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- 22 ESDP IN STRATEGIC NEIGHBOURHOODS: PROMISES OF STABILITY
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COOPERATION
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Chapters in books: Manuel Ennes Ferreira, "China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?", in Christopher Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 295-317.

Articles in journals: Paulo Gorjão, "Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975-2002" (*Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 5, September/October 2002), pp. 754-771.

Articles in newspapers: Paulo Gorjão, "UN needs coherent strategy to exit from East Timor" (*Jakarta Post*, 19 May 2004), p. 25.

5. Diagrams and tables should be avoided, or kept to a minimum.

ESDP in Strategic Neighbourhoods: Promises of Stability through International Military Cooperation

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Introduction:

ESDP as a Multifaceted Instrument for the Use of Force

The European Union (EU) is usually labelled a *sui generis* foreign policy actor. The 2003 *European Security Strategy*¹ advances, in an imprecise manner, the possible use of 'robust' responses to international challenges when needed. How accurate is this label? The military dimension of the EU has to be found in its evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). Since the launching of ESDP, and its first missions in 2003, the EU has been able to achieve noticeable progress on two fronts. On the one hand, it enhances internal capabilities for crisis management; on the other hand, it favours the principle of the participation of third countries in missions.

The *Strategy* needs to be adapted to rapidly-evolving EU instruments for crisis prevention and management. Since 2003, more than twenty ESDP operations and missions were launched in three continents. Despite these rapid initial achievements, the EU still faces structural challenges; namely, in terms of military capabilities (the need for an industrial base and a European defence market). The political will to act collectively is also crucial because the EU's military capabilities are those of its member states. The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, underlined the satisfying, but not sufficient, current state and stressed that "Europe is not an option among others. It is the unique horizon which is up to our political and strategic ambitions".²

These European ambitions are mainly directed at its neighbourhood. The strategic objective of creating security in this area is not only enshrined in the *Strategy*. Brussels further advanced this goal in the 2003 *Wider Europe* concept and in the subsequent *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP).³ Brussels is becoming more demanding and intrusive in domestic and neighbourhood affairs and proposes a stability model for part of its Eastern and Southern borders. In fact, the *common neighbourhood* reflects the enlarged EU's view of its external role on the borders. Nonetheless, specific security issues arise in these non-candidate countries and the EU method of addressing them is, mainly, 'soft' measures oriented. Moreover, security concerns are also considered by the EU in other direct or indirect borders, such as the Balkans and Africa. In the ENP geographic area, and in the other spaces impacting on European stability, Brussels needs to cooperate with key regional players, such as Russia, African states and regional organisations.

Our analysis seeks to compare EU international military cooperation in two strategic neighbourhoods: Eastern Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa. Considering the need to rely on relevant non-EU players, we assess the feasibility of launching EU missions. We aim to balance the impact of two main factors on the nature and scope of these missions: domestic EU constraints and military international cooperation with external states.

For that purpose, we compare two cases. On the one hand, we analyze the causes of weak cooperation with Russia on ESDP and the perspectives for 'frozen' conflicts in Europe (first section). On the other hand, we analyze the success of linkage between ESDP and EU development programs in Sub-Saharan Africa (second section). Against the background of differentiated security challenges, we aim to characterize the multifaceted use of ESDP. We detect a double tendency in ESDP: even if the EU is developing novel approaches to the use of the military tools for obtaining security (Africa), it is also a limited actor when addressing traditional security issues ('frozen' conflicts).

The Russian Challenge: A Difficult Role for ESDP in Europe⁴

From the EU's perspective, the purpose of the relationship with Moscow is to avoid new dividing lines in Europe after having overcome the previous one (bipolarity). An approximation of former enemies has occurred, mainly from the late 1990s onwards. Within the framework of EU-Russia cooperation, informed by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA, 1997) and the methodology of the four 'common spaces' (2003), security and defense issues are tackled. This is one of the most recent and least advanced areas of cooperation between the two actors. Nonetheless, progress is noticeable for two reasons. First, the PCA did not foresee this domain of interaction, and economic and trade cooperation have been prioritized. Secondly, taking into account the rapid evolution of Brussels and Moscow as global players, cooperation under ESDP has been stimulated in recent years. Furthermore, the enlargements of the Union and of NATO have chal-

lenged Russian positions in Europe. Since 2003, ten ESDP missions have been launched in the western Balkans, Moldova-Ukraine and in the South Caucasus. In some cases, the Union took over NATO or UN missions.

From the EU's perspective, there has always been a concern to associate European NATO countries not belonging to the Union and candidate countries. Similarly, the concern over Turkish involvement also has emerged. The idea of creating a space for third-state participation resulted in the launching of a negotiation process culminating in the Seville European Council (June 2002). As a result, the guidelines stipulating conditions for third-state contributions to ESDP missions were adopted. Cooperation was, then, made possible for all NATO members, except with the US, which insisted on military cooperation through NATO; as distinct from bilateral cooperation in civilian matters (the recent agreement signed between Washington and Brussels for EULEX Kosovo is a sign of change in the American position). Generally, Brussels acknowledges interest in the participation of countries, such as Brazil, not specifically solicited for that effect.

Moscow did not evolve in its initial position regarding these developments, and considers that the conditions agreed at Seville are inappropriate. On the one hand, the Russians consider it a unilateral document rather than a partnership established on an equal footing. On the other hand, the NATO-Russia Council is the model Moscow would like to replicate in its relations with Brussels. The EU's decision-making autonomy is maintained and it is a "redline" that Brussels wants to protect, as opposed to the Russian will of equality. Brussels and Moscow do not share the same view on 'joint operations'. Contrary to what happens with other countries, the EU has therefore not been able to sign with Russia a framework agreement for participation, under article 24 of the Treaty.

We have underlined Russia's dissatisfaction with the arrangements proposed by the EU to all third states. Furthermore, there is a need for a package of technical agreements to clarify how classified information can be protected, namely in Russia. One of the main obstacles to further discussion on ESDP issues is the fact that Russia does not participate in missions on the ground. Talks regarding details are not possible if there is no field experience; such exercises are virtual, and Russians do not take part in missions.

What are the concrete achievements in the realm of ESDP cooperation with Moscow? So far, ESDP-Russia cooperation has materialized in four main dimensions: (1) missions, (2) orientation courses, (3) expert talks, (4) virtual exercises. We examine below the limitations of these outcomes and their potential for generating deeper interaction.

(1) The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia Herzegovina (EUPM) is the first ESDP mission launched by the EU, in January 2003. It is commonly affirmed that Russia participated in the EUPM, withdrawing in the spring of 2006.⁵ This is the information available publicly, but, in fact, the EU and Russia were not able to conclude the negotiations needed for Russian participation. As a result, no Russian forces were sent to the theatre of operations. The first ESDP mission to which Moscow contributed since the signing of an agreement on 5 November 2008 is the EUFOR Chad/CAR.⁶ Negotiations were initiated

on March 2008 and the deployment is foreseen for the last week of November. In addition to Russia, Croatia and Albania also participate. During the bilateral talks, EU officials noticed Russia's willingness to enter into dialogue with the EU.

Russia will contribute by "(...) providing the military contingent of the Military Forces of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as "the Russian military contingent") for the purpose of supporting the EU operation by way of air transportation (...)"⁷ The division of authority is clearly stated in article 1.2 and article 4.1: the decision-making autonomy of the EU is preserved and the Russian contingent remains under the full command of Russia. The Kremlin will deploy four MI-8 MT utility helicopters, with full supporting equipment, and 120 soldiers.⁸ As with all other third states, Russia must finance its contribution since CFSP has a budget only for civilian activities and not military ones. Besides the political weight of the participation, there is a huge financial burden. For instance, food is provided by France but on a reimbursement basis. This can be contrasted with UN missions, in which people in operations are paid by that organization.

(2) In mid-2005, the European Security and Defense College was created to provide training in the field of ESDP. It is actually a network uniting several institutions of the member states. The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) is also part of the Executive Academic Board. Not all the courses are open to non-EU actors, but three or four courses per year are open to third states (distinct from candidate states). The focus of an "ESDP Orientation Course" is variable.⁹ Expenses associated with travel and accommodations are supported by the participating state.

(3) Expert talks between Brussels and Moscow have occurred since 2006. Ukraine is also developing this type of interaction with the EU, albeit in a more successful manner. This is a unique formula organized with these two countries. Under Kiev's insistence a program has even been adopted that was not foreseen by the Union at the beginning. This fact is interpreted by EU officials as demonstrative of the Union's capacity to offer more to its partners when interest is manifested. Two sessions took place with Russia in 2006 and one was held in 2007 addressing such topics as: lessons learnt from operations, practical aspects of interoperability, EU military structures, comprehensive planning (military and civilian) including exercises and training, human rights standards and best practices during the armed forces' transformation, practical aspects of EU-Russia cooperation during crisis management (at the theoretical level). These contacts are considered useful by the Union to understand the EU functioning and to facilitate negotiations and prospects for practical involvement. Participation in EUFOR Chad/CAR will certainly be a test to assess the capacity to share lessons or to socialize the Russians in EU practices. The differences of understanding might be partially overcome.

Talks occur at a working level (low) and several of their characteristics permit to a mixed assessment of their utility. Generally, they deal with concrete operations, which allows for the highlighting of similarities since officials have common UN mission experiences. It is therefore easier to discuss concrete results. Nonetheless, the EU's way of

organizing multinationality is specific, and thus distinct from what is experienced in large scale operations such as Iraq. In this case, one or two big contributors provide the basic framework and multinationality is not experienced as deeply as in the EU missions. In the latter situation, cooperation occurs at a very low level.

(4) Virtual exercises conducted by the EU are also illustrative of cooperation with Moscow. Russian involvement in exercises is limited and not all member states participate. Russia is also not inclined to have contacts with the European Defence Agency (EDA). The Crisis Management Exercise (CME) was launched in 2002 and, after a long period with no exercises since 2004, the EU will hold the CME08 in December. This is a strategic level exercise for planning at different stages (decision-making in a fictitious scenario). It is an internal EU exercise in which consultations with third states may occur. Thus, these external players are not invited to EU internal meetings. Launched in 2005, the EU Military Exercise (MILEX) is another type of exercise where no member states are present. It is a command post exercise and it is designed to simulate interaction between an operational headquarters and a force headquarters during EU-led crisis management operations. Since the creation of the EU Operations Centre, in January 2007, the aim has been to evaluate its activation and interaction with the two headquarters. Third states are only informed by briefing. For them, the difference is not significant between a CME and a MILEX, but for Brussels there is one major distinction. In the first case, consultations occur while in the second case only information is provided. At any rate, there is limited space for Russian involvement in these exercises.

Besides these four areas of concrete ESDP-Russia cooperation, another issue is arising. Since 2005, a security agreement on EU classified information is being discussed. There is a major difference which is more political than technical. On the one hand, the EU already has a framework for this kind of agreement and it is not able to adapt it specifically to Russia. On the other hand, the Kremlin disagrees with these terms. At present, there is scope for such an agreement because topics labeled as classified information need to be discussed between the two parties. This is the case, for instance, with EU sanctions against third states or EU military capabilities. Moreover, Moscow has manifested proactive attitudes towards greater ESDP cooperation, such as sending diplomatic letters to the EU and proposing other actions. There was little scope for cooperation or even discussion, even if Moscow was willing to use the narrow existing scope of ESDP. Today, given the contribution to EUFOR Chad/CAR, we may identify a possible shift in this state of affairs. For instance, there is a classified information provision for the mission foreseen in article 3 of the EU-Russia agreement. This will constitute the first ground experience and may entail further developments. The Russian contribution represents the end of their limbo because of their position regarding joint operations. Their attitude changed in the Chadian case, even if divergences on principles (Seville framework) have not been overcome. For Brussels, their contribution is crucial because huge distances have to be covered on the ground (a con-

tingent of 2800 supports 400 individuals). In a scale of willingness to cooperate, Russia seems to have adopted a facilitating posture in Chad, as opposed to Kosovo, and, more drastically, Georgia.

Understanding the shadow of NATO and the US on EU-Russia military cooperation helps to grasp the broader context in which a security dialogue develops. The Union represents an added-value compared to the Atlantic Alliance since it can discuss a less sensitive agenda (not including missile defence, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), mostly dealing with crisis management. Furthermore, Russia has demonstrated that it is inclined to use this leverage to balance its strained relations with NATO and Washington. Furthermore, poor Russian cooperation with ESDP missions leads us to consider the question in another perspective. What are the ESDP missions in the common neighbourhood and what are their main results? How does Russia relate to them? The EU approach towards Moldova and Georgia has not produced results in terms of engaging Russia in a positive fashion. Even if the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia caught observers by surprise, it is illustrative of this analysis. As a matter of fact, Russia views overall ENP as an interference in its *near abroad*. Instead of becoming an idealised European partner, Russia is becoming, from the EU perspective, a foreign policy challenger. We can synthesise these differences by comparing two concepts that reveal very different world-views: 'zone of influence' for the Kremlin *versus* 'neighbourhood policy' for the Union. The EU soft approach to these countries is certainly useful for their European aspirations but it has not helped to address Russia as an unavoidable part of the solution, nor does this help to create constructive and cooperative policies.

ESDP in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bringing Stability to Development

Significant advances have been made in addressing the causes and consequences of the last decade's conflicts in Africa, leading to the acceptance of the proposition that security depends on development and the other way around. In other words, the promotion of development has become synonymous with the pursuit of security. At the same time, security became a prerequisite for sustainable development".¹⁰ Areas like governance, rule of law and the security sector are seen as the basis for a sustainable peace, the last being crucial for conflict management while providing a safe and secure environment for development projects. This linkage has priority in the EU's agenda for sub-Saharan Africa. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) made the truth of this bi-univocal relation even clearer, while the EU reiterated its importance during the Africa-EU Summit of December 2007. Although this nexus became increasingly evident over the past years, the Commission and the Council have been pursuing different perspectives regarding the evolution of the concepts concerning development and security, making it difficult to reach a unique approach.

Concerning development, cooperation plays an important role in addressing the causes of conflict and the expressions of violence and insecurity. It then becomes necessary to analyse the success of the linkage between ESDP and EU development programs in Sub-Saharan Africa as new forms and concepts of international cooperation. The core ideas of the 2003 *European Security Strategy* and of the 2005 *EU Concept of Development* stressed that nexus, but the Union's internal debate has evolved since then. There is a long path to follow until this linkage constitutes the basis for EU intervention in fragile countries.

The EU has been carrying on development cooperation activities and humanitarian aid where security and crisis management actors are active and where conflict sensitive approaches are required. At the same time, the EU has strengthened its foreign policy role under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its crisis management capacity under the ESDP. Therefore, the EU possesses instruments and policies able (with some adaptations) to reinforce the nexus between security and development. The evolution of EU structures and procedures is taking place, a fact that may be confirmed by looking at strategic planning, in which the EU has put a major effort reinforcing capabilities to include concepts such as protection of women and children, and working conditions for humanitarian agencies in ESDP missions. Security Sector Reform (SSR) has also been going through a process of approximation of the two EU pillars: EC development projects have been contemplating the institutional reform of fragile countries in order to raise structures to support development plans, and SSR second pillar projects have been coordinated with ongoing development projects.

Prior to the Lisbon Summit, Africa-EU relations on Security and Defence were distributed at different levels: bilateral cooperation, ESDP missions in major crises and cooperation at the regional and continental level. This event reinforced the idea of the need for stronger linkages, towards a common front facing security threats and challenges. The Africa-EU strategic partnership¹¹ contains the promise that, through military co-operation, it is possible to stabilise one of the most insecure and poorer areas of the globe, sub-Saharan Africa, and thus bringing prosperity and security to this neighbourhood.

Many EU member states have been very active in development or SSR projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2003, EU attention to Africa was incremented in the security sphere, complementing the role of development cooperation with more concrete steps. ESDP missions largely contributed to this. But the growing relevance of Chinese and American actions in Africa underlines the importance of Africa in EU's agenda. Furthermore, the need to address complex challenges to security, such as illegal migration and trafficking, constitutes another relevant parameter for Europe and Africa.

The EU conducted various ESDP actions in Africa since the launching of its first military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), in 2003. After that, the most successful ESDP activity was the operation EUFOR RDC to support MONUC (the United Nations Mission in DRC) and the establishment of a security environment during the 2006 Congolese elections. At present, ESDP missions are underway in Chad, CAR, Guinea-

Bissau and DRC. The coastal waters of Somalia are the destination for a new mission to protect maritime sea-lanes from piracy. But other aspects relating to security and defence have been given priority. For instance, the African Peace Facility (APF) received EU's financial and technical support and the African project of raising a Standby Force (ASF) received attention in the form of training, although the AU has experienced difficulties in carrying on the project of raising one Brigade by each African economic region.

Did the EU achieve all of the objectives that were identified in these efforts? Maybe not. But the evolution of EU policy towards Africa constitutes progress. The EU has been progressively re-orienting its efforts to new perspectives, whereas development projects are intrinsically linked to security conditions. At the present time, EU involvement achieved great evolution and threat assessments on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failing states and organised crime, all defined as key common threats to Europe and Africa.

Relation of ESDP Missions with Other Actors

One factor contributing to the success of ESDP missions is the effective participation and cooperation of other actors, including third countries providing military capacities; host nations welcoming ESDP activities; NGOs operating in ESDP mission areas; International Organizations providing legal framing and politically supporting the missions.

Militarily, the Union is weak in strategic airlift and tactical air transport, as seen in the EUFOR Chad/CAR. Sometimes even "boots on the ground" from third countries are needed, and EU resorts to third countries to fill the gaps.

Special attention has to be dedicated to the work of NGOs on ESDP areas of operations, to avoid endangering their tasks and missions. Even the presence of an armed force near a NGO can sometimes turn their workers into targets. Finally, ESDP missions also must take into account international organisations like UN and the AU that play central roles in the field just like other EU entities present in the theatre.

The contribution third states and international organisations to the common efforts (including military co-operation, to stabilise, secure and develop certain regions of sub-Saharan Africa) improves the stability of Europe's strategic neighbourhood.

The nexus Security-Development in the EU's strategic planning

Does the EU-Africa Strategy contain elements to reinforce the nexus Security-Development? Does the strategy reinforce the EU's ability to provide stability in its neighbourhood? The strategic partnership points to a new manner of military co-operation between Africa and Europe, thus creating great expectations regarding the synergies produced,

and reinforcing the ability of the two parts to face common challenges to stability. Each part depends on the resources and the will of the other for the creation of an enlarged space of peace and prosperity.

The *Strategy* contains the elements fuelling the nexus Security-Development, but Africa needs to accelerate towards the accomplishment of the MDGs and, to achieve it, the best instruments are the specific strategies defined in the Strategy Action Plan. One year after the approval of the Africa-EU Strategy, the results, so far, are modest, and the process is clearly behind schedule. But these are crucial to bringing stability to EU neighbourhoods.

Conclusion:

The Need to Balance Military and Civil Engagement of ESDP

The fact that the EU is best defined as a post-modern actor has consequences on its ability to develop ESDP involvement. Depending on the security challenge and on relative power and needs in the partner countries, Brussels is more or less capable of using ESDP as tool to address security crisis. In the case of sub-Saharan Africa, security challenges are closely linked to development concerns and statehood fragility. That posture is expected to give impetus to development projects. In the Russian case, Brussels' ambitions in Eastern Europe and in the South Caucasus raise another catalogue of security concerns. 'Frozen' conflicts and Balkan disintegration are addressed by different tools (ESDP, ENP and accession tools). This is so because the Union deals with candidate and non-candidate countries. Moreover, Russia is the biggest European neighbour and is unwilling to be a member of the EU. Until now, Russia has cooperated only in one ESDP mission, and is not willing to cooperate in the ENP framework. The contribution of four helicopters to the EUFOR Chad/CAR is a positive albeit very recent signal. It may create conditions for further military cooperation under ESDP.

The deepening of CFSP/ESDP is regularly pointed out as a precondition for the EU to be an empowered global actor and a stability provider. Nonetheless, understanding the recent difficulties in creating political convergence is crucial for interpreting poor EU-Russian military cooperation. Furthermore, today there exists a complex 'basket' of security issues which relate to each other and undermine cooperation on 'frozen' conflicts and weaken the legal underpinnings for solutions. For instance, Russia's willingness to withdraw from the CFE Treaty impacts conventional armaments and the stationing of troops in disputed regions, and US installation of a missile shield in two EU member states is an irritant. As the French Permanent Representative to the EU underlines, "structures cannot be by themselves the solution for a political problem".¹² In the case of cooperation with Russia, both prospects are needed: more political convergence and a better EU offer. Nonetheless, even if Brussels has a responsibility to create alternatives

that are acceptable to Russia, Russia has the responsibility to interact positively and in a less confrontational fashion.

As far as Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, the EU has demonstrated its ability to develop ESDP activities through military cooperation with other actors, including African ones. Apart from contributing to a security environment in Africa, the EU is now redirecting its efforts to the construction of African military capabilities foreseen in the *EU-Africa Strategy* signed in Lisbon last year. The reinforcement of the military capabilities of African countries, by supporting the *African Peace and Security Architecture*, will be one of the major efforts Brussels will pursue in the continent. This will be undertaken, for the time being, by projects such as the EURORECAMP.

In the context of transforming the nature of security, traditional military intervention is still needed. Does the EU need such a capacity? It is arguable in conflict resolution in Africa, where a strong response may be considered the only solution to violent crisis. In the case of Russia, it would also help to bring Russia back to Europe and rebalance the disputed role of Washington and NATO. At present, Brussels is using ENP as a core instrument towards the attainment of stability in the post-Soviet space. We may criticize the value of this approach to deliver short and medium term results in 'frozen' conflicts. As the comparison between Eastern European and sub-Saharan ESDP involvement demonstrates, relative power is a key variable which determines the feasibility of launching missions. On the one hand, ESDP strong linkage with the nexus security-development has brought a novel approach to security in sub-Saharan Africa, validating the EU's holistic approach to problems, together with the African Union. In this context, the civil component of ESDP has been a valuable element for the promotion of stability. On the other hand, political rapprochement is a key element which needs to be further advanced in the relationship with Moscow so as to engage more seriously in the stabilization of the European neighbourhood. Where and how Russia and the EU fit into the regional structure of cooperation is a recurrent issue. The development of the military component of ESDP is a key to answer this question, in addition to the need to develop the civilian instruments capable of addressing complex security challenges.

Endnotes

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- 4 This section is, in part, based on primary evidence gathered from interviews conducted by Sandra Fernandes, between January 2007 to December 2008, with EU officials, Russian officials and experts.
- 5 See the website of the Council of the European Union.
- 6 Council of the European Union, Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the Agreement between the European Union and the Russian Federation on the participation of the Russian Federation in the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic (Operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA). 10806/08. (Brussels, 7 October 2008).
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