Angola and the three Guineas: the friendly security provider

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If the first months of 2011 produced a slogan for Angolan foreign policy, it would certainly be “Angola: your friendly security services provider”. Four months after the beginning of the year, Angola has already made important security deals with many African countries. Continuing to follow its notorious interest in the broader Gulf of Guinea region, Angola has had several meetings and signed important security deals with a very specific group of countries: Guinea-Bissau, Guinea Conakry and Equatorial Guinea.

Having shown interest in the Guinea-Bissau security sector, and sometime after the Bissau-Guinean troubles turned noticeably violent, Angola signed on September 10th 2010 a Technical and Military Assistance Protocol with Guinea-Bissau, aimed above all at restarting the Security Sector Reform (SSR) programs in that country. Following this conceptual agreement, on March 21st 2011 Angolan Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem, together with Bissau-Guinean President Malam Bâcai Sanhá, officially launched the MISSANG/GB, the Angolan military mission in Guinea-Bissau, aimed at assisting and advising Bissau’s military on its reform and unification. It is rare for any state to accept to host a military apparatus on its territory – other than its own –, without concrete historical underpinnings. It is even rarer for this to be done bilaterally. Most states usually agree on the military deployments and interventions of international organizations – which represent not only accessible forums for maintaining control but also erase fears of invasion – rather than those of single states. The fact that Angola alone managed to step up and help Guinea-Bissau to reform none other than its security sector with the latter’s open consent, is a colossal political victory for Angola. Hardly ever is a country able to bypass international organizations – in this case the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union, the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) and the United Nations – and be allowed to unilaterally assume large portions of the responsibility of helping a friendly country in such fragile matters such as security. Now, Angola’s position in Guinea-Bissau is more noticeable and influential than ever.

Concerning Equatorial Guinea, relations with Angola are developing at a steady pace, albeit not as intensely as with Guinea-Bissau. On January 20th 2011 President José Eduardo dos Santos received a message sent by President of Equatorial Guinea Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, where the latter made reference to the need to reinforce the already excellent relationship and bilateral cooperation both countries enjoyed, while also calling for a permanent consultation with regard to regional and international issues. Following Teodoro Obiang's initiative, on April 10th 2011 the first session of the established commission between Angola and Equatorial Guinea took place in Malabo. As co-President of the commission, Angolan Oil Minister Botelho Vasconcelos was present at the meeting, having revealed to the media that both parties identified several projects needing evaluation, concerning the oil, education, commerce, geology and mines, agriculture, fisheries, transportation, defense, security and public order sectors. Even though a proper response to Teodoro Obiang’s letter quickly materialized, the first session of the commission produced vague results, with no concrete outcome. Yet, to escape rhetoric and continue...
the work done so far, on the same month Equatorial Guinean Minister of Interior and National Security Nicolas Obama Nchama made a three-day visit to Luanda, where he met his Angolan counterpart Sebastião Martins. This time results were much more tangible, both countries having approved a program of technical assistance, training and advisory to the security forces of Equatorial Guinea. The basic goal of this plan is to help Equatorial Guinea make the necessary arrangements to host the CAN – the African Cup of Nations – in 2012, alongside Gabon. Angola managed to negotiate security arrangements with a country whose President had first sent a letter to better develop relations just four months before, which entails a high level of trust in Angola’s capacity to produce the results desired by Teodoro Obiang’s executive. Essentially, this call for assistance means that the January 2010 FLEC assault on the Togolese football team bus in Cabinda during the CAN did not stain or damage Angola’s reputation as a reliable security provider. On the contrary, it surprisingly increased the country’s security exports.

Finally, the last of Guineas – Conakry – has also made specific arrangements with Angola, albeit still at a rather embryonic stage. On January 28th 2011, President Alpha Condé met with President José Eduardo dos Santos in Luanda. At the end of the meeting the latter stated that after both countries achieved domestic stability, they could start readjusting their objectives and bilateral cooperation programs in order to reinforce economic, social, cultural, institutional and security relations. Again, security arrangements were mentioned at a high level meeting, José Eduardo dos Santos having gone as far as to say that the Angolan executive was ready to deepen the mentioned topics and to establish the necessary legal instruments to materialize this cooperation on that same day. Roughly three months later, on March 16th 2011, Conakry

Defense Minister Kabêlè Abdoul Camara arrived in Luanda, to be part of the first session of the commission between Angola and Guinea Conakry. On March 18th 2011, both commissions stated they had analyzed common areas of interest, especially in the security and defense sectors, having postponed the economic and financial consultations to a later date. Hence, three Guineas, two security deals and one ongoing negotiation. These three achievements reveal many features of Angola’s self-perception in Africa, as well as the perception of others. Above all, they reveal the astonishing tale of a country who became a reliable exporter of security – a fragile segment in many parts of Africa – only nine years after the end of its civil war. While still rebuilding and recuperating from 27 years of civil war, Angola is also exporting security to other countries, a fact which proves that Angola’s image and reputation in Africa are growing stronger on a daily basis. Today, many state leaders and ministers visit Luanda to make deals.

If ten years ago both parts of the Angolan civil war where tireless in trying to find support abroad, today the picture has changed dramatically. It is noteworthy that President José Eduardo dos Santos does not usually leave the country, and that most agreements and meetings with the three Guineas took place in Luanda, a symbolical token of Angola’s centralism in African affairs. Indeed, today it is Angola who is setting the agenda.

Finally, it is also important to reflect on the fast pace Angolan foreign policy has demonstrated in entering talks, negotiating and celebrating agreements with the three Guineas. This astounding speed in moving the agenda further proves a residual truth in international relations: the state is still at the center, thus a much more capable actor than any international organization. Perhaps Angolan diplomacy is aware of all the complications and lack of productivity most international organizations experience, which would explain its periodic reluctance to be active in the organizations it belongs to.

All things considered, these episodes are just examples of how Angola is climbing the regional power ladder. The only apparent reason why Angola is not yet acknowledged by the world as a powerful and promising regional power lies in some of its domestic indicators and in the liberal nature of the international system. Nonetheless, the world should not be surprised to see Angola on the frontline of African politics in the very short term.

From BRIC to BRICS: after the dust settles

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In all fairness, it is not hard to get caught up in the intellectual imaginary surrounding the BRICS countries – Brazil, Russia, India, China and from now on South Africa. The present and future impact of all these economies on global imbalances alone is more than enough to infuse newfound dynamism in their respective leaderships. Moreover, when one adds their alleged potential to influence other developing countries while tipping the balance of post-World War II international institutions, the effect that one particular acronym might have on current international policymaking and academic thinking is perfectly understandable. But without dwelling on any overreaching analysis of its core assumptions, some care is in order regarding some widely infused expectations for these countries and the pre-announced dawn of a new world order, supposedly already in the making.

It is not as if Goldman Sachs’ predictions in 2003 that BRIC
countries – at the time, South Africa had not yet been dragged into the fold – would dominate the world’s economy in the next decades are not right on track. On the contrary, a recent study by the Brazilian Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) demonstrates that BRICS countries have already contributed with over 60% of the global economy growth in 2008-2009 and become the recipients of 1/5 of all FDI global flows in 2009. Even inter-BRICS exchanges appear to follow the same overwhelming pattern, with Brazil, for example, displaying a 575% increase in trade with the remaining countries from 2003 to 2010, according to the newest Brazilian Foreign Ministry numbers. However, by all means, such compelling data is not even up for discussion, as it will only continue to significantly expand in the coming future, thus deflating any criticism regarding its actual sustainability. What should be highlighted instead is that any zero sum of individual economic numbers might make sense for a particular theoretical exercise but it also might prove insufficient for the kind of sustainable international platform that BRICS advocates so arduously claim to be already in existence. Indeed, even Jim O’Neill – elevated to the pantheon of international analysis for his role in coining the BRIC expression back in 2001 – already acknowledges the inaccuracy of trying to make BRIC(S) more that it is, i.e. trying to provide a pseudo-political institutionalization that only serves the purpose of helping to mask the significant structural differences between each and every member of this grouping. Likewise, the IPEA report follows this same line of thought when stating “despite creating a gravitational center for the global economy, the group does not manifest homogenous dynamics”. Naturally, one cannot fail to recognize some of the reasoning behind every gathering of this sort. For all purposes, their sheer weight in the global economy and trade comprises a handful of an agenda to be tackled in timely Summits, such as those that started in 2009 in Yekaterinburg, Russia. Moreover, their common claims for a greater say in international financial institutions are also easily discernible, especially since the ongoing financial crisis highlighted how their position was clearly not sufficiently taken into account. Still, while such issues do make viable common goals for all four countries – although it would be possible to enter into a lengthy debate regarding the merits of South Africa’s inclusion in these calculations – to put it bluntly they are simply not enough to sustain consensual political goals and the rhetoric that BRICS have grown accustomed to conveying to the international community over the past few years. Increased economic relations do tend to foster greater political connections between any two parties and can be a worthy driving force, but inevitably there has to be a minimum degree of common ground in their own foreign approaches and shared values in order to successfully claim a greater sway in the world at large.

If we ignore the disparities in their own political regimes and economic models of choice, a good case in point may be found in the latest Summit’s declaration on April 14th in Sanya, on the Chinese island of Hainan. Indeed, despite reaffirming “the need for a comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council” – the coveted Holy Grail of international representation for 3/4 of the BRICS – only a last-ditch effort made it possible to include a cleverly indirect reference stating that “China and Russia reiterate the importance they attach to the status of India, Brazil and South Africa in international affairs, and understand and support their aspiration to play a greater role in the UN”. Although at first this could have been bragged around as a token of unanimity, the careful and selective choice of words signals otherwise, perfectly illustrating the delicate balance between the countries committed to the established status quo – and therefore reluctant to either relinquish or share such membership – and the ones eager to be a part of it. On the other hand, when the UN Security Council – where coincidently, all four countries are presently in attendance, even if temporarily – was recently called to vote on the resolution over sanctions on Libya, South Africa also did not appear too conflicted by breaking rank and voting favorably, in opposition to its fellow BRICS peers. In that sense, it is not without irony that they now express the wish to “continue our cooperation in the UN Security Council on Libya”. Again, examples like this serve only to demonstrate how these countries’ own foreign policy considerations frequently trump any subliminal rejection of the West’s decaying influence or official discourses of “contributing significantly to the development of humanity and establishing a more equitable and fair world”. True, it does not neutralize or prevent any intended/pre-ordained agenda but it does leave a sense of hollowness in its actual and final implementation. Nevertheless, an all-out BRICS-bashing is out of the question. This group is a valid burgeoning forum of overwhelming economic powers that must be taken into consideration in any future geopolitical calculations. Furthermore, it is undeniable that their full inclusion in the existing international architecture would undoubtedly add an interesting dose of legitimacy to frequently stalled institutions. But at the end of the day, these four countries ought to bear in mind that such convergences can only confer an appearance of unity and consensus to a certain point. After that, when all is said and done, BRICS would ultimately do best if it frankly reassessed any illusions of grandeur or world-changing initiatives, while subsequently toning down its rhetoric.
The g7+: seeking security and equality in donor-recipient relationships

In an ever more globalized world, independent states have seen much of their power sapped by international organizations and multinational corporations, eroding traditional conceptions of state sovereignty. Smaller nations, and especially those emerging from conflict and plagued by instability, are particularly vulnerable to having their powers of independent decision making overridden or overwhelmed by external forces. Dependent on foreign aid for development and general governmental functioning, such states may find themselves constrained by the goals or strictures of international donors and unable to focus on national priorities or work in a contextually appropriate manner.

As international donors have become more responsive to critiques of their heavy handedness during the height of World Bank and International Monetary Fund-sponsored structural adjustment programs in the late 20th Century, though, vulnerable states have begun to assert themselves more in pursuit of a cooperative, rather than dependent, relationship with donors. Since early 2010, one of the key drivers of this reappraisal of donor-recipient relationships in development has been the ‘g7+’ group of countries, led by Timor Leste, and including some of the world’s most unstable countries, such as Afghanistan and Côte d’Ivoire.

The g7+ is an open forum for ‘fragile states.’ A fragile state is defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as a state “with weak capacity to carry out the basic state functions of governing a population and its territory and that lacks the ability or political will to develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society”. Fragile states may be experiencing (i) post-conflict/crisis or political transition situations; (ii) deteriorating governance environments, (iii) gradual improvement, and; (iv) prolonged crisis or impasse”.

While the classification of states as ‘fragile’ can be problematic and drive away donors,1 the term has been embraced by the g7+, who seek to appropriate it and disempower its negative connotations. In the g7+ statement of purpose resulting from the group’s first meeting at the International Dialogue on Peace Building and State Building in Dili in April 2010, the group argued that “fragile states are characterized and classified through the lens of the developed rather than through the eyes of the developing”, necessitating a shift in dialogue and practice to greater equality between donor and recipient countries. The g7+ have tried to frame their concerns in response to the dominant development framework of the moment, the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

Drafted by a group led by development economist Jeffrey Sachs and emerging from the UN’s Millennium Declaration, the MDGs were adopted in 2000 as a set of measurable targets to be achieved by 2015. The goals, each with three targets, are (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce the child mortality rate; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development. The targets for the final goal include a discussion of special measures for least developed countries, but these focus mainly on debt relief and trade.

The g7+ argue that in order to be successful in the achievement of the MDGs in fragile states, the

international community must concentrate first and foremost on conflict resolution and prevention and sociopolitical stability, for these are prerequisites to development in other areas. As Timor Leste’s Minister of Finance, Emília Pires, who chairs the g7+, told reporters in Díli, “aid is given based on MDG criteria, and from our experience we have found out that before we can get the MDGs, we have to do a few things first. We have to have peace and stability”.

Given the conviction of the g7+ member states that “without security there can be no development”, a set of complementary peacebuilding and statebuilding goals were laid out in the Díli Declaration. Key among these are the establishment and strengthening of basic safety and security; peacefully resolving conflicts and promoting access to justice; and contributing to regional stability and cooperation. Among the challenges raised that fragile states face in the achievement of these goals are the divergence of goals of governments and donors on one hand and citizens and civil society on the other; weak and distrusting relationships between donors and developing countries; and the lack of a cohesive plan for development among the multiplicity of donors found in most developing countries. It is primarily these challenges that the g7+ seeks to address. The Díli Declaration is also meant to be in dialogue with the “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations”, more commonly known as the “Fragile State Principles” or FSPs, adopted by the OECD in 2007 as a guideline for its own members’ engagement with fragile states. The FSPs focus on state-building, emphasizing local knowledge and context, espouse a ‘do no harm’ ethic, and also seek a more integrated front of donors to avoid confusion and overlapping aid projects. The fifth FSP, however, is the most relevant to the mission of the g7+: “recognize the links between political, security and development objectives”, which argues that peacebuilding is the most immediate concern in fragile states and is a prerequisite for development.

Timor Leste’s quest for security and development

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Timor Leste may be one of the newest and least developed countries in the world, but the country’s experience since independence of the difficulty of developing in the face of insecurity and instability, as well as the international advocacy skills gained by the ruling Fretilin party during the struggle against Indonesian occupation, have made it a poignant leader for the g7+. Since independence, Timor Leste has endured multiple political and security crises. The most pronounced of these crises were the 2006 factional military revolt, which devolved into generalized violence, causing 38 fatalities and over 150,000 internally displaced persons, violence around the 2007 elections, and the coordinated 2008 assassination attempts against President José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ Gusmão. However, there remains a high baseline level of violence and insecurity due to ordinary criminal activity, gang violence, and intimate partner violence primarily against women.

Until 2008, Timor Leste was struggling to make any developmental progress, despite massive injections of international aid and the presence of international peacekeeping forces. Mismanagement and wastefulness in aid spending have most certainly been a problem in Timor Leste. It has been estimated by Timorese development watchdog La’o Hamutuk that between 1999 and 2009, approximately US$5.2 billion was spent by bilateral and multilateral development agencies in Timor Leste, but only about 10% of this money went directly to into the Timorese

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2 Matt Crook, “East Timor: For Fragile States, MDG Summit Outcome Off-target” (Inter Press Service, 23 September 2010).

economy; the vast majority of funds were spent paying for foreign employees and outfitting them, generally with imported supplies. According to Timorese Minister of Finance Emília Pires, US$8 billion came into Timor Leste between 1999 and 2007, with only about US$1.5 billion of that entering the local economy.

Insecurity and instability, however, played at least an equally large role in hampering development in Timor Leste (beyond the high-priced security consultants and personnel they lead to among the international community on the ground). Poverty and malnutrition actually increased between 2001 and 2007, with the percentage of population living below the basic needs poverty line of US$0.88 per day going from 36% in 2001 to over 50% in 2007. The government’s 2009 report to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) on its MDG progress blamed the 2006 crisis for setbacks in a number of areas, including poverty and child and maternal mortality. Seeing how the impacts of conflict and instability on Timor Leste’s already vulnerable population hampered human development and economic growth, the government began to concentrate its own efforts and its partnerships with donors on improving the security sector and rectifying potentially problematic situations, such as the high levels of poverty and unemployment among military veterans of the independence struggle, who might be tempted to resort to violence in the post-conflict environment.

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Security sector reform in Timor Leste and the road ahead

International donors have remained the driving force behind security sector reform in Timor Leste, though

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4 La’o Hamutuk, “How much money have international donors spent on and in Timor-Leste?” (La’o Hamutuk Briefing Paper, September 2009).
5 Crook, ‘East Timor: For Fragile States, MDG Summit Outcome Off-target’.
this has slowly changed as the government has become more assertive. The impetus, however, remains largely with bilateral and multilateral donors, key among them Portugal and Australia, with Brazil also making a smaller contribution. The police have needed the most investment and reforms due to their previous weakness and lack of institutional support from the government. The UN police (UNPOL) have been the primary training and capacity building partner of the Timorese police force, but training has been highly uneven, as UNPOL members come for a variety of states, each with their own policing doctrine; there have even been reports of UNPOL officers counseling their Timorese peers to use excessive force.\footnote{International Center for Transitional Justice, “Security Sector Reform in Timor-Leste” (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2009), pp. 11-12.} The Timorese police and government have demanded a better and more cohesive police training regimen in response to this, and coordinated efforts by Australia and Portugal have begun to bear fruit.

Timor Leste took an important step toward consolidating both security sector reform and its own sovereignty on March 27\textsuperscript{th} 2011 when the United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) handed over control and coordination of policing to the Timorese national police. UNMIT and UNPOL will continue to play a role in police training and advising, and may be called upon for more active involvement in special circumstances, but responsibility for internal security now stands as a task and test for the Timorese themselves.

The increased security and stability that Timor Leste has enjoyed since 2008 have enabled the country to develop significantly in the years since. It will still be difficult for Timor Leste to meet all of its Millennium Development Goals, but the country demonstrates the need for security to be established in order to implement sustainable programs and reforms for development. The increased security and stability that Timor Leste has enjoyed since 2008 have enabled the country to develop significantly in the years since. It will still be difficult for Timor Leste to meet all of its MDGs, but the country demonstrates the need for security to be established in order to implement sustainable programs and reforms for development.

Timor Leste may in fact have benefited from its status as a very new country, which has allowed it to remain on the global agenda and prevented fatigue among donors. Other g7+ countries such as Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are unfortunately in some ways considered old news and lost causes, places where billions of dollars in aid have seemingly amounted to nothing. By banding together, though, the g7+ countries ensure that their voices are heard and that development in fragile states may begin to take place through partnership, rather than an unequal donor-recipient relationship. Local accountability must remain a priority, but worries about this should not preclude donors from seeking local, context-specific knowledge to improve and better target their aid. With security established as the basis for all further development, the g7+ countries have both set a concrete target for aid outcomes and also taken aim at their most intractable problem.

Timor Leste’s newfound peace and stability will face another test in the lead up to the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2012. Should the disorder of the 2007 elections be avoided, it will be one more sign that Timor Leste is overcoming its turbulent past and that its leadership in the g7+ may begin to serve as a beacon for other fragile states.
Timeline of Events

Angola

2 April (Luanda):
The newspaper Novo Jornal revealed that eight new Angolan Ambassadors will be posted to Austria, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, India, Guinea-Bissau and Zambia, while 16 others will change posts – including Russia, the UN, Mozambique, Brazil and China. This movement is seen as part of George Chicoty’s overhaul of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

4 April (Luanda):
Angola celebrated the 9th anniversary of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding, the historic agreement reached between the MPLA and UNITA which brought the civil war to an end. Angola was the last Lusophone country to reach peace, after living in almost uninterrupted conflict since 1961.

6 April (Luanda):
Although in a lighter way, the Angolan government reaffirmed its support for Ivory Coast’s incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo. Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesman José Maria Fernandes stated that Angola fully backs the AU but also that the country “should create a government of national unity, on the basis of dialogue, since Laurent Gbagbo was constitutionally elected”, while stating that “Angola will not enter [in] Ivory Coast like the French”.

8-9 April (Malabo):
Angola and Equatorial-Guinea held the first joint commission meeting. The Angolan delegation was led by Oil Minister José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos, and was comprised of officials from the Foreign Affairs, Petroleum, Interior, Transports, Agriculture and Fisheries, Science and Technology and Trade Ministries. Those areas were chosen for greater cooperation between the two nations.

11 April (Luanda):
Zimbabwe’s Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai traveled to Luanda to meet President José Eduardo dos Santos ahead of an extraordinary Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit meeting scheduled for May. This visit was framed within a diplomatic effort by Tsvangirai to isolate Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe. Angola will chair the SADC from August. No details were made public about this meeting, although Tsvangirai called it “excellent”.

11-14 April (Washington-Atlanta):
An Angolan Parliamentary delegation visited the US at the invitation of the National Democratic Institute.

12 April (Luanda):
The MPLA Politburo, chaired by José Eduardo dos Santos, held a meeting to analyze the country’s current socio-economic status. The Politburo also agreed to organize the IVth extraordinary congress.

12-15 April (Brasilia):
Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem visited Brazil at the invitation of his counterpart Nelson Jobim. He signed a bilateral memorandum to support Angola’s plans to expand its continental platform.

13 April (Washington):
Oil Minister José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos represented Angola in an international offshore oil meeting hosted by the US Department of the Interior. Botelho de Vasconcelos stated that current oil prices are due to the war in Libya.

14 April (Luanda):
The IMF revealed new growth forecasts for Angola. According to the Fund, the country will resume two-digit growth by 2012, reaching a 10.5% expansion.

15 April (Luanda):
Ruling party MPLA held the First Extraordinary Session of its Central Committee. President José Eduardo dos Santos inaugurated the event, seen as the kick-off for the 2012 general-election campaign, with a speech highlighting the MPLA’s role as a driver for change in Angola – since the colonial struggle to “democratic processes”. The President criticized those that, in the social networks, “talk of revolution, but they do not talk of democratic alternation” and rejected allegations that he held US$20 billion abroad.

20 April (Luanda):
Angolan Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos ‘Nandó’ announced that five new hospitals would be built in Luanda until the end of the year. It remains to be seen – as the Chinese ambassador pointed out earlier this year – if there will be doctors available to staff these infrastructures.

20-21 April (Luanda):
Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada met President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty, with whom he reviewed current bilateral relations. Among the topics discussed was the involvement of Angola’s National Oil Company – Sonangol – in several projects in São Tomé, including in the water sector and airport.

25 April (Luanda):
Equatorial-Guinea’s Interior Minister Nicolas Obama Nchama visited Angola, where his counterpart Sébastiao Martins received him. The two ministers reviewed bilateral cooperation, while Nchama was keen on learning from Angola’s experience organizing the CAN football tournament in 2010.

29-30 April (Luanda):
The MPLA’s IVth Extraordinary Congress inaugurated the pre-campaign mood in Angola. In his opening speech, President José Eduardo dos Santos praised Angola’s role as a promoter of stability in international relations, especially in Africa, highlighting its involvement in the Great Lakes Region, the Gulf of Guinea and in Guinea-Bissau. However, he warned against a return to Cold War methods, since he considers that the use of force and interference in countries’ internal affairs are being over-used.

30 April (Vatican):
Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos ‘Nandó’ traveled to Rome where he
represented the Angolan President at Pope John Paul II’s beatification.

Brazil

1 April [Santiago do Chile]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Chile where met with his counterpart Alberto Moreno, under the IIth Meeting of the Bilateral Commission. Bilateral cooperation, agriculture and energetic issues, as well as Haiti and UNASUR, were high on the agenda.

4 April [Brasilia]:
Costa Rican Foreign Minister René Castro Salazar met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota, seeking to review the respective political, economic and cooperative bilateral agenda.

5-6 April [New York]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota attended a UN Security Council meeting on the ongoing situation in Haiti.

10 April [Athens]:
As a stopover in her visit to China, President Dilma Rousseff paid an unofficial visit to Greece, where she met with Prime Minister George Papandreou. The current financial crisis and the possibility of Greece purchasing Brazilian biofuels were among the topics discussed.

12-13 April [Beijing]:
President Dilma Rousseff paid an official visit to China, seeking to reinforce bilateral economic relations between the two countries. To that end, Rousseff met with her counterpart Hu Jintao, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Wu Bangguo and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, to sign several cooperation agreements. Furthermore, significant business deals were also achieved in aviation, agriculture and technological hardware.

12-15 April [Brasilia]:
Defense Minister Nelson Jobim welcomed his Angolan counterpart Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem to Brazil. Van-Dúnem took the opportunity to sign a bilateral memorandum to support Angola’s plans to expand its continental platform.

14 April [Sanya]:
President Dilma Rousseff attended the III BRICS Summit, alongside her Chinese, South African, Russian and Indian counterparts – Hu Jintao, Jacob Zuma, Dmitry Medvedev and Manmohan Singh respectively – with calls for greater representation in international financial institutions and increased cooperation in multiple areas between these countries. On the sidelines, Rousseff also took the opportunity to meet with Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov.

15 April [Bo’Ao]:
President Dilma Rousseff attended the Bo’Ao Economic Forum, a non-governmental Asian platform for global political, business and academic leaders.

16 April [Tokyo]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Japan, where he met with his local counterpart Takeaki Matsumoto, seeking to convey Brazil’s solidarity and support for the ongoing reconstruction of the country, following the March earthquake.

20 April [Brasilia]:
During the ceremonies for Diplomat Day, President Dilma Rousseff took the opportunity to reaffirm her country’s foreign priorities. Among them, "South America will continue to be the foreign policy priority of my government. There is no room for discords and rivalries which split us in the past”. Moreover, Rousseff also stated that "Reforming the UN Security Council is not a whim of Brazil. It reflects the need to adjust this important instrument to the correlation of forces of the 21st century".

25 April [Brasilia]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with UNASUR Secretary-General María Emma Mejía to discuss Brazilian priorities for the organization in 2011 – particularly infrastructure, the fight against the worldwide drug problem and institutional consolidation – and the plans of the designated Secretary-General for her tenure.

26 April [Caracas]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota took part in the Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALCI), with the creation of a new regional mechanism – the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) – high on the agenda.

27-29 April [Rio de Janeiro]:
Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota attended the VI edition of the World Economic Forum on Latin America, this year under the motto of “Establishing the Foundations for a Latin American Decade”.

30 April [São Paulo]:
According to Folha de São Paulo newspaper reports, the Brazilian government has allegedly ordered Brazilian ambassador to the Organization of American States Ruy Casaes to remain in Brasilia, in a clear signal of protest to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), after it requested that the construction of a dam in the Amazon be suspended.

Cape Verde

5 April [Praia]:
Prime Minister José Maria Neves delivered his government’s agenda for 2011-2016 to the National Assembly.

12 April [Praia]:
President Pedro Pires met with vice-chairperson of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of China Chen Zhili, seeking to review bilateral ties.

Guinea-Bissau

4 April [Bissau]:
Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior defended the presence of the Angolan military mission in the country by stating that it is only intended to support the Security Sector Reform process and should not be wrongly interpreted.

7 April [Bissau]:
Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai praised Angola’s technical-military mission in the country – MISSANG/GB –, and expressed hope that this assistance would help his country avoid international isolation.
8 April (Bissau):  
Guinea-Bissau’s government released an official statement calling for the immediate suspension of air strikes against Libya, which it considers an attack on the Libyan people.

10 April (Washington):  
The US State Department released its annual Human Rights Report 2010, in which it accuses current Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai of commanding the troop squad which assassinated former President João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Veira in March 2009.

12 April (Bissau):  
The Armed Forces Chief of Staff António Indjai stated that the “political bodies” should answer the accusation made by the US State Department, as the military are subjected to the political authorities. The government stated that the US State Department’s attitude only fostered political instability, while it reiterated its support for the current military leadership.

20 April (Abidjan):  
According to Ivorian newspapers, some 85 officials linked to Gbagbo’s regime were caught with Bissau-Guinean diplomatic passports when escaping the country. Bissau’s government stated that it has no knowledge of having issued those documents.

26-27 April (Dakar):  
Guinea-Bissau’s donor roundtable took place with the presence of 20 major donors such as the EU, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, as well as bilateral donors. The needs and projects for the energy and water sectors – seen as crucial by the government – were presented to international partners. No final decisions were made, although the donors showed strong interest.

29 April (Bissau):  
The Electoral commission stated that it needed passports when escaping the country. Bissau’s officials linked to Gbagbo’s regime were assassinated former President João Bernardo ‘Nino’ Veira.

29 April (Maputo):  
The IMF’s Representative to Mozambique Victor Lledó announced that according to the organization’s estimates, Mozambique’s economy grew about 6.5% in 2010 and is expected to reach 7.2% in 2011.

12 April (Maputo):  
According to an official statement, the World Bank is to grant Mozambique a US$41 million loan to support the application of the second phase of the program to manage and maintain roads and bridges. This financial package is in addition to another one worth US$100 million, to be channeled into the Mozambican roads and bridges sector.

13 April (Maputo):  
During the opening of a three-day exhibition of Portuguese Goods and Services, Portuguese ambassador to Mozambique Mário Godinho de Matos announced that Mozambican exports to Portugal fell by 32% last year, down from €42.8 million in 2009 to €29.2 million in 2010.

18 April (Maputo):  
President Armando Guebuza met with self-proclaimed President of the High Transitional Authority of Madagascar Andry Rajoelina, seeking to lay the ground for a solution that allows for Madagascar’s return to constitutional rule.

20 April (Maputo):  
At a meeting of the government’s National Mine Action Program (PNAM), UN representative Jennifer Topping stated that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimates at US$21 million the funding needed to complete mine clearance in Mozambique between 2012 and 2014 – most of which has not yet been pledged by donors.

Portugal

1 April (Lisbon):  
Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his United Arab Emirates (UAE) counterpart Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan for the inauguration of the embassy in Lisbon. Moreover, bilateral cooperation and several international issues were also addressed.

6-7 April (Beijing):  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, João Gomes Cravinho met with Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying, exchanging views on China-Portugal relations, China-EU ties, as well as international and regional issues of common concern.

7 April (Lisbon):  
With borrowing rates soaring, Prime Minister José Sócrates announced that Portugal would ask the European Commission to begin the necessary procedures in order the provide the country with financial assistance.

8-9 April (Budapest):  
President Aníbal Cavaco Silva traveled to Hungary where he took part in a two-day meeting of the Arriaios Group, comprised of Portugal, Germany, Austria, Finland, Italy, Hungary, Latvia and Poland’s Heads of State.

12 April (Luxembourg):  
Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) meeting with the situation in Libya and Ivory Coast, as well as the implementation of the Southern Neighborhood strategy and the Middle East Peace Process, high on the agenda.

14-15 April (Berlin):  
Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the Meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers, with Libya and Afghanistan among the topics covered. Sideline meetings under the framework of NATO-Georgia (NGC), NATO-Ukraine (NUC) and the NATO-Russia (NRC) Councils, were also held.

15 April (Lisbon):  
Ukraine’s Deputy Economy Minister Valerii Pyatnytskyi met with Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourteig for bilateral consultations on the ongoing EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area negotiations.

19-21 April (Abu Dhabi):  
Foreign Minister Luís Amado traveled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), where he attended the XXIst Joint Meeting of the EU’s and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s Foreign Ministers, with recent developments in the Middle East high on the agenda. Amado also took the opportunity to inaugurate the Portuguese embassy in Abu Dhabi alongside his local counterpart, Sheik Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan.

21 April (Lisbon):  
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen met with President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and...
Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva to review the ongoing process for the restructuring of the organization, including the geographic distribution of command posts.

São Tomé and Príncipe

14 April (São Tomé): President Fradique de Menezes scheduled the upcoming presidential elections for July 17th.

20-21 April (Luanda): Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada, accompanied by Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, traveled to Angola where he met with President José Eduardo dos Santos and several other high authorities.

26 April (São Tomé): The President of the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Services (CCIAS) Abílio Afonso Henriques signed a cooperation agreement with his counterpart from the Taiwan International Economic Cooperation Association Mike Hung, seeking to make Taiwanese investment in the archipelago easier. Hung is in São Tomé heading a delegation of 14 businesspeople, having already been received by São Tomé’s Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada, and by Minister for Planning and Development Agostinho Fernandes.

28 April (São Tomé): According to São Tomé’s Minister for Natural Resources Carlos Vila Nova, Angolan state oil company Sonangol plans to invest US$12 million in 2011 to refurbish and modernize the Ana Chaves seaport and the São Tomé international airport.

Timor Leste

1 April (Canberra): Following the Bali Process Meeting, UN Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, Erika Feller said there have not been any formal talks with Timor Leste, about a regional processing center, despite Australia’s plans.

5 April (Díli): Thirty-one maritime officers from the Timorese Defense Forces (F-FDTL) participated in a joint training exercise with the US, Australian and New Zealand forces, off the coast of Timor.

6 April (Darwin): Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres confirmed that his country has rejected Australia’s proposal to establish a refugee processing center on Timorese soil.

8 April (Sydney): The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) issued a new report recommending the extension of the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) presence in Timor Leste beyond 2012.

12 April (Díli): Commenting on ASPI’s latest report, President José Ramos-Horta dismissed suggestions that Australian Defense Forces should remain in Timor Leste beyond a planned 2012 withdrawal. Ramos-Horta also stated that “it has been 10 years since independence. A country has to be on its own, on its own feet” and that “if we were to continue to need a strong international police force, it’s an admission of failure of leadership”.

15 April (Díli): Australian Defense Minister Stephen Smith visited Timor Leste, marking the 10th anniversary of Australia’s Defense Cooperation Program with the country. Smith took this opportunity to meet with President José Ramos-Horta, Vice Prime Minister José Luís Guterres, Secretary of State for Defense Júlio Pinto and Chief of Timor Leste’s Defense Forces Major General Taur Matan Ruak.

20 April (Sydney): Outgoing Woodside Petroleum chief executive Don Voelte expressed his frustration over the stalemate with Timorese authorities by lashing out at the country’s own progress.

25 April (Díli): Government spokesman Ágio Pereira rebuffed Woodside’s accusations.

26 April (Díli): China formally delivered a donation of 5000 tons of rice to Timor Leste in order to cover the food deficit in the country caused by a bad agricultural year.

30 April (Díli): Following contradictory reports of President José Ramos-Horta’s stance on the Australian-backed refugee-processing center, Prime Minister José Alexandre ‘Xanana’ Gusmão clearly stated that he had never accepted it, thus adding another blow to this process.
EDP ranks top 1 worldwide in the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, in the electricity sector. It reflects our role in the economical, environmental and social dimensions.

For the third consecutive year, EDP is listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Indexes, the most widely quoted stock market indicators to track the financial and sustainability performance of companies. This year we are the worldwide leader in our business sector, a recognition that rewards EDP's commitment to sustainable development. A company capable of creating wealth without ever losing sight of the social and environmental aspects. This is the way EDP performs, which reflects all our employees and stakeholders engagement for a better future.