



Portugal and South Africa: Matching words with deeds

PAULO GORJÃO
Researcher, IPRIS

Portuguese Foreign Minister Luís Amado has emphasized on several occasions over the last few years, namely last February in Addis Ababa on the sidelines of the 14th African Union Summit, that Southern Africa is nowadays the most important region in the world as far as Lisbon's diplomacy is concerned. Following the same logic, Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva emphasized while visiting Luanda last July that Angola could be an access platform for Portugal regarding Southern Africa.

The rhetoric on the importance of Southern Africa to Portugal's foreign policy is not surprising, considering that one of Portuguese diplomacy's main pillars is centered on Portuguese-speaking countries, two of them – Angola and Mozambique – being located precisely in the region. Last year, Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho went

as far as describing both Portuguese-speaking Southern African countries as the “spinal column of the relationship [of Portugal] with the African continent”.

Portugal's interest in Southern Africa is multilayered. Not only is there a significant community of Portuguese expatriates, but the Portuguese language itself is important in the region. Indeed, it is the official language in Angola and Mozambique, as well as one of the working languages of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU).

Moreover, while a few years ago the interest of Portuguese companies – such as Banif, BPI, Cimpor, CGD, Escom, Galp, Martifer, Mota Engil, MSF, Portugal Telecom, Sonae, Teixeira Duarte, among others – was centered mainly on Angola and Mozambique, nowadays their focus is spreading to the entire region. Indeed, diversifying exporting markets beyond European countries has become an imperative for the Portuguese economy, which is now looking not only to Portuguese-speaking countries with renewed interest, but also to the whole of Southern Africa.

Last but not the least, Portugal also has a political interest in the region. Southern Africa is a central part of Lisbon's strategy towards the African continent, as well as regarding the European Union (EU). The more relevant Portugal becomes in Southern Africa,

the more influence it will have in the African continent in general. Moreover, as it was pointed out by Foreign Minister Luís Amado last January, Portugal will become more relevant in the EU if it is able to be influent in other regions such as Southern Africa. Also, Portugal could perform the role of bridge builder between the EU and the SADC, thus reinforcing its influence in both chessboards.

The development of a bilateral relationship between Lisbon and Pretoria is crucial if indeed Portugal really wishes to match words with deeds when it says that Southern Africa is a strategic region. An increasingly important relationship with South Africa will give Portugal additional power vis-à-vis Angola and Mozambique, while at the same time working as an access platform regarding Southern Africa. The South African market is, by far, the most developed in Sub-Saharan Africa. It would not be unrealistic to explore possible business opportunities in South Africa, bearing in mind the large Portuguese community in the country – around 200 thousand – and their capacity to establish bridges between the two countries.

Until quite recently, the Portuguese foreign policy approach towards South Africa was managed mainly through the European Union. This state of affairs seems to be changing with this renewed bilateral focus, even if the process is incomplete at this stage. Last April, Graça Machel, the third



wife of Nelson Mandela and widow of late Mozambican President Samora Machel came to Lisbon. As chairperson of the Mozambican Whatana Investment Group, she was invited by the Portuguese Business Development Agency (AICEP) to participate in a conference about the overall Southern African market. This AICEP initiative confirmed that South Africa is nowadays a priority to the Portuguese government. Indeed, under the same strategic goal, the AICEP will organize in a few months an investment forum in South Africa.

In the last decade, the South African market has consistently lost relevance within the Portuguese overall exports ranking. In 2009, South Africa was Portugal's 42nd exporting market, while in 2000 it was the 31st, falling 11 places in just one decade. However, the AICEP's focus on Southern Africa and South Africa in particular, together with the renewed interest from Portuguese companies in the region seems to indicate that bilateral trade relations will improve in the forthcoming years.

Yet, Portugal must also invest more fully in the political and diplomatic relationship with South Africa. The most high-level bilateral interaction between the two countries since the end of apartheid in 1994 took place in March 2006, when former South African President Thabo Mbeki visited Lisbon to attend the inauguration of President Cavaco Silva (President Mbeki also participated in the EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon in December 2007). In turn, former Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio attended the inauguration of President Mbeki in June 1999. Surprisingly, there were no state visits to report. President Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister José Sócrates and Foreign Minister Luís Amado did not visit South Africa once since they occupied their posts. The same is true regarding South Africa: neither President Jacob Zuma nor Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane visited Portugal a single time. Moreover, the South African

embassy in Lisbon has been waiting almost a year for a new ambassador, while the post remains vacant.

Reversing this mutual political neglect will benefit both countries. Portugal in particular must bear in mind that South Africa is the key player in Southern Africa. It is the pivotal state, i.e. the "hot spot that could not only determine the fate of its region but also affect international stability".

In order to be successful, the Portuguese diplomatic strategy towards Southern Africa must not ignore South Africa. Thus, Lisbon must establish a clear regional partnership with Pretoria by emphasizing that unlike China or India, it will not pose a threat to South Africa's strategic interests in Southern Africa. Rather than an adversary or a rival, Portugal could be an useful partner, not only in Angola and Mozambique, but also in Botswana, Namibia, or Zimbabwe.

AQIM and West Africa: Can Guinea-Bissau become a narco-terrorist platform?

DIOGO NOIVO
Researcher, IPRIS

Guinea-Bissau has been spotlighted by the media due to its political instability and mounting involvement with drug trafficking – two aspects which are often connected. Although already disturbing, concerns about the country's situation deepened with the arrest of Sidi Ould Sidna in Bissau on

January 11th 2008. Sidna, an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) associate who is responsible for killing four French tourists in Mauritania in December 2007, was arrested in Bissau after traveling through Senegal and Gambia. Others were detained as well, namely a Mauritanian living in Guinea-Bissau for several years and accused of aiding Sidna. The arrest was perceived as another sign of AQIM moving South as well as a consequence of the region's debilities. As a result, the threat level in West Africa has escalated.

Last June, then Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Antonio Maria Costa, voiced his concern over AQIM's involvement in drug trafficking towards Europe. Costa pointed out that drugs are being used to finance terrorism, adding that Latin American cocaine trafficking routes cross territories which are, to some extent, under the control or characterized by the presence of AQIM.

Organized crime has been a problem in West Africa for some time. In 2005, the UNODC acknowledged that drug and human trafficking, diamond and tobacco smuggling, forgery, illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms, among other illicit activities conducted by transnational criminal organizations, were a growing concern in the region. In fact, according to the UN, nearly 60% of the drugs sold in Europe pass through West Africa.

Although the alert signaled by António Maria Costa should be taken very seriously, the connection between AQIM and illicit trafficking is not exactly surprising. The Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), considered to be the predecessor of AQIM, was involved in all sorts of illegal smuggling – so much so that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former GSPC member and currently one of AQIM's most noteworthy commanders, also goes by the nickname of 'Mr. Marlboro'. Moreover, recourse to document forgery and drug traf-



ficking by jihadist cells in Europe – many of which acting on behalf of AQIM – is well known.

Therefore, the connection between Islamist terrorism and drug trafficking or smuggling in general is not new. And, as mentioned above, the presence of criminal organizations in West Africa is not groundbreaking either. The novelty lays in AQIM having a more active role in Western Africa drug routes from Latin America to Europe. Still, it is difficult to assess the real dimension of AQIM's involvement. Jihadist groups tend to have highly flexible structures with some autonomy within their ranks. Furthermore, internal strife and competition are also common, and generate conflicting clusters within the organization. With regard to AQIM's particular case, another angle has to be taken into consideration: reports from West Africa seem to indicate that many so-called al-Qaeda cells are in fact smugglers that enjoy AQIM's protection or simply act under its banner.

However, a connection between AQIM and drug cartels in West Africa is not improbable: AQIM has financial needs to fulfill – demonstrated in the kidnapping European citizens and holding them for ransom – and the organization has gradually moved South, leaving North Africa to establish a foothold in the Sahel and Sahara regions.

The following cases provide some sustainability to Antonio Maria Costa's alarm. In November 2009, the wreckage of a Boeing 727 was discovered in Mali. The plane departed from Venezuela, and was burnt by its occupants after the crash. Investigations concluded that it was carrying up to ten tons of cocaine. The fact that the plane was discovered in an area known for Islamist militancy and smuggling of all kinds raised suspicions of a possible involvement of terrorist groups and drug cartels: tire tracks found in the sand suggest that the cargo was recovered and moved. In December 2009, the US District Attorney in New York charged three Ma-

lians arrested in Ghana with conspiracy to commit acts of narco-terrorism and to support terrorist organizations. According to a joint statement by the US District Attorney and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), in a series of telephone calls and meetings with two confidential sources working with the DEA and claiming to represent the Colombian terrorist group FARC, the three individuals described their strong connections with al-Qaeda, adding that they had a transportation route from West to North Africa, ultimately taking them into Spain, with security being provided by AQIM.

In January 2010, *Reuters* got access to a confidential report written in early 2008 by an official at the US Department of Homeland Security: inside, the author describes a clandestine air fleet of twin-engine turboprops, executive jets and a retired Boeing 727 that crosses the Atlantic from Latin America to West Africa and back. The route transports tons of cocaine and possibly weapons. The drugs are then taken across the Sahara and into Europe.

In February of the same year, Mauritanian soldiers killed three armed men and took 18 prisoners after attempting to stop a convoy transporting cocaine and cannabis in an area near the borders with Algeria and Mali. A month later, a Mauritanian court charged these individuals with being part of a drug trafficking ring with links to AQIM.

Smugglers, terrorist groups and all sorts of organized crime are at home in West Africa: corruption, weak governance, armed conflicts and coups d'état, a destroyed economic fabric, porous borders, the extensive decline of state services, ill-equipped and ill-trained security forces, among other factors, create favorable conditions for them to operate in the region.

Guinea-Bissau suffers from all of the above, which explains the growing drug trafficking problem – part of the political and military apparatus has an important role in receiving and moving drug cargos. The case of

AQIM's associates in Guinea-Bissau is not connected to drug trafficking. However, if we add the influence that drug cartels now have in Bissau to AQIM's shift towards the South and its involvement with drug running in West Africa, we have a mixture that certainly deserves attention.

Some long time observers of Guinea-Bissau have told me that public displays of Islamic faith have become more frequent – public prayer is more commonplace and the number of *madrassas* has visibly grown. This could be a natural reaction to the state's widespread failure in fulfilling its obligations and, by itself, does not allow us to draw any conclusions about a possible radicalization of the population. Nonetheless, at least in theory, it creates a context that can be capitalized on by jihadist-driven groups.

Guinea-Bissau's internal problems are more than enough to generate concern and the surrounding regional context only aggravates the situation. The spillover into Bissau of the drug-terror association is a realistic possibility.



20 years on São Tomé and Príncipe has voted again for “change”

GERHARD SEIBERT
CEA/ISCTE-IUL

In December 1989, São Tomé and Príncipe was the first African one-party state to hold a National Conference and decide on a transition to multiparty democracy. On January 20th 1991, the archipelago was the second African country – after Cape Verde a week prior – to hold democratic elections. Since then, both legislative and presidential elections have been organized regularly and peacefully. All these elections – financed by foreign donors – have been considered by international observers as free, fair and transparent. However, due to financial constraints and a lack of political will, local elections – first held in December 1992 and constitutionally due every three years – did not take place again until August 2006. Local elections scheduled for August 2009 were postponed due to lack of funds and delays in voter registration. The latter problem also affected the legislative elections, which legally must imperatively be held in March 2010. In that month, President Fradique de Menezes (2001-) scheduled local elections on July 25th, and legislative elections on August 1st respectively. The four main competing parties in both elections were the Liberation Movement of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social-democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD), the Democratic Convergence Party (PCD), the Independent Democratic Action (ADI), and the Democratic Movement Force of Change (MDFM). These parties do not represent different political ideologies or programmes, but rather competing group interests. All four parties took part at one time or another in the consecutive coalition governments during the legislature from 2006 to 2010.

After the 2006 elections, the MDFM-PCD party alliance that won 23 seats in the 55-member National Assembly constituted a minority government headed by Tomé Vera Cruz, then leader of the MDFM, a party constituted by followers of President Menezes in 2001. In February 2008, Prime Minister Vera Cruz resigned to avoid disapproval of the 2008 budget by opposition parties. Still in the same month, Patrice Trovoada - son of ex-president Miguel Trovoada (1991-2001), born during his father's exile in Libreville in 1962 and leader of opposition party

ADI (11 seats) – became Prime Minister of a coalition government constituted by his party and the MDFM-PCD alliance. Patrice Trovoada negotiated this solution with President Menezes, who had by then lost confidence in Vera Cruz. Trovoada, a businessman who converted to Islam as a student, was expected to raise foreign funds through his supposed network of personal international connections.

In May of that same year, Trovoada lost a motion of no confidence in Parliament supported by major opposition party MLSTP/PSD (20 seats) and coalition party PCD, which accused Trovoada of lacking transparency in government affairs. Consequently, the MDFM ended its alliance with the PCD, which dated back 2002. In June 2008, leader of the MLSTP/PSD Rafael Branco was appointed Prime Minister of a coalition government formed by his party, PCD and MDFM. Reportedly, in return for supporting the motion of no confidence, the PCD had benefitted from financial assistance from the MPLA, the MLSTP/PSD's longstanding external ally. In December 2009, following fierce criticism by the MLSTP/PSD and the PCD of President Menezes' constitutionally controversial election as MDFM chairman, the MDFM abandoned the coalition. Thereafter, Branco governed with a coalition of MLSTP/PSD and PCD that was supported by a majority of 31 deputies in the National Assembly, since 11 out of 23 deputies elected for the MDFM-PCD alliance in 2006 belonged to the PCD. During the four-year period none of the consecutive governments succeeded in performing well: they were all plagued by failures in the health and energy sectors, accusations of maladministration and corruption. Due to the poor performance of his government, Prime Minister Rafael Branco became a rather unpopular figure during his two years in office, and faced increasing opposition from within his own party. Nevertheless, his election goal was to obtain an absolute majority for the MLSTP/PSD.

During the two-week campaign for the legislative elections – which was interrupted by local elections – with the exception of the legally compulsory campaign spots



in local radios and television channels where all ten competing parties appeared, only the four major parties were visible to the public, since they alone disposed of sufficient supporters and financial means to organize meetings and rallies, and could afford to distribute campaign paraphernalia like caps, t-shirts and rucksacks. Reportedly the wealthier parties even donated cell phones, motorbikes, and household appliances. Most of the campaign funds came from foreign sources, since in poor São Tomé and Príncipe political parties lack enough domestic financing to run campaigns. However, no one knows exactly who these foreign sponsors are and what political interests motivated them to provide financial support. According to local legislation on party financing, parties are obliged to declare the sources of their campaign budgets, yet parties have never complied with this law.

From the beginning it was clear that the other six parties on the ballot would not play any role in the outcome of the elections. Interestingly, despite a population increase between 2006 and 2010, the number of registered voters dropped from 79,850 to 78,800 in the same period. During the registration process underway in March, a total of about 90,000 voters had been expected to register. This loss of about 1,050 registered voters can only be explained by the new voter registration carried out after many delays by the National Electoral Commission (CEN) in the beginning of 2010. The new voter registration had become necessary as the previous database disappeared during the 2008 burglary of the CEN office. In early 2010, Secretary-General of the MDFM Raul Cravid publicly accused MLSTP/PSD and PCD of having staged the voter registration robbery to deliberately delay the elections.

On July 23rd, Raul Cravid was again involved in an incident, this time on the estate of Agostinho Neto, when he and his campaigners fought with MLSTP/PSD supporters and shots were fired into the air. A few days later, Cravid left the country unexpectedly by plane, allegedly for health reasons. In the local elections of July 25th, the MLSTP/PSD obtained most of the total votes and a majority in the four district councils of Lobata, Lembá, Cantagalo, and Caué, while the ADI became the country's second most voted party and gained the majority in the two most populated districts of Água Grande (where

the capital, São Tomé, is situated) and Mé-Zóchi, which represent almost 80% of the archipelago's population. The PCD lost the four district councils it had controlled since 2006, and only received two seats in the Cantagalo district assembly, and one seat in both Lobata e Caué. Surprisingly, the MDFM, competing alone in an election for the very first time, did not manage to secure a single seat in any of the six districts. The Union for Príncipe's Change and Progress (UMPP) headed by Tozé Cassandra repeated the victory of 2006 and won all seven seats in Príncipe's Regional Assembly. The UMPP's only competitor in Príncipe's regional elections was the MLSTP/PSD, since ADI, PCD, and MDFM supported Cassandra's grouping. Both MLSTP/PSD and ADI claimed victory in the local elections, the former because it won the major-

ity of votes, the latter because it gained control of the two most populated district councils. Although the results of local elections had apparently been influenced by the popularity of individual candidates, some observers in São Tomé believed that the legislative election results would be similar to those of the local ones. Besides, it was expected that the electorate would choose between the ADI and MDFM and the MLSTP/PSD and PCD coalitions, headed by Patrice Trovoada and Rafael Branco respectively, since nobody believed that in the context of the country's four-party constellation one party alone could achieve an absolute majority.

In the second campaign week it became increasingly clear that the ADI would considerably improve its 2006 result of 20% of the votes and 11 deputies. In the 2002 elections, the ADI competed together with four other small parties in an electoral coalition called Uê Kédadji that won only 8 seats, half of the 16 seats the ADI had achieved by itself in 1998. Patrice Trovoada improved the ADI's results in 2006, but in the presidential elections held the same year he lost clearly with 38.8% of the votes against the incumbent Menezes with 60.6%. President Menezes agreed to appoint Trovoada as Prime Minister in 2008, although the ADI disposed of only 11 seats in Parliament. Then, surprisingly, he was dismissed after three months through a motion of no confidence by the MLSTP/PSD and the PCD.

In this year's election campaign, Trovoada capitalized on this episode by saying that the two parties only removed him from office when he tried to end the practice

The reduction of the ministries and the appointment of new people is another feature that reminds of the first democratically elected government of the PCD in 1991. At the time, the PCD failed to implement the promised change and lost power within three years.



of cumulating government jobs: because of this, many leaders of both parties would earn thousands of dollars per month, while young trained cadres could hardly find any adequate occupation at all. He further reminded the electorate of the consecutive corruption scandals that affected previous governments and promised to seriously fight corruption. Trovoada's call for a true change in government affairs came at a time when many people were fed up with the ruling political elite and willing to give him and his party a chance. Trovoada, who speaks Portuguese with a French accent and whose source of personal wealth remains unknown in São Tomé, proved particularly attractive to the younger generations since he promised a true change in local politics. His opponents considered Trovoada to be the true "owner" of the ADI, since the party relies completely and exclusively on him, both financially and politically. Shortly before the elections, the ADI confirmed Trovoada by acclamation as party leader. The ADI has been São Tomé and Príncipe's first presidential party, whose main characteristic is to be autocratically ruled by its leader, while competitive elections for party leadership would be unthinkable. Contrary to the MLSTP/PSD and PCD, the ADI does not dispose of a working grassroots party structure either. Trovoada compensated this disadvantage successfully by using his financial means and external support, thus enabling the ADI to run an efficient election campaign throughout the entire country. As Trovoada's ADI participated only in his short-lived government, he could easily accuse the MLSTP/PSD and the PCD of maladministration and of being involved in alleged corruption scandals.

In contrast, MDFM – the other presidential party – was weakened by ongoing internal problems within its leadership which President Menezes, the party's *de facto* leader, failed to resolve. It was common knowledge that João Costa Alegre, Vice-President of the MDFM, and Raul Cravid, the Secretary-General, had a difficult relationship, although both men enjoy Menezes' confidence. Additionally, after nine years in office and a year before completing his second and last term, Menezes himself had become rather unpopular. Consequently, several prominent party members publicly declared their withdrawal from the MDFM a few months before the elections. The results of the local elections had already indicated that many voters considered the MDFM to be redundant and were rather inclined to prefer ADI.

During his campaign, Patrice Trovoada wooed PCD followers by claiming that in 2008, the party leadership had removed him from office without approval from party members. Besides, the ADI accused the PCD of having been involved in several corruption scandals and of being co-responsible for the poor performance of consecutive governments since 2006. The PCD, which apparently had not expected poor results in the local elections, blamed the practice of *banho* (literally meaning bath) – the name

given to vote buying in the country – for the party's defeat. The PCD leadership still hoped to improve its results in the legislative elections, where contrary to local elections mandates are not awarded according to majority rule, but are distributed in accordance to proportional representation.

During the campaign, Trovoada's adversaries tried to undermine his credibility by stressing that he lacked adequate governance experience and did not know his country sufficiently well since he had spent a major part of his life abroad. They even went so far as to point out that not only was Trovoada's wife Malian – allegedly the daughter of a wealthy businessman – but his domestic servants and his dog were also foreigners. In the end, none of these arguments could prevent a majority from voting for the ADI. Possibly his position as a relative stranger worked in his advantage, since it dissociated him from the local political class and their unpopular practices. Whatever the reason, the ADI clearly won the election by obtaining 26 seats, two short of an absolute majority. It was already the fourth time since 1991, 1994, and 2006 that an opposition party won the elections in the archipelago. The MLSTP/PSD secured 21 seats, one more than in 2006, but considerably less than the much sought after absolute majority. The PCD received only seven deputies, one each in Príncipe and São Tomé's six districts. While the PCD lost four seats in relation to the eleven seats occupied in the alliance with the MDFM, results were similar to those in 1998, when the party competed alone. The MDFM suffered worse results, as it was awarded only one seat. This debacle also left the ADI without a coalition partner. In fact, the ADI had primarily won its majority at the expense of MDFM and PCD, while the MLSTP/PSD slightly increased its votes. Like in previous elections, vote buying was again an integral part of the process. It was rumored that parties had paid amounts in local currency worth €6 or more for one vote. However, it remains unclear if and to which extent the *banho* influenced results, since several parties apparently had applied this strategy, and there is no guarantee that voters actually cast their ballots in favor of the party that paid them. On the other hand, it cannot be excluded that the *banho* contributed to the high turnout of 89% of registered voters. While electoral observers from the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) stressed the civism of the electorate, those from the African Union declared the elections to be free, transparent and democratic. The observer mission from the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) was the only one that reported – with the "greatest apprehension" – evidence of vote buying.

With the exception of vote buying, these elections featured many similarities with the first multiparty elections of 1991 when opposition party PCD won by a landslide victory. The successful voter mobilization brought



about by Trovoada's promises and hope of real change, together with the high voter turnout, are only comparable to the first democratic elections. The difference is that in 1991, the people vested their hopes for change in a group of new politicians, while now they seem to gather around a single personality. Immediately after election results were known, Trovoada confirmed that he would not negotiate any agreement with the current leadership of the MLSTP/PSD and the PCD, who were responsible for removing him from office in 2008. He did not consider ruling without a parliamentary majority to be a problem, since Vera Cruz also managed to rule with the support of only 23 deputies.

On August 14th, Patrice Trovoada was sworn in as Prime Minister of the country's 16th government since 1991. His executive is composed of one Secretary of State and ten Ministers, four of whom do not belong to the ADI but are considered independents. One of them is Afonso Varela, who was appointed Minister Secretary-General with the task of coordinating between ministries. He is the only minister with previous government experience, though only for three months in 1999 when he was Minister of Planning and Finance for the MLSTP/PSD. Another independent, Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, was appointed the new Minister of Foreign Affairs after being an ambassador for São Tomé and Príncipe in Luanda and Libreville. While most new ministers come from the public administration sector, several of them are only in their

thirties and are largely unknown. Interestingly, neither agriculture nor tourism appear explicitly in the designations of any of the ministries, although both have been considered key sectors of the country's economy. Both are integrated in the Ministry of Planning and Development run by Agostinho Fernandes, a young lawyer. On the other side, the Ministry of Public Works and Natural Resources is headed by Carlos Vila Nova, employee of a local travel agency. In oil affairs, he may be advised by Minister Afonso Varela, a French-trained lawyer who has participated in several of the country's oil negotiations and a former director of the National Oil Agency (ANP). Given his position and his background, Varela must be considered the strong man of this new government. The reduction of ministries and the appointment of new people is another feature that brings back memories of the first democratically elected PCD government, in 1991. At the time, the PCD failed to implement the promised change and lost power within three years. It remains to be seen if Trovoada and his government will be able to keep their promise of change and good governance. The appointment of office-holders dissociated from the old political elite is not enough, since transforming the country's governance requires a different political and bureaucratic culture, one that may only be achieved by significant shifts on all levels of the corruption infested state apparatus and the sluggish bureaucracy.

Election turnout & results of the major parties (seats in Parliament, percentage of votes)

Legislative elections	20 January 1991	2 October 1994	8 November 1998	3 March 2002	26 March 2006	1 August 2010
Reg. Voters Turnout	51,610 76.7%	55,862 52.1%	49,639 64.7%	60,961 66.3%	79,849 64.0%	78,798 89%
MLSTP/PSD (founded 1972)	21 (30.6%)	27 (37.1%)	31 (46.1%)	24 (39.6%)	20 (29.5%)	21 (32.1%)
PCD (1990)	33 (54.4%)	14 (21.4%)	8 (14.5%)			7 (13.6%)
ADI (1992)		14 (22.9%)	16 (25.6%)	8 (16.2%) Uê Kédadji	11 (20.0%)	26 (42.2%)
MDFM (2001)				23 (39.4%) MDFM-PCD	23 (36.8%) MDFM-PCD	1 (7.1%)



Timeline of Events

Angola

3 August (Luanda):

The government released new forecasts for GDP growth in 2010, trimming the first estimation of 9.7% to 6.7%, while its foreign debt is expected to hit 40% of the GDP. The US\$9 billion debt that the country owes to foreign construction firms will be paid off by the creation of a special oil fund, which will use the profits of 100 thousand of Angola's 1.79 million barrels of oil produced per day.

3 August (Cabinda):

Four Cabinda human rights activists were sentenced to prison for their alleged involvement in last February's attack on the Togo football team. Francisco Luemba, Raúl Tati, José Benjamin Fuca and Belchior Tati were sentenced to three to six years of jail. Amnesty International called for their immediate release.

4 August (Cabinda):

Rodrigues Mingas, head of the FLEC/PM – *Forças de Libertação do Estado de Cabinda/Posição Militar* – classified the four activists' trial as a farce set up by the Angolan government and said the condemned have no link to the FLEC.

4-8 August (Brasília):

Defense Minister Carlos Van-Dúnem visited Brazil to strengthen cooperation ties. Among other topics, the establishment of a strategic partnership and its implementation were high on the agenda, in line with President José Eduardo dos Santos' visit on the 23rd and 24th of June, as well as the training of military and civilian personnel by Brazil.

6 August (Luanda):

The IMF ended its weeklong assessment mission regarding the application of its US\$1.4 billion loan plan. The Fund was broadly satisfied and will allow the disbursement of a US\$342 million installment, which follows some US\$515 million already lent. The IMF praised prudent fiscal policies, while it pointed out the damaging effects of unpaid government bills, which can be as high as US\$9 billion.

12 August (Luanda):

Ahead of the planned 2012 general elections, the National Assembly unanimously elected Susana António da Conceição Nicolau Inglês as chairperson for the National Electoral Commission.

15 August (Brazzaville):

President José Eduardo dos Santos attended the 50th anniversary of the independence of the Republic of the Congo.

16 August (Luanda):

Angola's daily oil production is set to reach two million barrels per day in 2011 according to The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), up from 1.95 million in 2010. The EIU predicts a GDP increase of 8.8% this year and 6.2% in 2011.

16-17 August (Windhoek):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the 30th Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern Africa Development Community. Angola was elected for the Community's Vice Presidency and was chosen to host the 31st Summit in 2011.

23-29 August (Maputo):

Speaker of Parliament Paulo Kassoma paid a six-day official visit to reinforce the already excellent ties between Angola and Mozambique. Among other meetings, Mozambican President Armando Guebuza received Kassoma.

24 August (Johannesburg):

According to South Africa's Rand Merchant Bank, Angola's GDP will increase by 7.2% in 2010 and 6.9% in 2011. This growth will be driven by higher oil prices. Oil is still responsible for over 50% of state revenue.

25 August (Bujumbura):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' was received by re-elected Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza, after he attended the latter's swearing-in ceremony. The two discussed ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation and economic ties.

26 August (Paris):

The exiled *Forças de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda* (FLEC) leadership in France issued a statement rejecting any peace talks engaged in by the FLEC/PM faction in Cabinda. Moreover, it reaffirmed the leadership of Nzita Tiago as the movement's President, while dismissing Vice-President Alexander Tati, Armed Forces Chief of Staff Estanislau Boma and Counselor to the President Luís Luemba.

30 August (Luanda):

Cape Verdean Prime Minister José Maria Neves met President José Eduardo dos Santos to discuss, among other topics, bilateral cooperation and the situation in Guinea-Bissau.

Brazil

2 August (San Juan):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the 39th meeting of Mercosul's Common Market Council, aiming to lay common ground for the next Mercosul Summit.

2 August (Brasília):

President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva signed a law creating a state company that will manage the development of the country's vast new oil reserves. However, three other oil bills – proposed by the government to tighten control over recent oil discovery and ensure that proceeds flow to the state to help pay for infrastructure, education and poverty-reduction programs – remain blocked in Congress, which will not vote on them until after the presidential elections in October.

3 August (San Juan):

President Lula da Silva attended Mercosul's Heads of State and Government Summit, where important breakthroughs were achieved – including a consensus on the distribution of customs revenues and the elimination of double taxation on goods imported by member countries – allowing the organization to effectively become an actual customs union. A free-trade agreement with Egypt, commercial benefits to Haiti and the protection of the Guaraní aquifer were also high on the agenda. Additionally, Bra-



zil also officially assumed the organization's pro tempore Presidency and Lula da Silva took the opportunity to meet bilaterally with his Argentinian counterpart Cristina Kirchner in order to assess the current state of relations between the two countries.

4 August (Brasília):

Mexico's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ambassador Patricia Espinosa, met with Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, the Brazil-Mexico Strategic Agreement for Economic Integration being high on the agenda. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, climate change, and the situation in Honduras were also addressed.

4-5 August (Brasília):

Cameroonian President Paul Biya met with his counterpart Lula da Silva, in the context of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between both countries. Agriculture, cooperation on culture and tourism, as well as the opening of a new Embassy for Cameroon in Brasília, were high on the agenda.

6 August (Caracas):

President Lula da Silva met with his Venezuelan counterpart Hugo Chávez. The strengthening of bilateral economic ties and social cooperation, as well as regional security issues including UNASUR and Colombia, were high on the agenda.

7 August (Bogotá):

President Lula da Silva attended the inauguration of Colombian President José Manuel Santos. Lula also took the opportunity to encourage dialogue between Venezuela and Colombia as a way out of the recent crisis, while Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with his counterpart Maria Ângela Holguín.

9 August (São Paulo):

President of El Salvador Mauricio Funes attended, alongside President Lula da Silva, the Brazil-El Salvador Business Meeting. Additionally, both officials reviewed bilateral ties and discussed regional integration possibilities and other areas of cooperation.

10 August (Brasília):

President Lula da Silva signed the decree regarding the UN sanctions against Iran – despite Brazilian efforts to negotiate a nuclear-swap deal with the Islamic state – arguing that Brazil

would observe the sanctions imposed, regardless of its opposition to them.

12 August (Washington):

Brazil and the US have reached a debt-reduction agreement that will let Brasília commit funds for the protection of its tropical forests. The agreement reduces Brazil's debt payments to the US by nearly US\$21 million over the next five years. In return, Brazil will fund grants protecting lands that are home to a variety of wildlife.

13-14 August (São Paulo):

New Zealand's Foreign Minister Murray McCully met with his counterpart Celso Amorim. Trade, investments, student exchanges and tourism were high on the agenda.

17 August (Brasília):

Chilean Foreign Minister Alfredo Moreno, alongside his counterpart Celso Amorim, presided over the 1st meeting of the Chile-Brazil Bilateral Commission. Science, education and cultural cooperation as well as UNASUR integration and the situation in Haiti, were high on the agenda of both officials.

19 August (Brasília):

Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patiño, met with his Brazilian counterpart Celso Amorim. The consolidation of UNASUR, the humanitarian crisis in Haiti and bilateral issues regarding the Amazon rainforest, were high on the agenda.

25 August (Brasília):

Bissau-Guinean President Malam Bacai Sanhá met President Lula da Silva and Defense Minister Nelson Jobim. Bilateral cooperation and local stabilization of the African country were high on the agenda.

Cape Verde

2 August (Praia):

According to the Bank of Cape Verde, the country's exports and imports rose by 59.3 % and 8.3% respectively in the first half of this year, according to official figures. Portugal and Spain were Cape Verde's main trading partners.

11 August (Praia):

The governor of Luanda (an Angolan province) Francisca do Espírito Santo met with Cape Verdean President Pedro Pires and Prime Min-

ister José Maria Neves. Culture, community school exchange, tourism, professional training and business approximation were discussed.

30 August (Luanda):

Prime Minister José Maria Neves met with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos under the bilateral cooperation framework to discuss the current situation in Guinea-Bissau, among other issues.

Guinea-Bissau

1 August (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá accepted the idea of welcoming a stabilization force sent by the international community, without revealing further details about it. This followed some discussions held with CPLP and African Union members, who said they would only intervene in the country if they were asked to.

2 August (Brussels):

The EU decided to withdraw its Security Sector Reform mission from Guinea-Bissau. The mission, which began in June 2008, will exit the country next month with little success to show. The EU complained that its constant appeals to respect the rule of law and end military impunity, in particular after the April 1st events, were never headed.

3 August (Dili):

Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho stated that Portuguese troops would not be sent to Guinea-Bissau, while he welcomed Bissau-Guinean intentions to host an international mission. Timorese Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão stated that his country would consider the possibility of sending troops to support their "Bissau-Guinean brothers".

3 August (Jakarta):

Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs Luís Amado said no Portuguese troops were necessary in Guinea-Bissau, though he added that Portugal would continue to support the country in other ways.

3 August (Bissau):

Military authorities seemed to be reluctant to accept the presence of a foreign stabilization force, which they see as a bodyguard for civil authorities, in particular for Prime Minister Car-



los Gomes Júnior. Nevertheless, the military are likely to agree to the deployment of the force.

3 August (Bissau):

The idea of an international stabilization force proved conflictual among Guinea-Bissau's political community. The *Partido de Renovação Social* (PRS) – the main opposition party – rejected the idea on grounds that a foreign presence would only bring more problems to the fragile internal situation.

4 August (Bissau):

Government and military sources renewed their intention to accept a foreign stabilization mission, considered a 'peacekeeping' body, composed of advisers from international organizations such as ECOWAS, the African Union and the CPLP. Following the EU's departure from the country, this marks a reversal of course from a clear ten-year pattern of disengagement from the international community, and represents an appeal for a renewed partnership based on a common reform discourse.

6 August (Bissau):

Spokesman for the Presidency Agnelo Regnalla clarified that the stabilization mission would not be a military force but would be composed of military and civilian experts and support the ongoing Security Sector Reform process.

7-8 August (Tehran):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá visited Iran, where he met with President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The Iranian leader stressed the expansion of bilateral relations, framed in an effort to deepen his country's ties with Africa. Sanhá defended Iran's right to pursue its plans and goals internationally. Eight cooperation memorandums were signed during the visit.

9 August (Bissau):

A CPLP delegation, including representatives from Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde and Portugal, arrived in Bissau to assess the possibility of the Community's involvement in the stabilization mission. No decision having yet been reached, it is established that the Community will only intervene if asked by local authorities.

13 August (New York):

The new Permanent Representative of Guinea-Bissau to the United Nations, João Soares da Gama, presented his credentials to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. Previously, Soares

da Gama worked in Guinea-Bissau's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Communities and was currently a Minister's Counselor and Focal Point for the CPLP. Soares da Gama replaces Rwandan Joseph Mutaboba, who held the post for one and a half years.

18 August (Abuja):

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan noted Guinea-Bissau's current instability and promised to involve ECOWAS in attempts to assist the country. A meeting of ECOWAS to discuss the deployment of a stabilization force should be held in mid-September.

18 August (Luanda):

Angolan academic, diplomat and former Vice-Foreign Minister Sebastião Isata was appointed as special representative to Guinea-Bissau of African Union chairman Jean Ping. Isata will replace fellow countryman João Miranda.

21 August (Bissau):

The government decided in an extraordinary Council of Ministers meeting that Guinea-Bissau will only accept a stabilization mission under a UN mandate and according to the country's constitution.

24 August (Sal):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá met Defense Minister Cristina Fontes Lima, who stated that Cape Verde is available to support Guinea-Bissau, for instance in training military personnel, and would continue to work to stabilize the country together with international organizations such as the CPLP, the UN and ECOWAS.

25-26 August (Brasília):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá paid his first official visit to Brazil. Sanhá met his counterpart Lula da Silva and discussed cooperation ties between the two countries, in particular in the education, health and agricultural sectors (the latter with a focus on cashew production). Brazil's involvement in the possible stabilization mission, with either military experts or troops, was also discussed.

25 August (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior's working visit to South Africa, scheduled for August 27th, was postponed indefinitely.

26-27 August (Havana):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá met his Cuban counterpart Raúl Castro, with whom he discussed cooperation ties, particularly in the health sector.

27 August (Luanda):

Guinea-Bissau's Consul General in Luanda, José Isaac Monteiro Silva, stated that his country's stabilization depends on the honourable treatment, along with a respectful pension, of former independence fighters.

Mozambique

4 August (Moamba):

The US and Mozambican militaries began a week of joint training exercises in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, under the Shared Accord of 2010, involving about 800 Mozambican and 700 US personnel.

5 August (Maputo):

Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói presided over the SADC Ministerial Committee, where the situation in Madagascar and preparations for the organization's upcoming summit in Namibia, were high on the agenda.

9 August (Maputo):

Mozambican company Moçamgalp plans to invest US\$19 million over the next five years in Mozambique's Manica province to produce biodiesel from jatropha oil, in a concerted effort from its shareholders, national supplier Petro-moc, Portuguese fuel company Galp and biodiesel producer Ecomoz.

9 August (Maputo):

According to government spokesperson Alberto Nkutumula, Mozambique's economy grew by 7.2% during the first half of 2010 while the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew 9.5%. On the other hand, inflation reached 5.7%, while the country's exports rose to US\$456 million in the first quarter of 2010.

10 August (Maputo):

According to the Mozambican Centre for Investment Promotion, Portugal was the country that invested the most in Mozambique during the first six months of the year, totaling US\$58.9 million. Following were Italy, Spain, China and South Africa, with investments of approximately US\$22.4 million. All in all, Foreign Direct In-



vestment (FDI) in Mozambique soared by 400% in the first half of 2010 compared to the same period last year.

12 August (Maputo):

After contacts with Mozambican President Armando Guebuza, President of the autonomous Italian province of Trento announced that a rural development bank would be set up in the Mozambican province of Sofala, seeking to provide financing to the population for projects to develop the local economy.

12 August (Maputo):

Mozambique's state-owned electricity company Electricidade de Moçambique announced it will sign a US\$1.7 billion deal with the European Investment Bank to finance the construction of a high-voltage power-transmission line seeking to connect the capital, Maputo, to the Cahora Bassa hydropower dam.

13 August (Maputo):

The government signed a financing agreement with the German Development Bank worth €47 million to support the implementation of the Education Sector Strategy Plan until 2013. The agreement was achieved a day after the Mozambican Education Ministry announced a 20% reduction in support from the international community for education in the country, due to the international financial crisis.

15 August (Windhoek):

President Armando Guebuza chaired the SADC Troika on Politics, Defense and Security, which reviewed the situation in Zimbabwe and the possibility of new regionally monitored elections in 2011.

16 August (Lisbon):

According to media reports, Portuguese company Portucel may eventually build a second paper pulp factory in Mozambique's Manica province. Such a move would involve an additional investment of €1.5 billion, which will be added to the €1.79 billion already announced by the company for projects in that country.

16-17 August (Windhoek):

President Armando Guebuza attended the 30th SADC Heads of State and Government Summit, with the situations in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Madagascar, the powers of the SADC Tribunal, and further economic integration high on the organization's agenda.

17 August (Maputo):

American oil company Anadarko has discovered offshore oil deposits in northern Mozambique, in the Rovuma Basin. President Armando Guebuza quickly tried to tone down general expectations, since it is still unclear if the find will prove commercially viable.

17-21 August (Maputo):

Canadian Minister for International Cooperation Beverley Oda visited Mozambique, seeking to deepen cooperation between the two countries. Oda took the opportunity to meet with Minister of Health Ivo Garrido, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Henrique Banze and Governor of the northern province of Nampula Felismina Tocoli.

18-20 August (Maputo):

Zambian President Rupiah Banda met with his counterpart Armando Guebuza and several cabinet members, including Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói. Both delegations signed eight cooperation agreements regarding mineral resources, education, air travel, natural disaster management and tourism.

23 August (Maputo):

According to recently published figures, seven foreign companies prospecting for hydrocarbons in Mozambique – including South Africa's Sasol, Norwegian DNO, Buzi Hydrocarbons, StatOil, US company Anadarko, Italy's ENI and Malaysia's Petronas – have invested an overall amount of US\$1 billion in the last 18 months.

23 August (Maputo):

Foreign Affairs Minister Oldemiro Balói and US ambassador Leslie Rowe signed an agreement through which the US government will donate US\$250 million each year until 2013 to support the implementation of Mozambique's national strategy against HIV/AIDS.

23-28 August (Maputo):

Speaker of the Angolan National Assembly Paulo Kassoma met with President Armando Guebuza and his counterpart Verónica Macamo, among others. Kassoma also took this opportunity to sign a Parliamentary Cooperation Program for 2010/2011, aimed at materializing the protocol that exists in this field since 2003.

25 August (Maputo):

In a reaction to recent rumors, Secretary-General of Frelimo Filipe Paunde declared that there were no plans to introduce new amendments to

the Constitution, in order to allow a third term for current President Armando Guebuza.

Portugal

3-4 August (Jakarta):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his Indonesian counterpart Marty Natalegawa, seeking to boost bilateral ties. The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance the two countries' relationship in economy, social affairs and culture, as well as concerted efforts towards the development of Timor Leste – including its bid to join ASEAN – were high on the agenda.

9 August (Brasília):

Brazilian Banco do Brasil and Bradesco signed a memorandum of understanding with the Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo (BES), in order to carry out studies on a strategic partnership with the aim of operating in Africa while focusing on existing BES operations. Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde are to become priority markets.

25 August (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado contacted his Pakistani counterpart Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi to express Portugal's solidarity and support to the victims of the recent floods.

25 August (Belgrade):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mirko Stefanovic. Bilateral relations between both countries, as well as EU relations with the Western Balkans and Portugal's support for Serbia's European integration process, were high on the agenda.

30 August (Bucharest):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with Romania's Minister for Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconshi, and Minister for European Affairs Bogdan Manoiu. Current EU issues such as the economic and financial crisis, the future multi-annual financial framework, the implementation of the Europe 2020 Strategy, the European External Action and the European Neighborhood Policy were high on the agenda.

**30 August (Budapest):**

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with his Hungarian counterpart Eniko Gyori to discuss current EU affairs.

31 August (Skopje):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with the Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Vasko Naumovski to discuss the country's possible EU accession and Portugal's support for the ongoing reforms needed to reach this goal.

São Tomé and Príncipe

1 August (São Tomé):

Legislative elections took place and the Independent Democratic Action (ADI) won with 26 out of a possible 55 seats. The Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe/Social Democratic Party (MLSTP/PSD), headed by Prime Minister Rafael Branco, came second with 21 seats. The Party of Democratic Convergence (PCD) came in third place with seven seats, while President Fradique de Menezes's Force for Democratic Change Movement/Liberal Party (MDFM/PL) won just one seat. ADI did not achieve an absolute majority.

8 August (São Tomé):

Elections were repeated in the Belém and Ribamato districts due to irregularities, but the final outcome did not change.

13 August (São Tomé):

President Fradique de Menezes nominated Patrice Trovoada as Prime Minister.

14 August (São Tomé):

The new ADI minority government was sworn in.

17 August (Libreville):

President Fradique de Menezes attended celebrations for Gabon's 50th independence anniversary, alongside dozens of other African Heads of State.

17 August (São Tomé):

Following a meeting with the new Prime Minister, Patrice Trovoada, Russian ambassador Sergei Nenachev announced that his country plans to provide economic support to the country in the oil, hydroelectric power and fishing sectors.

Timor Leste

1 August (Manila):

According to the latest edition of the Asian Development Bank's (ADB) Pacific Economic Monitor, Timor Leste is expected to experience high economic growth – due to continued increases in government expenditure and improved agricultural production – which will in turn result in an upgrade of projected economic growth in the Pacific region overall.

9 August (Suva):

Foreign Minister Zacarias Albano da Costa met with Minister for Fiji's Foreign Affairs, International Cooperation and Civil Aviation Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. Costa expressed Timor Leste's interest in joining the Pacific's Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).

17-19 August (Díli):

Singapore's Foreign Minister George Yeo visited Timor and took the opportunity to meet with his counterpart Zacarias Albano da Costa, President José Ramos-Horta, opposition leader Marí Alkatiri, Acting Prime Minister José Luís Guterres, President of the National Parliament Fernando de Araújo and Special Representative for the UN Secretary-General in Timor Leste Ameerah Haq. Strengthening ties between the two nations – including technical assistance to Timor Leste under the Singapore Cooperation Program (SCP) – and Timor Leste's accession to ASEAN were high on the agenda.

20-21 August (Díli):

Myanmar's Foreign Minister U Nyan Win paid a controversial visit to Timor Leste, marred by public protests over human rights abuses by the military junta. U Nyan Win met with President Ramos-Horta. Despite his past criticism of Myanmar's rulers, President Ramos-Horta professed his wish for better relations between the two countries, including commercial ties.

24 August (Díli):

Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão called for closer military ties with China in a speech delivered at the ceremony marking the start of construction work on new joint headquarters for the Timorese military and defense department, wholly funded by the Chinese government.

25 August (Díli):

President Ramos-Horta pardoned those involved in the 2008 attacks during which he was shot and nearly died.

EDITOR | Paulo Gorjão

ASSISTANT EDITORS | Kai Thaler • Laura Tereno • Pedro Seabra

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Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS)
Rua Vitorino Nemésio, 5 - 1750-306 Lisboa
PORTUGAL

<http://www.ipris.org>
email: ipris@ipris.org

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