration is the most pressing. Indeed, if a development plan is not approved by February 2013, or if extraction does not take place by 2017, then either Australia or Timor Leste can cancel the existing arrangements, meaning that Sunrise development would be suspended indefinitely until a new treaty was in place.

Currently, it is almost unanimous that the 2007 agreements were forced upon the Timorese leadership by the

Howard government – who allegedly threatened to withhold aid flows to Timor Leste. But ultimately, Timor Leste's consent will always be required and as further proof of its resolve, reports have surfaced regarding the auscultation of other potential interested companies – like Malaysian Petrobras – that could further interfere with the quick settlement of this dispute. Although the Timorese government is consistently and publicly presenting its case as 'David/impoverished nation vs. Goliath/ruthless Australian mega-corporation', it needs to be aware of the risks surrounding the potentially unfriendly business attitude this could originate. Indeed, the tense relationship – to say the least – with Woodside, and more recently with Portugal Telecom, may prove to be counterproductive in achieving the necessary amount of foreign investment the country so desperately needs.

Likewise, accusations of bullying towards Australia are also likely to bear little fruit.¹¹ As the recognizable preponderant actor in the region, Australia is bound to assume

an overreaching and overprotective attitude regarding its closest neighbors, of which Timor Leste is an unavoidable element – indeed, its security, stability and cohesion have already been upgraded to a national strategic interest by the Australian defense policy.¹² If Timor Leste truly desires an equal and effective working relationship with Australia – as it should – overcoming the usual inflammable rhetoric might prove to be a useful and meaningful step.

Portuguese authorities must be wondering if conditions on the ground are finally ripe for a low-profile withdrawal of their National Republican Guard (GNR). As local stability endures, the mistreatment of Portuguese investors – such as Portugal Telecom – will only make such decision more likely to arrive sooner than later.

⁹ For more on China and Timor Leste's relations see Nuno Canas Mendes, "The Dragon and the Crocodile: Chinese Interests in East Timor" (*Portuguese Journal of International Affairs*, No. 1, Spring 2009): 3-11.

¹⁰ "East Timor government to liberalise telecommunications by start of 2011" (*Macaubub*, 12 May 2010).

¹¹ José Belo, "Proud Timorese are fed up with Canberra's bullying" (*National Times*, 15 June 2010).

¹² See "Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030" (Defense White Paper 2009).



However, both countries and the remaining international community will inevitably bump heads when it comes to Timor Leste's military needs. Bottom line, the ongoing presence of an international military force appears to contradict the excessively ambitious goals the Timorese authorities have set forward for their own military, proposed in the 2007 defense blueprint Force 2020 Report. The unrealistic self-declared need for 3000-strong armed forces backed by a national conscription process and missile-equipped warships – to which the recent purchase of the Chinese vessels is only considered the latest addition – is enough to leave the international community wondering about the actual security apparatus the country requires. As justified as Timor Leste is in providing for its national defense, the exaggerated plans and the apparent political will to pursue them – despite the lack of official approval by the Timorese Parliament – might, in a short-term scenario, compel international forces to begin pulling out or at least reduce their presence, like New Zealand did last May.

The next in line could very well be Portugal. Given the long duration of the country's commitment to the development of Timor Leste, Portuguese authorities must be wondering if conditions on the ground are finally ripe for a low-profile withdrawal of their National Republican Guard (GNR). As local stability endures, the mistreatment of its investors will only make such decision more likely to arrive sooner than later.

Within its Southeastern strategy, Timor Leste is also increasingly setting its sights on Thailand and the Philippines, as potential players in the region, in the hopes of gaining support for its ASEAN accession. Nevertheless, such a goal is almost certain to be postponed beyond 2012, as President Ramos-Horta himself recognized the difficulties in adapting and harmonizing the necessary legislation, inherent to any integration project. Even so, Burma will probably still remain a blocking force by then.

Reversely, the necessary cohabitation with Indonesia in the island of Timor never looked more feasible. Despite the ongoing border disputes and the situation in the Oecusse enclave, both countries seem keen on working around it.¹³ However, despite the clear political will to move forward, previous human rights violations are likely to hover over both parties for the time being as the issue still splits civil society and the international community in two, calling for either a general amnesty or an international tribunal as a way to finally put the past to rest.¹⁴ On the other hand, China is set for a major role in any fu-

ture Timor Leste foreign policy scenario, whatever it may be. Initially, its overwhelming approach was mainly understood as a preemptive measure against any possible Taiwanese influence, but nowadays it is viewed within a larger strategy of insertion in the remaining Portuguese-speaking countries and consolidation of influence in Southeast Asia. Although it will try to remain under the radar, China's investments and aid – military, not excluded – will not stop rising and for its part Timor Leste will most certainly be too willing to receive it. At the end of the day and if anything, these growing ties and the public perception they imply will be increasingly and skillfully used by the Timorese authorities whenever a neighborly dispute arises, especially with regionally-sensitive Australia.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the aforementioned examples showcase an underlying problem for every small state. Indeed, it is not uncommon that instead of a long-term foreign policy strategy, such states – frequently “new” or “weak”, albeit not “failed” yet – focus on “intensive bursts of crisis management”.¹⁵ Their ultimate goal consists of searching for a neutral status, an alliance with a greater power or an emphasis on collective security. In Timor Leste's case, this is not quite so clear, as growing voices point to an increased detachment from previous positions, seeking to exhibit an autonomy that the predominant players in the region are simply not used to.

Still, recent political choices only further reinforce a general perception of persistent disarray within the Timorese leadership, regarding its foreign positioning and relationship with crucial actors – both instrumental to its independence and vital to its future.

Arguing that such apparent need for greater emancipation is inherent to any state's growing maturity is understandable. However, the fact is that the country still remains on the one hand overwhelming dependent on foreign aid and assistance from the international community, and on the other deeply intertwined with the fate of the forced/necessary cohabitation with Indonesia and Australia.

Therefore it is unconceivable that Timor Leste not take into consideration these important variables. Its leadership cannot ignore the trail of confusion and distrust it is building and leaving behind, and accordingly a careful evaluation of the country's agenda is needed to prevent any further damage.

¹³ See “Timor Leste: Oecusse and the Indonesian Border” (*International Crisis Group*, Asia Briefing No. 104, 20 May 2010).

¹⁴ See Paulo Gorjão, “Timor Leste: An amnesty is needed once and for all” (*IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin*, No. 1, November 2009): 4-5. See also “Timor Leste: International Criminal Court: Justice in the shadow” (*Amnesty International*, 28 June 2010).

¹⁵ Anthony Smith, “Constraints and Choices: East Timor as Foreign Policy Actor” (*New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 1, June 2005): 15-36.

Timeline of Events

Angola

1 July (Cabinda):

Deep divisions within Cabinda's FLEC – *Frente de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda* – were made public. Its historic leader, Nzita Tiago, currently exiled in Paris, was excluded from the movement's presidency by the auto-proclaimed *Alto Comando das Forças Armadas Cabindesas Unidas*. Tiago dismissed such allegations and claimed instead to have fired those militants responsible that move.

2 July (Luanda):

The Secretary of State for Economic Coordination, Job Graça, said that foreign direct investment in Angola rose from US\$9.57 billion in 2006 to US\$17.17 billion in 2008, a clear sign of the country's growing business attractiveness.

2 July (Luanda):

In his final hours as US ambassador, Dan Mozena was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Mozena highlighted great improvements regarding bilateral relations over the past year, which will soon be consolidated by a strategic partnership agreement.

7 July (Washington):

In a World Bank report entitled "Investing Across Borders 2010", Angola is the worst ranked country among the 87 states considered. It takes as long as 263 days for a foreign investor to set up a company in the country.

7 July (Washington):

Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos traveled to Washington, where he met Foreign Secretary Hilary Clinton. The visit was justified by the signature of the Strategic Partnership Dialogue Agreement between the US and Angola. Clinton stated the US wishes to diversify its relations with Luanda, still very much focused on oil – last year Angola was its 8th supplier. The new agreement boasts cooperation in areas such as energy, security, trade and the promotion of democracy.

7 July (Luanda):

Chinese director general of the Department for African and Asian Trade Xie Yajing visited Luanda and met with Carlos Maria Feijó, Civil House Chief for the Presidency and State Minister. Yajing declared that the two countries would extend their areas of cooperation to include industry, agriculture and agro-industry.

7-8 July (Pretoria):

President José Eduardo dos Santos visited South Africa in a two-day official visit. In the meeting with his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma, the two presidents discussed bilateral ties – considered to be positively growing – and the region's security situation.

9 July (Luanda):

Finance Minister, Carlos Alberto Lopes, revealed a new Chinese loan for his country: the China Export-Import Bank will lend around US\$500 million. This loan was agreed upon after José Eduardo dos Santos met Bank President Li Ruogu. The World Bank estimates that Chinese loans have reached US\$14.5 billion.

12 July (Luanda):

Italy's ENI and Angola's Sonangol have announced a new offshore oil discovery.

12 July (Luanda):

A member of Cabinda's FLEC disclosed that preliminary contacts with the central government were under way to start negotiations regarding the enclave status.

14 July (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos received his Western Saharan counterpart Mohamed Adelaziz. It is known that Angola favors the Sahrawi cause, a fact proven by the acceptance of an Embassy in Luanda. In a communiqué, José Eduardo dos Santos stated that he supports Western Sahara's self-determination and independence within the framework of agreements signed under the aegis of the UN.

15 July (Luanda):

Portuguese ambassador to Angola, Francisco Ribeiro Telles, stated at the International Fair

of Luanda (FILDA) and on the eve of the CPLP's VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government that commercial exchanges between Portugal and Angola reached €2 billion in 2009, and are centered around finance, civil construction, public works and trade.

15 July (Luanda):

Angolan ambassador to Mozambique Garcia Brites pointed out, in a interview to the *Novo Jornal*, the importance of the newly established flight connection between Luanda and Maputo for the reinforcement of ties between the two countries.

19 July (Luanda):

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos reaffirmed, alongside visiting Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, his commitment to support Guinea-Bissau's stabilisation process and to avoid military interference in politics.

22 July (Paris):

N'Zita Tiago, the exiled leader of the FLEC/FAC – *Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda/Forças Armadas de Cabinda* – denied the existence of any peace talks with Luanda. Earlier this month, self-proclaimed military leaders of FLEC in Cabinda had displaced Tiago.

23 July (Luanda):

Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates highlighted the growing importance of relations and deepening cooperation between Portugal and Angola, after visiting FILDA.

23 July (Luanda):

Angola formally assumed the two-year Presidency of the CPLP. President José Eduardo dos Santos declared in the opening session that the CPLP could be a powerful force capable of contributing to peace and security and strengthening all of its member countries at regional and international level. The Final Statement of the CPLP recognized Equatorial Guinea's formal request to join the organization and confirmed the needed accession negotiations. It also commented on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and adopted a plan to promote and spread the Portuguese language in the world. Finally, Ukraine and Swaziland formally requested to



become associated observers. President José Eduardo dos Santos presented the top priorities for Angola's presidency of the CPLP. The main topics will be the continuous support to Guinea-Bissau, the possible creation of a CPLP citizen status, the negotiations for Equatorial Guinea's accession.

25-26 July (Kampala):

President José Eduardo dos Santos attended the 15th Summit of the African Union (AU). José Eduardo dos Santos first met Bissau-Guinean President Malam Bacai Sanhá to discuss bilateral relations and AU matters. The president also met his Algerian counterpart Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and held a tripartite meeting with Jacob Zuma from South Africa and Denis Sassou Nguesso from the Republic of Congo to discuss issues related to peace, stability and development in the African continent.

26 July (Luanda):

Angola became China's first oil supplier with a 15% quota, surpassing Saudi Arabia.

28 July (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos received his Cape-Verdean counterpart Pedro Pires, after they both attended the AU Summit. Bilateral relations, which are deemed excellent, and international issues were on the table during the short meeting.

29 July (Luanda):

An IMF mission visited Luanda to assess the implementation of the US\$1.4 billion loan agreement, which included some clauses on increasing budgetary transparency and fighting corruption.

29 July (Luanda):

Angola Oil Minister, José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos, received his Congo Brazzaville counterpart André Rafael Loemba. The officials agreed to set up a joint oil exploration body to develop the border "Lunzi" field.

Brazil

3-4 July (Sal Island):

President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva attended the I Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, a gathering

designed to formalize the current good terms between both parts. Lula da Silva also took the opportunity to meet separately with Cape Verde's President Pedro Pires and Prime Minister José Maria Neves.

4-5 July (Malabo):

President Lula da Silva met with his counterpart from Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, during his African tour. Bilateral trade possibilities and the Brazilian support to Guinea's membership to CPLP were high on the agenda.

6 July (Nairobi):

President Lula da Silva's official entourage – including Foreign Minister Celso Amorim – met with his Kenyan counterpart Mwai Kibaki, Vice-President Kalonzo Musyoka and Foreign Minister Moses Wetangula, seeking to reinforce bilateral relations between the two countries. Six key agreements aimed at boosting trade, investments, economic and energetic ties were signed.

7 July (Dar es Salaam):

President Lula da Silva met with his Tanzanian counterpart Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete on agricultural and energy issues: the possibility of creating a local production of ethanol was high on the agenda.

7-8 July (Lusaka):

President Lula da Silva met with his local counterpart Rupiah Bwezani Banda, and signed several agreements geared towards enhancing bilateral cooperation between the two countries, including a possible copper mining operation by Brazilian company Vale do Rio Doce in Zambia, as well as local biofuels production. Lula da Silva also took the opportunity to address the Zambian National Assembly.

8-9 July (Pretoria):

President Lula da Silva met with his counterpart Jacob Zuma. The strengthening of economic bilateral relations was high on the agenda.

10 July (Luanda):

President Lula da Silva met with Angolan Vice President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos.

14 July (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva, accompanied by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, attended the IV

Brazil-EU Summit, alongside European Commission President José Manuel Durão Barroso, and European Council President Herman van Rompuy. Climate change, the reform of international financing institutions, trade and the Doha round, as well as common cooperation in the production of biofuels, were high on the agenda.

19 July (Brasília):

Argelia's Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim, in order to discuss bilateral relations. Agriculture, trade and energy issues were high on the agenda.

20 July (Brasília):

Former Palestinian Foreign Minister and current Fatah high-ranking official Nabil Shaath met with President Lula da Silva, after which the later announced a pledge of nearly US\$14 million to help in the reconstruction of Palestinian territories.

21 July (Brasília):

Paraguay's Foreign Minister Héctor Lacognata met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim in order to prepare the upcoming meeting between President Lula da Silva and Fernando Lugo. Common infrastructure projects, migration control and social issues were among the topics discussed.

22 July (Brasília):

Kuwait's Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah met with President Lula da Silva seeking to enhance bilateral ties between the two countries.

22 July (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva offered to mediate the conflict between Colombia and Venezuela over a crisis that led to the rupture of their diplomatic relations.

22-23 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim participated in the CPLP's Council of Ministers and later represented President Lula da Silva in the subsequent VIII Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

24-25 July (Ankara):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his Turkish counterpart Ahmet Davutoglu to discuss



the Iranian nuclear program and the previous fuel swap proposal by the two countries. Both officials later met with their Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki over the same issue.

25 July (Jerusalem):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Middle East peace talks were high on the agenda.

26 July (Ramallah):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority Salam Fayyad and local counterpart Riad Malki, seeking to advance Middle East peace talks.

26 July (Brasília):

Venezuelan Foreign Minister Nicolás Maduro met with Brazilian President Lula da Silva in a bid to gain support and mediation for the ongoing feud between Venezuela and Colombia.

28 July (Damascus):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his Syrian counterpart Walid Al-Muallem and President Bashar Al-Assad. Bilateral cooperation agreements, including health and agriculture, as well as Middle East peace talks high were on the agenda.

28 July (Brasília):

President of Nicaragua Daniel Ortega met with his Brazilian counterpart Lula da Silva. Social and economic cooperation, common infrastructure programs and the progress of several regional integration projects were some of the topics discussed.

30 July (Rivera):

President Lula da Silva, accompanied by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, met with his Uruguayan counterpart José Mujica on the issue of enhancing bilateral cooperation, specifically relating to border issues such as transport and energy. Agriculture, science and defense were also common topics brought up during their meeting.

30 July (Vila Hayes):

President Lula da Silva and Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo. Bilateral economic trade and common projects regarding the Itaipu dam were high on the agenda.

31 July (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva offered to provide political refuge to Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, who was sentenced to death in Iran following her conviction for committing adultery.

10-14 July (Boston):

Prime Minister José Maria Neves paid an official visit to the Cape Verdean community in the US.

13-15 July (Brava Island):

Cape Verdean and Portuguese military forces performed a three-day joint military exercise, dubbed "Garça-010", to boost relations and enhance civilian and military cooperation. The exercise brought together nearly 110 soldiers from both countries and included naval landing, reconnaissance patrols on the island and civilian actions.

13-15 July (Beijing):

Foreign Minister Carlos Brito met with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi and with Commerce Minister Fu Ziyang, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Joint Committee on Economic, Commercial and Technical Cooperation between the two countries. Both parts signed various economic and business agreements.

19 July (Praia):

Prime Minister José Maria Neves expressed interest in reinforcing CPLP participation in the resolution of problems in Guinea-Bissau.

20 July (Praia):

As part of a deal struck by US authorities, Guantanamo detainee Abd-al-Nisr Mohammed Khantumani was transferred to Cape Verde.

21-23 July (Luanda):

President Pedro Pires attended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

25-27 July (Kampala):

President Pedro Pires attended the 15th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU).

29 July (Luanda):

President Pedro Pires expressed his trust in the Angolan presidency of the CPLP and conditioned any intervention in Guinea-Bissau to a request from the democratically elected government. Pires also took the opportunity to meet privately with his Angolan counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos.

Cape Verde

2 July (Sal Island):

Ten Heads of State attended the 88th ECOWAS Summit hosted by Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires and Prime Minister José Maria Neves. A common industrial policy, the election criteria for the organization structures and the pending situations in Guinea-Bissau, Guinea-Conakry and Niger were high on the agenda.

3 July (Sal Island):

President Lula da Silva attended the first Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, where he received support for Brazil's bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Joint cooperation in development aid and trade was also on the table.

3 July (Sal Island):

After the end of the Brazil-ECOWAS Summit, President Lula da Silva announced Brazilian oil company Petrobrás would support Cape Verde's efforts to prospect for oil and gas in ultra-deepwater areas around the islands.

4-7 July (Praia):

President Pedro Pires hosted his Portuguese counterpart Aníbal Cavaco Silva as guest at the 35th anniversary celebrations of the archipelago's independence.

6 July (Praia):

Cape Verde and the Canary Islands held their first official summit. Prime Minister José Maria Neves and President of the autonomous community of the Canary Islands Paulino Rivero discussed the expansion of the Macaronesia, in order to include Cape Verde as part of the EU ultra-peripheral regions. Bilateral political and economic cooperation were also on the agenda.



Guinea-Bissau

1 July (Brasília):

President of Brazil Lula da Silva canceled his scheduled three-hour stopover in Bissau as a response to the appointment of António Indjai as Armed Forces Chief of Staff.

1 July (New York):

Portuguese Secretary of State for Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho agreed with the content of the Secretary General's latest report and re-asserted that fighting narco-trafficking and reforming the security sector were key in achieving stability in Guinea-Bissau.

1 July (Sal Island):

On the sidelines of the 38th ordinary session of ECOWAS in Cape Verde, Representative of the UN Secretary General and Head of the UN Peace-building Support office in Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba chose to downplay the content of the UN report on Guinea-Bissau. Mutaboba stated that any political appointment such as Indjai's is a decision made by a sovereign state.

2 July (Sal Island):

Guinea-Bissau's political situation was one of the ECOWAS 38th ordinary session's main topics. Sanctions were discussed as a reaction to António Indjai's nomination. ECOWAS had already canceled its Armed Forces Chief of Staff meeting, which was scheduled for the 28th and 29th of June in Bissau, as a sign of protest. James Victor Gbeho, President of the ECOWAS Commission, stated that he did not "understand nor approve" Guinea-Bissau's decision.

2-3 July (Sal Island):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá participated in the ECOWAS session and the subsequent summit with Brazil. At the end of the meetings, Sanhá declared that the Community would reinforce its assistance to Guinea-Bissau. Yet President Sanhá failed to deliver any comments on Indjai's appointment, while he stated the Zamora Induta's liberation was a Justice matter.

3 July (Sal Island):

Although failing to visit Bissau, Brazilian President Lula da Silva conveyed his hopes that Guinea-Bissau would not fall back in its reform process, while he reinforced that his country

will continue to closely follow the country's internal situation and support Guinea-Bissau as long as it "solves its problems".

3 July (Sal Island):

The final joint statement of ECOWAS's leaders referred to the "lack of progress in the fight against impunity" in Guinea-Bissau and the "great concern" over António Indjai's nomination, calling upon President Malam Bacai Sanhá not only to reconsider his choice, but to name an Armed Forces Chief of Staff who was not directly involved in the April 1st military coup.

4 July (Dakar):

In reaction to António Indjai's nomination, the US embassy in Dakar confirmed that the US ceased its military support and cooperation with Guinea-Bissau.

6 July (Brussels):

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton, disclosed that EU would re-examine all of its support to Guinea-Bissau due to the country's internal political situation and Indjai's nomination in particular, which may not be compatible with the Cotonou agreement.

6 July (Lisbon):

Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva stated that the international community had a crucial role to play in Guinea-Bissau's stability. He considered that ECOWAS, the CPLP, the EU and the UN were on the front row of support to weak institutions.

6 July (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai rebuffed the international community's criticism of his appointment by declaring that it "does not understand the Bissau-Guinean military's reality" and that censure in itself would not help the country's development.

7 July (Paris):

Paris Club creditors and Brazil gave Guinea-Bissau a three-year debt suspension until the end of 2012. This break only includes debt up to 1986, which is estimated at US\$240 million.

9 July (Bissau):

In a rare harsh tone, President Malam Bacai Sanhá told Guinea-Bissau's Superior Council of Defense that the military exist to defend the

country, not to hurt its people. Furthermore, he stated that "Guinea-Bissau is not the private property of soldiers".

13 July (Lisbon):

João Gomes Cravinho, Portuguese Secretary of State for Cooperation, stated that the consolidation of stability in Guinea-Bissau suffered an "extremely severe" setback which damaged the international community's trust in the country.

15 July (New York):

Special Representative of the UN Secretary General Joseph Mutaboba presented the latest report on Guinea-Bissau to the UN Security Council. Mutaboba expressed his belief that civilian authorities are not fully in charge in Bissau, but that the situation could be solved if tackled without delay by the international community. The report describes the April 1st incidents as a "major setback". The wave of political instability is seen as threatening the positive momentum witnessed in the previous year, putting in danger the implementation of crucial reforms, in particular in the key military sector.

15 July (New York):

Following the presentation of the UN's latest report on Guinea-Bissau, the US informed it would reinforce sanctions against drug traffickers in the country. Yet, the UN Security Council failed to reach any resolution concerning Guinea-Bissau.

16 July (Bissau):

Ahead of the CPLP meeting in Luanda, President Malam Bacai Sanhá pressured his Lusophone peers in a TV interview by stating he hoped that the CPLP would not follow other international organizations' example in suspending aid to Guinea-Bissau, thus isolating the country.

20 July (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai decided to begin making his own nominations to military command posts, in a move clearly intended to reinforce his position of power within the Armed Forces and weaken the status of Bubo Na Tchuto – former Navy Chief of Staff and participant in the April 1st coup –, thus ignoring the criticism of the international community. Sanha Cusse, former Navy Intelligence Chief, was named as Navy Vice-Chief of Staff, and Ma-



for Carlos Mandugal, whose name was repeatedly linked to drug trafficking, was named Navy Operational Commander. Indjai also nominated Tomás Djassi, a close ally, as Army Vice-Chief of Staff, as well as new regional military commander.

21 July (Bissau):

Ahead of his departure to Luanda, President Malam Bacai Sanhá expressed his wish to see a CPLP also working on economic matters besides its natural cultural and linguistic goals. The President also expressed his support for Equatorial-Guinea's bid to join the Community.

21 July (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai tried to appease the international community by stating that "any military who would not subordinate to the political power would be expelled from the Armed Forces" and that "from now on the military would constitute an example of discipline and respect towards civil authorities".

22 July (New York):

The UN Security Council issued a nonbinding statement urging Bissau-Guinean military forces to respect civilian authority, and its political forces to respect the rule of law. In particular, the Security Council requested the release of those imprisoned after the April 1st coup for their fair and proper trial and an increased effort in preventing drug trafficking.

22 July (Brussels):

Renewed signs that the EU may end or severely downsize its current Security Sector Reform mission in Guinea-Bissau were once again released, but the decision has not been made yet.

22 July (Luanda):

Ahead of the CPLP summit, Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado rejected the idea of deploying a CPLP security force to stabilize Guinea-Bissau. Amado stressed that the Community had no legitimacy to do so and that Guinea-Bissau's issues should be solved by the international community, namely ECOWAS and the UN.

23 July (Luanda):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá attended the VIII Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

23 July (Luanda):

The Final Declaration of VIII Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the CPLP considered the events of April 1st to be a "grave incident" against Guinea-Bissau's constitutional order, while it reaffirmed the need for military power to respect civilian rule. It also called on Guinea-Bissau to "solve" the detainees' situation and remain engaged in the Security Sector Reform.

23 July (Luanda):

Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos pointed out that the CPLP will focus its efforts on organizing a donor's conference in order to garner the financial means necessary to strengthen democratic institutions. José Eduardo dos Santos also declared that during Angola's tenure of the CPLP, no options would be excluded in the process of supporting Guinea-Bissau, including a military one – although strictly respecting the demands of local authorities.

26 July (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior vowed to analyze the UN's appeal to release former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Zamora Induta, still in jail following the April 1st coup.

27 July (Bissau):

Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai referred that Zamora Induta's situation as justice matter which should therefore be decided by the courts.

27 July (Kampala):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá participated in the 15th Summit of the African Union (AU), where he declared that António Indjai would continue as head of the Armed Forces. Sanhá pointed out that a sovereign country made this decision and that the international community should respect it. As for Zamora Induta's situation, the President clarified that the courts would deal it with. Finally, Sanhá declared he counted on Portugal, Angola and Libya to support his country in international forums.

30 July (Abuja):

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan praised the CPLP's efforts to support Guinea-Bissau alongside with other international organizations. As such, the President, who is also chairman of ECOWAS, confirmed that the regional

body will continue to assist the country together with other partners.

Mozambique

2 July (Maputo):

A Chinese delegation of 46 businessmen led by Deputy Minister of Trade Chen Jian met with President Armando Guebuza and other government officials in order to assess possible investment opportunities.

4-6 July (Maputo):

India's External Affairs Minister S. M. Krishna met with President Armando Guebuza, Prime Minister Aires Ali and his counterpart Oldemiro Baloí, in order to boost bilateral relations, particularly in the trade and energy sectors. Krishna also took the opportunity to sign an agreement extending a credit of US\$25 million to Mozambique for rural electrification and another, worth US\$40 million, aimed at setting up centers for planning and training in the coal sector.

5-7 July (Gaborone):

President Armando Guebuza met with his Botswanan counterpart Ian Khama seeking to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries.

6 July (Maputo):

Representatives of the governments of Mozambique and Luxembourg signed the 3rd Indicative Cooperation Program (PIC), which will be put in place between 2010 and 2015.

10 July (Pretoria):

President Armando Guebuza met with his Angolan and South African counterparts, José Eduardo dos Santos and Jacob Zuma, and discussed regional common issues.

12 July (Gaborone):

As the head of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Organ on Politics, Defense and Security, President Armando Guebuza inaugurated a conflict management center at the organization's headquarters with the aim of linking national crisis management centers of every SADC state member.

**12 July (Maputo):**

Electricidade de Moçambique (EdM) and Portugal's REN signed a protocol to set up a company for investment projects related to the expansion of the Mozambican power network, including the Cesul project which envisages creating a power transmission line linking the Tete and Maputo provinces, estimated at US\$1.7 billion.

14 July (Maputo):

Interpol's Secretary General Ronald Noble met with President Armando Guebuza, after which he announced the international police body intends to investigate drug trafficking in Mozambique, for fear that it is becoming a transit route for drugs on their way from Latin America to Europe. This visit comes just six weeks after US President Barack Obama named prominent Mozambican businessman Mohamed Bachir Suleman as a drug baron.

14 July (Maputo):

Foreign Affairs Minister Oldemiro Baloi hosted the Interstate Political and Diplomacy Committee's session of the SADC. The gathered officials analyzed the political and security situation of the region with particular focus on Zimbabwe and Madagascar, as well as the consolidation of democracy in the SADC area and the preparation of the upcoming Heads of State and Government Summit in Namibia.

22 July (Luanda):

Education Minister Zeferino Martins represented Mozambique during the CPLP's Council of Ministers.

22 July (Maputo):

Dorothy Tembo, executive secretary of the World Trade Organization's program to boost the Integrated Framework, announced it will start providing US\$1 million per year to Mozambique to support industrial programs in the country.

22-23 July (Luanda):

President Armando Guebuza attended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

25-27 (Kampala):

President Armando Guebuza attended the 15th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU). Guebuza also took the opportunity to meet with US Assistant Secre-

tary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson, and with Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires.

28 July (Maputo):

According to official reports, Mozambique and Angola plan to reinforce the African Union's mission in Somalia, currently at 6,000 troops but expected to surpass the 8,000 soon.

Portugal

1 July (New York):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho took part in the High-Level Segment of the UN Economic and Social Council. Cravinho also took the opportunity to sign a memorandum of understanding with UN Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations, Atul Khare, regarding Portugal's contribution to the UNSAS-Stand-by Arrangement System.

2 July (Lisbon):

During preparations for the next Summit of the Atlantic Alliance to be held in November in Lisbon, NATO's Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen held meetings with Portuguese Prime Minister José Sócrates, Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama, Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva, and Foreign Minister Luís Amado.

3-4 July (Sal Island):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the First ECOWAS-Brazil Summit as an observing party.

4-7 July (Praia):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, accompanied by Foreign Minister Luís Amado, attended the 35th anniversary celebrations of Cape Verde's independence. Cavaco Silva also held meetings with his counterpart Pedro Pires as well as with Prime Minister José Maria Neves, where bilateral cooperation, the promotion of Portuguese language and the situation in Guinea-Bissau were high on the agenda.

8 July (Brussels):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie attended the Informal Gathering of the

European Affairs Ministers, in order to assess the planned Belgian EU Presidency.

9 July (Lisbon):

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sultanate of Oman Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah met with his counterpart Luís Amado and Portuguese Speaker of Parliament Jaime Gama. The strengthening of bilateral relations, EU-GCC relations, the Middle Eastern peace process, the situation in Afghanistan, the acts of piracy in the Horn of Africa and energy issues were high on the agenda.

9 July (Seychelles Islands):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva, accompanied by Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Valença Pinto met with the Portuguese military assigned to the EU's Operation Atalanta, seeking to fight piracy in the Indic Ocean. Santos Silva also took the opportunity to meet with President of Seychelles James Michel, Interior Minister Joel Morgan, and Foreign Minister Jean-Paul Adam, as well as with local Army Chief of Staff Brigadier Leopold Payet. The Portuguese candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN's Security Council during the 2011-2012 biennium was one of the topics covered.

13 July (Lisbon):

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran Manoutchehr Mottaki met with his counterpart Luís Amado. Human rights, Iran's nuclear program and ongoing international sanctions were high on the agenda.

14 July (Lisbon):

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu met with his counterpart Luís Amado, in order to discuss the strengthening of bilateral relations, EU-Turkey relations, the Middle-East peace process, the Balkans, the forthcoming NATO summit and the international financial and economic crisis as well as energy issues.

15 July (Baku):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with Azerbaijan's Minister for Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov in order to discuss the strengthening of bilateral relations, EU-Azerbaijan relations, the forthcoming NATO



summit, energy issues and the Central Asian context. Amado also took the opportunity to sign an Agreement for Political Consultations with his counterpart.

15-17 July (Pretoria):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho met with his South African counterpart Sue van der Merwe, to assess economic relations between Portugal and South Africa.

16-17 (Almaty):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his local counterpart Kanat Saudabeyev as well as Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbayev before attending the OSCE Ministerial Troika Meeting and later, the OSCE Informal Ministerial Meeting. Amado also met with his Armenian, Belarusian and Serbian counterparts Edward Nalbandian, Sergei Martynov and Vuk Jeremic, respectively.

18-23 July (Luanda):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, accompanied by an entourage of over 105 businessmen and several government officials including Foreign Minister Luis Amado, visited Angola in a bid to strengthen cooperation between both countries. Cavaco Silva met with his counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos, and with leader of UNITA Isaías Samakuva.

20 July (Kabul):

Secretary of State for Portuguese Communities Abroad António Braga represented Portugal in the International Donors Conference on Afghanistan, where dialogue with the Taliban, new aid commitments and a timeframe for the withdrawal of international troops were decided.

22 July (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the CPLP's Council of Ministers.

23 July (Luanda):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

25-27 July (Kampala):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the African Union Summit as an observing party.

Amado took the opportunity to make bilateral contacts with some of the 30 African Heads of State and Government present.

26 July (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's Foreign Minister Council, where further sanctions on Iran as a result of its nuclear program were agreed.

29 July-2 August (Díli):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho held bilateral meetings with President José Ramos-Horta and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Zacarias da Costa, among others.

São Tomé and Príncipe

22 July (Luanda):

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Carlos Tiny, attended the Council of Ministers of the CPLP.

22 July (N'Djamena):

President Fradique de Menezes participated in the XII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Community of Sahelo-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). The organization's reforms, a harmonization of positions on the eve of the Africa Union Summit, as well as common economic, social and cultural cooperation were high on the agenda.

22-23 July (Luanda):

President Fradique de Menezes attended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

25 July (São Tomé):

Municipal elections took place, with Prime Minister Rafael Branco's MLSTP-PSD winning the most votes and mandates, followed by ADI from former Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada. President Fradique de Menezes's MDFM-PL did not manage to elect any local representative.

25-27 July (Kampala):

President Fradique de Menezes attended the 15th Summit of the African Union (AU). Menezes also took the opportunity to meet with Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who announced the pardon of a US\$3 million debt.

Timor Leste

5 July (Sydney):

Australia's new Prime Minister Julia Gillard announced her government's intention to build a regional processing center for asylum seekers in Timor Leste. Although President José Ramos-Horta expressed openness to the proposal, Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres said that Timor Leste did not have the capacity to bring the plan to fruition. The Australian authorities did not consult Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão.

7 July (Sydney):

Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard said she was willing to discuss the Woodside Petroleum planned Sunrise natural gas project in Timor Leste to help win support for a regional processing center for asylum seekers.

9 July (New York):

Shigeru Mochida was appointed as Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Timor Leste.

12 July (Díli):

The Parliament unanimously voted a non-binding resolution rejecting Australia's proposal to build a regional processing center for asylum seekers in Timor Leste.

14 July (Díli):

Deputy Prime Minister Mário Carrascalão rejected Australia's proposal to process asylum seekers, claiming that Timor Leste was nobody's "puppet".

21 July (Hanoi):

Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa stated that Timor Leste had not ruled out involvement in a center for processing asylum seekers, but that this idea – developed by



Australia – should be dealt with regionally. Additionally, Costa also said that Australia's Woodside Petroleum was "more open" to considering piping gas from the Greater Sunrise fields to an onshore liquefied natural gas plant.

22-23 July (Luanda):

Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres attended the VIII Summit of Heads of State and Government of the CPLP.

22 July (Hanoi):

Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa attended the ASEAN Regional Forum.

25 July (Díli):

Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa rejected Prime Minister Julia Gillard's claims that Australia is in "active dialogue" with his country over her pre-election plan to use Timor Leste as a processing center for asylum seekers, and made it clear that that discussions had yet to take place.

27-28 July (Díli):

Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa met with his counterpart Zacarias da Costa, President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, seeking to enhance bilateral relations. An air transport agree-

ment, border control issues and the Australian refugee-processing center were high on the agenda.

28 July (Díli):

President José Ramos-Horta said that his country had "no plans" to build a detention center for asylum seekers, but remained open to discuss the idea.

30 July (Díli):

State Secretary for Defense Júlio Tomás Pinto called on Australia to continue providing technical assistance to the Timor Leste Defense Forces (F-FDTL).

Reading List

Carrie Manning, "Mozambique's Slide into One-Party Rule" (*Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No. 2, April 2010): 151-165.

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