

Is oil Angola's goose that lays golden eggs?

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The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) met in Luanda this month. While it has been a member since 2007, this year, for the first time, Angola was the holder of the OPEC presidency. Angola's OPEC membership is a symbol of its increasing relevance as an oil producer. In 2008, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), Angola overtook Nigeria as Africa's biggest oil producer and the world's eighth-largest. This year, once again, Angola was one of Africa's leading oil producers. And as far as the future is concerned, its oil industry has the potential for significant growth in the coming years.

Nowadays, China, India and the U.S., among others, are rivals in their attempts to secure access to Angola's oil. Among U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's destinations in her first year in office was Luanda. That Angola was high on Clinton's priority list should not be a surprise, as U.S. oil imports coming from Africa,

mainly from Angola and Nigeria, will continue to rise.

Like gas, oil is less and less a trade commodity and increasingly a strategic resource. Inevitably, oil diplomacy acquires increased relevance. In *Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Fiona Venn defines oil diplomacy as "the role of oil in international relations, both as factor directly influencing intergovernment relationships and as a multinational enterprise" constraining states' policies. Like other oil-rich states, Angola is using its petroleum as a power resource. In the last few years, Sonangol, Angola's national oil and gas company (NOC), like other NOCs elsewhere, began investing not only upstream, but also downstream, inside and outside Angola. More importantly, Sonangol is also investing beyond the oil sector, acquiring significant stakes, for example, in national and foreign banks. Unsurprisingly, Sonangol's investment portfolio corresponds with some of Angola's more important diplomatic relations. In the last five years, it has become quite clear that Sonangol aims to strengthen Angola's political influence in West and Central Africa, as well as in the other Portuguese speaking countries. Portugal, in particular, became a favored destination of investment. Currently, Sonangol has a 45% stake in Amorim Energia – which in turn controls 33.3% of the Portuguese oil company Galp Energia – as well as a 10% stake in Millennium BCP bank, one of Por-

tugal's major financial institutions. Assuming the trend continues, in the coming years Sonangol will continue to invest in companies active in Angola, as well as their host countries. The sectors probably will be the same: banks, energy and, if possible, telecommunications.

Yet, oil diplomacy has limits. Oil and gas nowadays represent additional power resources, but do not guarantee unlimited political success. Oil diplomacy does not replace traditional diplomacy, as some might think. Bilateral relations with South Africa are a good example of the above. So far Angola has been unable to leverage its status as an energy producer into greater influence, although it possibly expects a shifting balance in the medium and long-term. Last August, South African President Jacob Zuma made his first official state visit to Angola. Eleven ministers accompanied Zuma, the largest South African delegation to Angola in fifteen years. The political gesture did not go unnoticed and Pretoria's intention of strengthening relations between the two countries became obvious. However, the historic legacy still matters. Regional rivalry, as well as years of mutual suspicion, guarantees that political progress will come slowly. Moreover, oil diplomacy has little use regarding other oil-rich countries. Russia comes to mind immediately. Last June, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Luanda. Moscow's ties with Angola came to a sudden



halt with the Soviet collapse in 1991. Since 2006, however, Russia has been making an effort to revive diplomatic relations with key African states, especially Angola. Still, bilateral trade ties nowadays remain insignificant. In *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet*, Michael T. Klare emphasized that in the “new international energy order, countries can be divided into energy-surplus and energy-deficit” and, as a consequence, “a nation’s rank will increasingly be determined by the vastness of its oil and gas reserves”. If this is true, then Angola’s rise in the world ranking is inevitable. In fact, the gallery of heads of state and government, as well as foreign ministers, who have visited Luanda in the last five years is almost endless. Since no one predicts a sharp decline in oil demand in the next ten or twenty years – trends go in the opposite direction, despite increasing investments in renewable sources of energy – Luanda will continue to benefit from its vast oil revenues and will become an increasingly important player in world politics. Oil is Angola’s treasure, and unlike the greedy couple in Aesop’s fable, Angola is patiently caring for its goose and guarding its golden eggs. No wonder...

Brazil: Inevitable choices

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Brazilian international influence has gradually increased since the end of the Cold War, both regionally and globally. The broadening of Mercosur, the

IBSA coalition and the decisive participation of Brazilian army in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) led the country to be one of the top actors in several multilateral enterprises. The recent debates about climate change also showcases the importance of Brazilian input in international affairs. One of the reasons for this ascendance is the stability of the Brazilian domestic political environment, which has been remarkably calm since the 1989 election, the first one after almost 20 years of dictatorship. Presidents like Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva have enjoyed wide popular support and have strengthened Brazil’s democracy, which has been welcomed internationally. Continued economic stability, commitment to international treaties and taking up a role as an international peacemaker would also help Brazil to solidify its place as one of the new international leaders, and recent actions indicate that Brazil is likely to continue pushing for a broader global role. As Robert Frost wrote, though, nothing gold can stay. Despite its bright prospects, the Brazilian government is showing some signs of being blinded by its own triumphs. As Brazil is getting more comfortable in the new global order and clamoring for changes and a new structure of the international system – e.g. a restructuring of the United Nations Security Council and a permanent seat in this body – the government is projecting an overconfident stance on some critical issues that may harm its pretensions to broader power, most particularly in the matter of Brazilian support for the development of the Iranian nuclear program. How can a state that is looking for an international leadership role openly support the nuclear program of a rogue state? This is an unreasonable position for an aspiring leader, and it may affect Brazil’s international role. The Iranian question must be approached from two different perspectives: first, Brazil acting in its role as a leader of the Southern bloc and attempting to guarantee its own position within the bloc; secondly,

Brazil seeking to gain major power status and, in accordance with this role, working in support of international principles.

In its position as a regional leader, Brazil must support the proposition that any country should be allowed to develop technologies if this technology would lead to its development, eliminating the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries. Threats to international peace are likely to appear no matter who retains nuclear capacity, be it Iran, the U.S. or Russia. Lula has stated that if we want a more peaceful world, each and every country should abandon its nuclear weapons program, a very strong position befitting Brazil’s role as a non-nuclear power aspiring to greater influence.

Nonetheless, as Brazil is seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, the body responsible for the maintenance of international security, the country should maintain a more orthodox position in an attempt to create bonds of confidence with other countries. No one wants a bully hanging around in the neighborhood. And despite his charisma and ability to gather support for his propositions, Lula will not be accepted as a member of the club if he continues his loud demands for what he terms “fair” political conditions for all countries. Well, politics is not fair. It is politics.

If Brazil does want to be a leader in this new world order, there must be a compromise between ideals and the established rules of international politics by which Brazil must play. As history shows, a country cannot be both a revolutionary leader and a friend of the *ancien régime*. The Brazilian government must decide which path it will follow: to be the leader of the marginalized countries or to join the club of the developed nations. To be a leader is to be trusted and if Brazil does want this role, it must be a little more concerned with this. There is nothing wrong with supporting the claims and the interests of those who are marginalized, politically,

economically and socially. However, one cannot expect to be trusted and welcomed by the elites if he stands against their principles. A choice must be made, something Brazil is reluctant to do.

The diplomacy of Lula's government: Political foundations and agenda priorities

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In Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva's government, Brazil's foreign policy can be defined – according to the apparent order of relevance – as a conceptual hybrid among: (a) the *Partido dos Trabalhadores's* views and political preferences (in particular those of President Lula da Silva and of former International Secretary and current foreign policy advisor to the President, Marco Aurélio Garcia); (b) The Chancery leaders' personal political preferences (namely those of State Minister Celso Amorim and of Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Secretary-General between 2003 and 2009; the latter has a bigger "theoretical" role, being one of the rare examples of a diplomat who writes for a larger audience, particularly in academic circles); (c) the Brazilian Chancery's (known as Itamaraty) views and diplomatic traditions, *strictu sensu*, though tempered by the new conceptions and political priorities of political leaders (they come in last, but they're

relevant from an operational point of view).

The first two conceptual models are the most important as far as political agenda-setting is concerned, while the last one has a more important function in the area of technical support and operational substantiation. Acting mainly as an agent in the procedural field, the Chancery has a lesser role in determining the government's political orientation. The large number of players involved in foreign policy – compared with the relatively homogenous standard in the past, when foreign policy advisors to the President were career diplomats – might entail higher risks to the conceptual and operational unity of Brazilian diplomacy.

The theoretical views and conceptual universe of the different actors involved in foreign policy-making mark a return to the developmentalist and nationalist tradition of in mid-twentieth century Brazilian political thought, to which the Brazilian Left made several contributions.

From a practical level, this overall orientation has led to several new initiatives. The hyper-activist approach to operational diplomacy seems designed to overcome the legacy of presidential diplomacy of Fernando Henrique Cardoso's government – criticized as being part of a "cursed inheritance" of alleged submission to external interests and of suffering from a deficit of sovereignty as well as poor defense of national interests.

Three major issues have been at the top of the foreign policy agenda: (a) facilitating Mercosul's reinforcement and expansion; (b) obtaining a permanent seat in the United Nations' Security Council; and (c) securing regional trade agreements, while resisting intrusive agreements with major powers. These remain the three greatest diplomatic priorities of Lula's government: not only were they expressly mentioned in the President's inaugural speech on 1st January 2003, but they were later reaffirmed in 2007, at beginning of Lula's second term.

Other issues also appear on the diplomatic agenda: (d) encouraging and

stimulating regional integration (which has had few practical results); (e) creating selective strategic alliances in the context of South-South diplomacy: IBAS, interregional summit meetings with Africa and Arab countries, as well as the BRIC group (Russia, India and China); (f) becoming an influential protagonist on an international level in the pursuit of a permanent seat on the UN's Security Council and with the objective of creating a new balance of powers on a global scale; (g) reforming international economic institutions; (h) maintaining the existing environmental plan which benefits the biggest polluters in the developing world, while attempting to shift the costs of those policies onto developed countries; (i) taking action to combat hunger by mobilizing international aid and conceiving "innovative financing mechanisms" (which contradict Brazil's interests, like the Tobin Tax).

These overall goals are the government's current range of foreign policy priorities, the implementation of which requires the use of traditional diplomatic instruments as well as other "tools". Professional diplomats and presidential aides are not the only players to take part in this process of hyperactive diplomacy: informal players (party members, for example), businessmen, leaders of public opinion and NGO representatives also take part in the system.

The multiplication of channels and participants could impair unity of command and create obstacles to the implementation of Brazilian foreign policy, the scope of which requires the concerted effort of many sectors of the government. Formulating and executing external policy through a great number of channels invites dispersion of action, and may even lead to contradicting orders: this could result in overlapping policies and loss of credibility for the country.

Additionally, besides making it difficult to manage items on the political agenda, an exaggerated presidential hyper activism – especially when negotiating issues of regional importance – makes the chain of command



unclear by involving the President from the start of negotiations. Hence, far-reaching diplomatic decisions may be made impulsively and without the necessary background work and reflection, or under the strong influence of other national leaders.

Concerning its diplomatic intentions, the Lula government has been more outspoken than it has been successful in obtaining palpable results for Brazil. While it cannot be denied that Brazil has become a more influential actor on the international scene and is better equipped to call attention to its interests, this gain in international prominence could also be credited to its continuing internal economic stability and growing ability to attract international capital – the foundations of which were laid during Fernando Henrique Cardoso's (FHC) presidency. Indeed, the fundamental components of the Brazilian economy were established at the beginning of FHC's second Administration in 1999: a target system for inflation, an exchange rate fluctuation regime, primary surplus in the management of the national budget, and a law concerning fiscal responsibility that prevents high-ranking politicians from spending irresponsibly and leaving debt for their successors.

It was precisely because of this good economic governance – labeled derogatorily as “neoliberal” by the traditional Left – that the Lula government was well received by the G8 governments. The current government has at its disposal large resources for publicity and can count on the general public's ignorance of its foreign policy agenda, given that Brazil has few research centers dedicated to international issues. Consequently, this government has great latitude of action and may count on the respect the Itamaraty's professional diplomacy has garnered over time. More importantly, perhaps, when it comes to its immediate needs and propagandistic objectives, Lula's government may rely on a large capital of sympathy acquired (or to be acquired) by many social actors that

were seduced by its apparently progressive external policy. This acts as a kind of practical compensation for the more conservative aspects of the government's economic policy, keeping Brazil in balance.

Guinea-Bissau: From ashes to uncertainty

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After so many starts and re-starts in Guinea-Bissau, one could hardly say that we are facing a new beginning. The international community's optimism about the country's future may be seen as a promising sign, but the country's tradition of instability requires a more reserved view. There is a need for caution and, above all, a realist analysis of the situation. The novelty of the current situation is the existence of a tacit pact between the political and the military classes. This is certainly an improvement over the previous antagonism between the political and military establishments. With luck it will provide some stability and allow the country to live in peace while facing the uncertainties of the future.

If the current government is able to provide some measure of peace and security, the international community should act quickly to bolster it with aid. This support must be given as soon as possible, as usually periods of stability in Guinea-Bissau only last six to twelve months. However, this timeframe is also long enough for a new politico-military death or another coup attempt to destroy whatever shadow of order has been created.

If Guinea-Bissau is to achieve a meaningful new beginning – a chance to rebuild the country from the ashes – there is a need to act with care in addressing issues of military interference in politics, respecting the military's power. Therefore, the international community's wish for peace in Guinea-Bissau will not be realized by imposing severe restrictions on its military.

This approach should not be seen as an opportunity given to Guinea-Bissau's military to continue wielding an influence over politics. It is rather an appeal to the growth and ripening of independent political institutions. The goals of the international community should be seen from the epistemic side of politics: to educate the government as to how to conduct politics and to educate politicians on how to behave as public figures. This should not be blended with the West's longing to solve the narco-trafficking problem. These must remain separate goals.

Bissau-Guinean politicians must understand that public service should be the motivation for entering into politics. If they do not embrace this spirit, there will never be an effective political system in Guinea-Bissau. Bearing this in mind, the international community should focus in organizing a continuous political seminar for local politicians and military officials to tutor them on how to better perform their duties. Local institutions have failed to educate their officials to work for the people, rather than for themselves. Without that, there is no possibility for political accountability in Guinea-Bissau. Only with an ethical compromise will politics in Guinea-Bissau serve those who are the object of politics.

It is crucial for Guinea-Bissau to improve its education system and work toward the fair distribution of the country's meagre resources, but this cannot happen without political reform. Guinea-Bissau's politicians must also avoid the image of a country besieged by narco-trafficking, while avoiding making this their main priority and obsession. The fight against drug trafficking must also be dealt with by the



countries affected by it in cooperation with Guinea-Bissau's government, providing it with effective tools. However, the difference between providing and imposing must be respected. Even the scanty peace envisaged by the international community must be backed with respect for Guinea-Bissau's current government in order to give it the opportunity to succeed.

While Bissau-Guinean political institutions today are sluggish and frequently ineffective, they are still preferable to the previous era of swift and bloody institutional change. The current government is seeking to solidify a new politics of peace to end the cycle of violence that has plagued Guinea-Bissau for decades. Providing Guinea-Bissau's public officials with political and ethical tutorials will help cement political and institutional stability, ultimately benefiting Bissau-Guineans and the rest of the world.

São Tomé: Fradique's dangerous gamble

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São Tomé and Príncipe's political scene seems destined to endure another episode of turmoil in the new year. In a bold and risky move, considering the fragility of the latest government, on 19 December, President Fradique de Menezes assumed the leadership of the *Movimento Democrático das Forças da Mudança-Partido Liberal* (MDFM-PL), the movement that he himself created after his first electoral win in 2001.

Outraged critics from the other political parties and civil society quickly condemned the move, highlighting its potential to be simply a power grab by the President. While his presidential mandate ends in 2011, São Tomé is due to hold legislative elections in 2010 and the MDFM-PL is well-positioned to win, which could leave the country with Fradique de Menezes remaining in power for the foreseeable future (something he has already admitted desiring) by his assuming a position as a deputy in the National Assembly and possibly Prime Minister after the end of his mandate as President.

Such pretensions, however, directly clash with the explicit rules of São Tomé's Constitution, with its Article 72 clearly declaring the incompatibility between the role of President of the Republic with any other public or private responsibilities, which would logically include political party presidencies. Furthermore, the Constitution bestows upon the President the permanently difficult task of promoting the state unity and assuring the effective performance of its institutions, which, according to the opposition, would be seriously compromised.

Thus, accusations of violating the Constitution were among the first declarations by the *Partido da Convergência Democrática* (PCD), who, alongside the MDFM-PL and the *Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe-Partido Social Democrata* (MLSTP-PSD), still support the currently fragile coalition government of Prime Minister Rafael Branco. In a blunt response to this first wave of criticism, Fradique was quick to classify his opponents as simply "scum".

As for the MLSTP-PSD – Branco's party – and despite initial appeals to calm and serenity among São Tomé's political class, it has also come to demand the immediate intervention of the Constitutional Court, the only judicial national body capable of resolving such legal matters, involving the highest figures of the state. The only problem is that the Court is currently lacking a member, which prevents its proper functioning, leaving the Supreme Court

of Justice as the only option available, at least for the short-term.

In a response to such wide disapproval, on 30 December, Fradique de Menezes took another step in this spiral of political controversy, by formally withdrawing the four MDFM-PL ministers from the government's coalition, prompting fears of an early expiration date for Rafael Branco's term, as the Prime Minister warned against the growing "political chaos" in the country.

Notwithstanding his past commitment to the development of São Tomé's democracy (either by his participation in previous governments or by his two internationally-recognized presidential elections), President Fradique de Menezes seems eager to extend his political legacy, even if it is at the expense of the institutions he helped build. Curiously enough, in February 2009, when an alleged coup to overthrow the Presidency was discovered, Fradique de Menezes was quoted saying, "If I am the reason that things are not working in this country, if there is instability, I will go, because I do not want the people to be faced with fighting over power". As events are likely to escalate in the near future in São Tomé and Príncipe, it appears that political instability will be Fradique de Menezes' primary contribution to his country.

Security Sector Reform handbook facing reality in Timor Leste

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Since the beginning of the United Nations intervention in Timor Leste in



1999, what was seen almost from the beginning as a major success story is slowly gaining other less positive attributes. No peace-building and institution-building mission starts from scratch: peace and institutions are built upon an existing social, political and economic base. Hence, their design, implementation and review should be done having that in mind. The United Nations has not failed in its goals: nowadays, Timor Leste is an independent, sovereign and nascent democratic nation. However, the United Nations has not attained the success it aimed for.

As in almost every peace-building and peacekeeping mission, Security Sector Reform (SSR) takes central stage. Security is seen by Western interveners as the most important condition for peace, liberal democracy and economic growth. SSR attracts funding because it is seen as a technical exercise, applying apolitical, bureaucratic and context-immune policies, while overlooking the existing or emerging social processes of conflict and following pre-established steps. However, the central difficulties in SSR programs are not their broad goals. The main problem is twofold: there is no consensus on its definition and the tools to apply it are often misconceived.

In Timor Leste, the situation is no different. The definition of security was never clearly co-established between the actors involved, and cooperation between them was never smooth.

The 2006 '*Peticionários*' crisis showed the imbalances of a poorly-conceived security apparatus. At the request of the Timorese, the United Nations stepped in to maintain security on the ground. However, the mandate for this renewed intervention, as well as the cooperation between United Nations forces and national ones, was badly defined. On paper, the United Nations controlled the police force, but on the ground, it was the Timorese military and police who led what was supposedly a joint-mission. In fact, the '*Peticionários*' crisis was resolved by a joint military-

police Timorese command, a move openly against the agreement made with the United Nations. A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report indentifies several episodes of mismanagement, planning flaws, lack of cooperation between local and international forces and a non-functional vetting process of local officials that hindered the international mission to reform the Police force.

Simply put, it is clear that the government and the United Nations are lacking in dialog at several levels, and that mistrust is mutual. Nowadays, the United Nations still tells its officials on the ground that the political situation can change at any moment. Despite this picture, the United Nations mission did not hesitate to act according to plan and hand over police control to the government, district by district, earlier this year. The process began in May 2009, but the steps taken remain apolitical and do not lay down any rules for future cooperation between local police and international forces. This handover process is not, *per se*, a problem. In fact, the current SSR program is so poorly conceived and the existing cooperation so limited, that the immediate impact of this measure is negligible. The ICG even said that this is the right step to take, as it mirrors the reality on the ground.

Yet this should not be the central debate. It is now commonplace to criticize SSR programs for their lack of political sensitivity. However, the measures used to tackle current issues with the Timorese police are well established: increasing accountability, halting impunity, implementing transparency, building cooperation between the United Nations and the police, constructing a police force independent from political power, avoiding the current militarization and focusing on special police units in the force, clearly defining the boundaries between the Police and the Military. These objectives are probably on point, but for now they are nothing but wishful thinking. They overlook the fact

that only ten years have passed since the country became independent. It is certainly impossible to achieve a Western-type force in so little time.

The United Nations mission should shift its focus back to the basics. Firstly, it must understand that in Timor Leste, the police force and the power it wields are a political tool. Controlling the Police, in particular its special units, is an important political issue for the government. Then the United Nations must recalibrate its mission. It can hand over control – it is probably for the best to vest responsibility in the Timorese themselves – and, having done this, it should concentrate on strengthening high-level police institutions and defining the current police mission. The UN should not engage in police patrolling, but rather in dialogue at the highest level, technical assistance and training, a rigorous and accepted vetting process, and quality policy and legal research, design, evaluation and support hand-in-hand with the Timorese. In this way, the United Nations may achieve concrete results, rather than constantly missing its lofty goals.



Portugal and the Lisbon Treaty: And on we go!

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"If it's a Yes, we will say 'On we go', and if it's a No we will say 'We continue'". These famous words were uttered by Luxembourg's Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker in May 2005, while he was holding the European Union (EU) Presidency, summing up the Union's approach toward the results of the referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. This is the way the EU has been building itself since its foundation. The Lisbon Treaty is considered to be another milestone in making the EU a stronger player, both internally and globally. Two years after it was first approved, the Reform Treaty had a winding path until it finally came into force on 1 December 2009.

Negotiations to modify European Union's institutions began in 2001, resulting in the European Constitutional Treaty, which failed due to rejection by French and Dutch voters in 2005. The proposal for a new Treaty came to life under the German Presidency in the first semester of 2007, and was later fulfilled during the Portuguese Presidency in the second semester of the same year. The Lisbon amendments to the former Treaties were initially stopped by the Irish referendum in June 2008, but overcame their last obstacle with the Czech ratification in fall 2009 – which succeeded despite fears that property claims by people expelled after World War II would go directly to the European Court of Justice. Shortly before the last signature, the Polish government was also apprehensive about signing the Lisbon Treaty due to sovereignty issues.

The final ratification of the Treaty results in the elimination of the former pillar system of the EU and brings a great deal of changes to the institutional frameworks, decision-making procedures and voting systems of the Union. Still, most of its new rulings will not come into

force until 2014. Thus, the consequences of the new Treaty will remain undefined for some time but predictions, hopes and apprehensions have been raised on different bases by all EU members. When it comes to Portugal, there are at least three points which have been fostering insecurities.

In the short term, the country is concerned that José Manuel Durão Barroso, the President of the European Commission and the Portuguese key player at the EU level, may lose his relevance due to two new high-ranking positions: the High Representative for Foreign Af-

airs and Security Policy, a post which now belongs to Catherine Ashton, and the first long-term Presidency of the Council, held by former Belgian Prime Minister, Herman van Rompuy who will stay in office for the next two and a half years. The High Representative may assume a particularly important role, since it merges the already existing post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the role of the Commissioner for External Relations, assisting both the European Council and the European Commission. This position will also be supported by a newly created External Action Service, which will be composed by officials from the Council, Commission and Diplomatic

Services of Member States. This service seeks to gather all those involved in matters of the European Union foreign affairs and will be responsible for overseeing not only Europe's huge aid and humanitarian budget but also relations with countries around the world.

The second point concerns the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system in the European Council. Four years from now, the QMV will be extended to 21 new legal areas and to 23 areas which are currently under unanimity rule. Also, double majority voting will enable the European

The EU has been, so far, a multi-faced player – its dynamic is highly dependent on the "men chosen for the job" – and this will most likely remain so.



Council to take decisions more swiftly. Each country will possess one vote only, but population will be taken into consideration, making it a double vote. Until now 255 votes out of 345 votes were required to pass a law, now two different aspects have to be taken into account.

While this may ease the EU ability to pass legislation, it does also make medium and smaller countries worry whether the new, allegedly more proportional representation will be beneficial for others besides the most populated countries. Voting procedures in the European Council will, for the first time in the history of European integration, have one country standing above all others. Indeed, Germany has the majority of votes in the European Council, followed by France and Great Britain.

Then again, the European Commission will reduce the number of seats in its College of Commissioners to $\frac{1}{3}$ of the number of the member states. So far, this institution had been perceived as a strategic partner to smaller countries or new member states, due to its more “independent political role”. Third, in the field of foreign affairs there is a clear necessity to keep up with the United States (U.S.), especially at the time when North American ties to Asia are growing faster than ever. After a “down time” in our relations with the U.S., specifically during the George W. Bush administration and disagreements over the conflicts in the Middle East, the transatlantic relationship seems to have once again stabilized. Shortly after Barack Obama came into office, Nicolas Sarkozy, then holding the European Presidency, wished for a “partnership of equals” to address global problems in the post-Bush era. While not all countries may find this a priority, certainly most of the Western European countries would widely support the strengthening of ties with the U.S. for historical reasons. On the other hand, all European countries seem to realize the importance of developing of economic partnerships in Asia. The EU has been far behind other parts of the world in becoming an important player on the other side of the globe, and that relationship needs to be fostered. Then again, the EU needs to find its own place in the international arena, which can only be done if the ties within the EU are strengthened. At the same time, the ties to the U.S., NATO and the United Nations have to be cared for. All of these investments in a reinforced common security and foreign affairs policy make small countries with lower investment possibilities, like Portugal, fearful of become secondary players.

When it comes to the European Council voting, Portugal has to be aware, just like other small and medium sized countries, that it cannot stand alone, just like it could not before the Lisbon Treaty.

Identifying problems and opportunities

For Portugal, as mentioned above, one of the main worries has been the loss of relevance of its key European figure: President of the European Commission Durão Barroso. Some, like German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, consider that Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy, whom newspapers have so far called “the unknowns”, may still grow in power in their positions. But, at a time when the definition of roles between the three high ranking positions is still very ambiguous, their low key status will most likely be a disadvantage for them. In the end, all three are in some way responsible for representing the EU externally, and it is probable that many functions may even be carried out by more than

one of them. In addition to experience, personality also matters in determining who will fill what role and emerge in the position of the greatest power. The impact of personality can be seen in the difference between the time of Nicolas Sarkozy as President of the European Council and the much less memorable Czech Presidency. In the end the French Presidency outshined Barroso, while the Czech did not. The EU has been, so far, a multi-faced player – its dynamic is highly dependent on the “men chosen for the job” – and this will most likely remain so.

In order to pass a law or an amendment from 2014 on, 55% of the member states will have to agree on it, which translates into 15 out of 27 states and a total of 65% of the population. The new voting system in the European Council will change decision-making dynamics. Smaller countries, like Portugal, will partially lose decision-making power and will

have to rely on others for support. Still, we should not forget that the EU has a history of seeking consensus. According to a report by the Centre for European Policy Studies, in 2006 there were 153 pieces of legislation passed by the Council of Ministers, but a disagreement registered through QMV voting occurred on only 34 occasions. The possibility of unanimous decision-making remains even in the double majority voting procedure – bigger countries are not able to take decisions into their own hands and will have to count on medium and smaller countries to agree on bills. Also, member states still retain a veto over any new proposals/decisions in the fields of defense, foreign affairs, taxation and civil and family law.

For instance, a “Modified Ioannina Compromise” will allow the European Council to build a broader support



group when a number of member states – which have to represent at least $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population needed to form a blocking minority or $\frac{3}{4}$ of the member states needed to form a blocking minority – request that the European Council work to find a new agreement “without prejudicing obligatory time limits laid down by the Union law”. The “Ioannina Compromise” is not a veto and goes hand in hand with the search for unanimity without stopping the laws from being passed.

On the other hand, in order to prevent the three biggest countries from stopping decision-making procedures, blocking minorities must include at least four countries. This way, if fewer than four states disagree on the bill, even if the population agreeing does not represent 65%, the bill will still be passed. Currently, no three countries represent at least 35% of the population, but with further enlargements this will be a very important point. Also, we must bear in mind that the United Kingdom has not had a history of agreeing with Germany and France, which makes it less likely that these three countries may in some way “bully” the rest of Europe.

When it comes to the European Council voting, Portugal has to be aware, just like other small and medium sized countries, that it cannot stand alone, just like it could not before the Lisbon Treaty. The difference now is that single countries are less capable of blocking decisions, but are still able to be active participants in the process. On the other hand, being tenth in the voting ranks, Portugal may be considered to be a strategic partner in decision-making procedures. This means that the country may be able to negotiate for its interests if it brands itself as an important partner in decision-making process.

The reduction of the number of commissioners at the College and the possibility of a subsequent “unequal rotation” at this institutional body is a collective problem and not just a one that will affect only small and medium countries. The European Commission does still have limited powers and will not be a part of the legislative procedures in matters of foreign affairs and security policy. With a reduced number of member states represented at the European Commission, that institution may lose support while the powers of the European Council and the European Parliament grow. In the end, the European Commission will not only be losing commissioners, but strength and member state

support. Due to its composition, the political agenda of the Commission is not a national one and is supposed to maintain “an independent political role”. If fewer countries are represented in an institutional body which is supposed to reach out to member states on behalf of the Union, the effectiveness of its work will be put to the test. Countries that are not represented may have a more hostile attitude towards the Commission. Changes within this institution will become particularly worse if there is not an “equal rotation” in the representation procedures, as foreseen. This may still become a problem, since there is not yet a clear definition on how this rotation will take place and the final settlement may be less “equal” than primarily stated.

In several interviews, António Vitorino, Portuguese politician and former member of the Joint European Parliament-Portuguese Parliament Committee on European Integration, considered the new role of the national parliaments as one of the most beneficial changes for individual countries. After a legislative proposal is made, the national parliaments have eight weeks to ask for a revision of the proposal should they feel it does not fully respect the principle of subsidiarity. The process is more important than the result itself. It is expected that this will help national parliaments to be more active and informed on the European level while debating legislation, rather than making them a constant blocking power. This policy networking helps the Portuguese Parliament, like others, to watch the European decision-making process more closely, which, if it is used effectively, may also outweigh the loss of power in the Council.

Portugal has participated in the majority of European missions, but the future success of the country’s participation in the Common European Security Policy will now depend on the national defense budget. Also, the country has to recognize that *permanent structured cooperation* must be a priority in the national defense department. This investment does not have to imply that Portugal will be putting its NATO and United Nations agendas aside, though, since the EU has been more and more willing to make them complementary to the European defense.

Portugal’s biggest asset in the field of foreign affairs is its political and economic ties to Africa’s rising economies, like Angola, and South America’s most stable democracy, Brazil. Fostering these ties is crucial to reinforce Eu-

Portugal may be at the front row of the decision-making in the areas of foreign affairs and security policy by figuring out the advantages that it can bring to the diplomatic table – namely its existing ties with Angola and Brazil.



rope's global strength, and if Portugal manages to play the role of building bridges in economic and diplomatic relations between these countries and the EU, it will strengthen its position within the European Union and even outside European borders. In order to make this happen, Portugal has to be ready to be in the front row of negotiations.

Taking changes into our own hands

All in all, Portugal will probably not have to worry about the loss of relevance of Durão Barroso until 2014. For now, Portugal should focus on filling other important roles, as the one acquired with João Vale de Almeida as Director-General for External Relations. These roles are decisive, and will grow in importance when Barroso leaves his post. The upcoming years, before the Treaty enters fully into force, will be filled with controversy concerning the changes within the European Commission institutional framework. Not only may this institutional body lose power, also, many EU countries may stand up against these changes or against anomalies in the commissioners "rotation". One of the main characteristics of the EU is that institutions and member states are constantly watching one another. This mutual monitor-

ing is very important in times of change and the new role of national parliaments reinforces this practice.

When it comes to voting in the European Council, Portugal will have to sharpen its diplomacy to show that it may be an important partner in obtaining the number of votes necessary to pass a bill. On the other hand, this "good student" may be at the front row of the decision-making in the areas of foreign affairs and security policy by figuring out the advantages that it can bring to the diplomatic table – namely its existing ties with Angola and Brazil. Soon, the new government budget will be approved and the national Parliament should keep in mind how important the EU is to Portugal. This applies specifically to the defense department. Besides being a part of the most important defense operations, Portugal has to support a strong national diplomatic presence at the External Action Service.

So far we have shown that we can keep up with the demands of the European Union, but this has to translate into a national effort as it did with the country's entry in the EU and the adoption of the euro. António Monteiro, former Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that, after all, "it will be good for Europe, so it will be good for us", and today we, as a country, are most likely gain influence and advance the national interest by working within the European Union framework.



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 December 2009 (Luanda):

Due to the Dubai financial crisis, the government was forced to delay its U.S.\$4 billion bond sale until early 2010. Additionally, it is hoped that, by that time, the selling will be rated, thus improving its creditworthiness.

1 December 2009 (Luanda):

Former Cabindan separatist fighter and Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) member António Bento Bembe – who is now a Minister without Portfolio in the government – stated that FLEC no longer exists. Bembe led a FLEC faction who signed a peace deal in 2006, but some inside the movement do not recognize the deal.

4 December 2009 (Luanda):

Prominent Angolan journalist and human rights activist Rafael Marques de Morais denounced endemic corruption in society as a by-product of the shadowy activities of President José Eduardo dos Santos, in particular his FESA foundation, which extends clientelistic networks, thus preventing a societal fight against it.

8 December 2009 (Luanda):

MPLA's VIth Congress was opened by President José Eduardo dos Santos with a speech defending as a national priority the fight against severe poverty, which still affects over 60% of the population.

9 December 2009 (Luanda):

José Eduardo dos Santos was re-elected MPLA president. He was the only candidate to chair the MPLA in the congress, which also elected a new Central Committee. For the first time, the vote was secret and, albeit in the face of a 99% victory, 26 members voted against José Eduardo dos Santos.

9 December 2009 (Malabo):

Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos represented Angola's President in Equatorial Guinea's President Teodoro Obiang Nguema's swear-in.

10 December 2009 (Luanda):

MPLA's VIth Congress ended with a final resolution defending peace, national sovereignty, internal security and regional, continental and global stability. It was also signalled by President José Eduardo dos Santos that the government's and the party's executive powers should be reinforced and the quest for transparency, and sustainable and equitable growth reinforced.

10 December 2009 (Luanda):

José Eduardo dos Santos confirmed in the closing speech of the MPLA's VIth Congress that Presidential elections will only be held in 2012. These elections were firstly promised to take place in 2009. Yet dos Santos now claims that the MPLA ought to finish its legislative mandate and approve the new Constitution – which sets the rules for the presidential elections.

10 December 2009 (Luanda):

Sonangol's president, Manuel Vicente, was elected to the MPLA's Political Bureau.

11 December 2009 (Luanda):

Sonangol bought a 20% stake from Marathon in block 32 for an estimated amount of U.S.\$1,3 billion, making use of its contractual right of preference against a China National Offshore Oil Corporation and China Petrochemical Corporation bid.

11 December 2009 (Luanda):

An investigation by the newspaper *Novo Jornal* on the shadowy privatization of the mobile phone company Movitel found out that 40% of the corporation was sold to a company, Portmil Investments, connected to General Hélder Vieira Dias "Kopelipa", Head of the Military Office of the Presidency.

15 December 2009 (Cabinda):

Two journalists, José Manuel Gimbi and Benoît Faucon, were arrested and held without charge for five hours by the police in Cabinda. Both were taking pictures of the local football stadium – which will hold games for the African Nations Cup. Human Rights Watch pressured Luanda to maintain press freedom during the football tournament and to use the event as an opportunity to foster transparency.

15-17 December 2009 (Luanda):

The ninth Angola-DRC bilateral commission session was held in Luanda. Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos called for a deeper cooperation beyond the strictly bilateral cooperation as a way to better understand and solve the issues of migration and border disputes between the two nations.

16-18 December 2009 (Luanda):

AFRICOM's Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, visited Luanda with the goal of strengthening existing cooperation activities, in particular in the energy sector, while praising Angola's role in regional security.

16-18 December 2009 (Luanda):

IMF's Deputy Managing Director, Takatoshi Tako, visited Luanda for follow-up meetings with President José Eduardo dos Santos and several ministers concerning the U.S.\$1,4 billion loan by the Fund. While stating confidence in Angola's policies, he advised the government to tame the non-oil sector fiscal deficit to curb inflation and ensure economic stability.

20 December 2009 (Lisboa):

A company owned by Isabel dos Santos, Kento Holding, bought a 10% stake in Portugal's ZON cable channel. This deal opens the door to the Angolan market for the Portuguese company.

22 December 2009 (Lobito):

Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos announced that the completion of a major oil refinery was postponed to 2015 as a result of the global economic downturn, but said he still considers the project a national priority.

22-23 December 2009 (Luanda):

For the first time, Angola hosted an OPEC meeting. The 155th (Extraordinary) Meeting closed Angola's term as chair of the organization. Angolan Oil Minister José Botelho de Vasconcelos stated that OPEC would not change production levels or goals during this meeting, and Prime Minister Paulo Kassoma defended the need to enhance the use of renewable energy to allow for a better management of non-renewable sources.

**23 December 2009 (Luanda):**

Chevron confirmed Sonangol's estimates that Angola's first liquefied natural gas plant will cost U.S.\$9 billion and will start deliveries by 2012.

23 December 2009 (Baghdad):

Sonangol won two Iraqi oil-field exploration contracts in an international auction. The Angolan national oil company was the only firm that presented a proposal, as the two fields are located in the northern Kurdish area and are deemed too dangerous by other corporations.

24 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Angolan Ambassador to Portugal Marcos Barica stated that 2009 was a year marked by excellent bilateral relations between the two countries, highlighting increasing multi-layered ties.

28 December 2009 (Luanda):

In the year end greetings ceremony, President José Eduardo dos Santos demanded greater transparency and responsibility in public funds management, recalling the pledge made by his MPLA party in its last congress. President dos Santos received greetings from approximately 2,000 dignitaries in the presidential palace.

31 December 2009 (Luanda):

Former Cabinda rebel and now Minister Without Portfolio António Bento Bembe stated that all security and stability conditions have been achieved in the northern oil-production enclave.

Brazil

1 December 2009 (Lisbon):

The countries participating in the XIXth Ibero-American Summit unanimously accepted the Summit's Presidential declaration recognizing Honduras's ousted Manuel Zelaya as the legitimate President until the end of his term in office. The declaration also defines the coup as "unacceptable".

2 December 2009 (Geneva):

At a meeting in Geneva, the Foreign Relations Ministers of India, Mercosul (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho,

Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) agreed to study the idea of a Trilateral Trade Arrangement, aiming to form a trade alliance between countries of Africa, Asia and South America.

2 December 2009 (Kiev):

President Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva began a two-day official visit to Ukraine, where a treaty for the extradition of convicts, the partial renouncement of visa requirements, and greater cooperation with regards to culture, education and aerospace were addressed.

3 December 2009 (Isfahan):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim paid a short visit to Iran in order to continue the talks started in Brasília, including discussion of Iran's controversial nuclear program. Amorim met with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki.

3 December 2009 (Berlin):

President Lula da Silva began an official visit to Germany and met with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Among other topics, they addressed the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.

8 December 2009 (Montevideo):

President Lula da Silva attended the regular meeting of heads of state and government of Mercosul. Bilateral meetings with Uruguayan President-Elect José Mujica and Argentinean President Cristina Kirchner were also held.

9 December 2009 (Brasília):

The Brazilian Senate postponed the vote on Venezuela's incorporation to Mercosur following a heated debate on the floor, where the opposition strongly criticized Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez.

10 December 2009 (Lima):

President Lula da Silva arrived in Peru, where he began a work visit aiming at signing agreements regarding border integration, technical cooperation projects in border areas, coffee and cocoa production in the Peruvian Amazon, the fight against organized crime and environmental protection. The political situation in Honduras was also addressed.

14 December 2009 (Brasília):

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela arrived

to hold a meeting with President Lula da Silva's foreign policy advisor, Marco Aurélio Garcia, concerning the situation in Honduras and recent developments related to Brazil-Iran relations.

15 December 2009 (Copenhagen):

President Lula da Silva arrived at Copenhagen, two days earlier than expected, to attend the 15th UN Climate Change Conference, where he participated in the discussion about global warming.

15 December 2009 (Brasília):

Brazil's Congress approved Venezuela's admission to Mercosul by 35-27, despite considerable concerns from the opposition about Venezuela's democracy.

17 December 2009 (Brasília):

The governor of Minas Gerais state, Aécio Neves, said he would not seek to become the presidential candidate for the opposition PSDB party in next October's election, leaving it almost certain that São Paulo state governor José Serra will be the main opposition party's presidential candidate.

22 December 2009 (Brasília):

Brazil's Congress passed the 2010 budget, which allows a boost in government spending ahead of October's presidential elections, a move that may put pressure on the Central Bank to raise interest rates.

26-27 December 2009 (Cairo):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim visited Egypt, aiming at improving bilateral relations in the fields of economy, trade, science, technology and culture. Increased political consultations and the Middle East peace process were also addressed.

Cape Verde

7 December (Washington, DC):

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the seventh review under the Policy Support Instrument (PSI) for Cape Verde. The PSI for Cape Verde was approved on 31 July 2006 and was extended by one year on 19 June 2009.

**9 December 2009 (Dubai):**

In view of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 15), taking place in Copenhagen, the Foreign Minister of Cape Verde, José Brito, alongside with his counterparts from Costa Rica, Iceland, Singapore, Slovenia, and the United Arab Emirates, issued a common statement, where they agreed to strengthen their commitments and call for renewed global action to address climate change.

11 December 2009 (Praia):

U.S. ambassador to Cape Verde, Marianne Myles, announced that Cape Verde was the only country selected by the United States for the second compact for financial development aid due to its sustainable development within the framework of Democratic Rule of Law, Good Governance and Human Rights.

29 December 2009 (Praia):

Cape Verde has obtained a credit line of €3,3 million from the Spanish government, through the Contingent Development Fund, to extend its desalination unit, which will be an additional contribution to the implementation of Cape Verde's Strategic Policy Programme to reduce poverty and guarantee sustainable economic growth.

Guinea-Bissau

1 December 2009 (Bissau):

The National Secretariat Against AIDS' Executive-Director, João Monteiro, reported that 8% of the country's 1,5 million inhabitants are infected with HIV/AIDS. The fight against the virus is hampered by the population's lack of consciousness and its skepticism about seeking public treatment.

3 December 2009 (Bissau):

Attorney-General Amine Saad gave 30 days to the country's ministers to disclose personal revenues and patrimonies. The measure tries to enforce a 1999 law decree and is aimed at fighting corruption.

3 December 2009 (Bissau):

The President's official visit to Portugal, scheduled for December 4th and 5th, had to be postponed due to health problems. Malam Bacai

Sanhá reportedly suffered diabetes complications and was transferred to Dakar where he received treatment. The scheduled visit to Brazil from December 7th to 9th was also postponed.

8 December 2009 (Bissau):

Guinea-Bissau's Parliament approved the government's state budget for 2010. Amounting to €184 million, its main priorities are agriculture, education, health and public infrastructures. The state budget aims at boosting economic growth.

8 December 2009 (Bissau):

In the United Nations Security Council, Antonio Maria Costa, the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), stated that drug trafficking threatens UNODC's efforts in peace building and peace-keeping missions, including Guinea-Bissau.

9 December 2009 (Bissau):

The Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries' (CPLP) Executive Secretary, Domingos Simões Pereira, stated in Bissau that now he could feel an atmosphere of confidence and optimism in the country's future, although the situation was still "serious" and thus there is a need to avoid political battles.

10 December 2009 (Paris):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá was transferred from Dakar to Val-de-Grâce military hospital in Paris in order to recover from possible diabetes complications he suffered earlier in the month.

11 December 2009 (Bissau):

Public Administration and State Modernization Minister Fernando Gomes revealed that over the last few years over 2,300 persons were admitted to the public service erroneously. The minister now intends to oust those to be found working illegally within the State.

11 December 2009 (Bissau):

Justice Minister Mamadu Djaló Pires addressed the country's difficulties dealing with narco-trafficking. In particular, Guinea-Bissau finds it nearly impossible to patrol the Bijagós archipelago, which is used to store drugs in transit to the mainland and where state presence is weak. Pires also disclosed that the European Union will provide ECOWAS with €15 million to fight drug-trafficking in the region.

12 December 2009 (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior announced

that his country holds "important" oil, bauxite, and phosphate reserves, which can generate important business opportunities both within and outside Guinea-Bissau.

14 December 2009 (Bissau):

In a Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) Business Council meeting, the Business Confederation of the CPLP was created. It aims to strengthen economic and business ties between the eight member countries.

15 December 2009 (Brussels):

The European Union announced a €230 million aid package to support developing countries fighting the global economic crisis, of which €8 million are earmarked for Guinea-Bissau.

15 December 2009 (Washington):

Guinea-Bissau will receive U.S.\$3 million from AFRICOM's Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partnership, intended to boost security cooperation between the country and the United States' African Military Command.

15 December 2009 (Banjul):

Bissau-Guinean authorities have seized a ship bound for The Gambia containing armaments for the country's armed forces. Gambia's Foreign Minister Ousman Jammeh was dispatched to Bissau to solve the imbroglio. Guinea-Bissau claimed that it could not release the ship until the proper paperwork is presented.

17 December 2009 (Bissau):

Two high officials of the Fisheries Ministry have been arrested on suspicions of fund diversion. These detentions are framed in a wider investigation by the Attorney-General to eradicate corruption in a sector that is one of the main sources of revenues for Guinea-Bissau thanks to a European Union Fishing Agreement.

19 December 2009 (Paris):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá left hospital without knowing for sure from what he is suffering. The President stated that even during his recovery he kept track on Guinea-Bissau's issues, praising recent reforms and the decline in drug trafficking. Before returning to Bissau, the President will recover in the Canary Islands.

21 December 2009 (Bissau):

French Ambassador Jean-François Parot and the country's Finance Minister, Mário Vaz, signed an agreement by which France will grant €3 mil-



lion to Guinea-Bissau to support the payment of salaries in the education and health sector, as well as part of the public debt.

23 December 2009 (Bissau):

The Agriculture Minister, Carlos Mussa Balde, decided to suspend the ministry's mandate while his Fisheries department is under investigation for fraud by the Attorney-General.

24 December 2009 (Bissau):

The country's Finance Minister disclosed a €26 million deal agreed to with the EU's Representative in Guinea-Bissau, Franco Nulli, to help the government pay salary arrears and service public debt. However, it was not made clear if the sum is a loan or a contribution.

28 December 2009 (Bissau):

Bissau-Guinean bishops affirmed that no lasting peace will be achieved in the country while poverty and social inequality remains unaddressed. In particular, they urged a larger investment in health and land communications.

28 December 2009 (Bissau):

Former Navy Chief of Staff José Américo Bubo Na Tchute returned from Gambia, where he took refuge after being accused of taking part in a failed coup attempt in August 2008. Moreover, he was also connected to the killing of former Armed Forces Chief of Staff Tagmé Na Waié in March 2009. Bubo Na Tchute returned to Guinea-Bissau illegally by sea and took shelter in the UN compound due to judicial charges pending against him, though he denies any involvement in the coup attempt or assassination. The government called an extraordinary Council of Ministers where it expressed the need to capture and bring Bubo Na Tchute to court.

28 December 2009 (Bissau):

Chinese Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau Yan Bangua announced that China will rebuild the Palace of the Republic, while it signed a U.S.\$8 million finance deal to support the construction of the military hospital in Bissau.

30 December 2009 (Bissau):

Bissau-Guinean authorities and the UN office in Bissau failed to reach an agreement concerning the situation of former Navy Chief of Staff Bubo Na Tchute. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior stated that justice must be made to assure the country's political and constitutional

order, but the UN seemed wary of the consequences of releasing Bubo Na Tchute.

30 December 2009 (Bissau):

Malam Bacai Sanhá returned to Guinea-Bissau after an almost four-week absence due to a still unknown illness. The President downplayed the comeback of Bubo Na Tchute, stating that any Bissau-Guinean citizen can return to his country.

31 December 2009 (Bissau):

The government demanded of the United Nations office the immediate and unconditional hand-over of Bubo Na Tchute, as well as announcing its intention to establish an enquiry commission to determine how the former Navy Chief of Staff entered the country illegally.

Mozambique

4 December 2009 (Maputo):

Three of Madagascar's leading politicians met with the head of the international mediation team and former President of Mozambique Joaquim Chissano for talks meant to clear the way to forming a unity government.

4 December 2009 (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza met with João Maria de Moreira Sousa, the Angolan Attorney-General, in order to discuss possible ways of strengthening the cooperation between both countries' administration and justice sectors.

10 December 2009 (Maputo):

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) announced a credit of about U.S.\$22.6 million under the Fund's Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF).

10 December 2009 (Maputo):

The U.S. Embassy in Mozambique announced two development programmes, named "Strengthening Communities through Integrated Programming" (SCIP), in Zambezia and Nampula provinces to provide, among other services, integrated health services, including HIV/AIDS prevention, support for rural enterprises, hygiene and sanitation.

12 December 2009 (Maputo):

The Norwegian government has pledged U.S.\$1,3 million to Mozambique for a strategic evaluation of the coastal zone. Mozambique's Environment Minister, Alcinda Abreu, said this agreement will deepen bilateral cooperation between the two countries, specifically in the area of the environment and climate change.

14 December 2009 (Maputo):

The Chinese Centre for Agricultural Technology was launched in Mozambique with the purpose of meeting demand for food from the Chinese population.

17 December 2009 (Maputo):

Foreign Minister Oldemiro Baloi said Mozambique is fully committed to cooperating with the hand-over of Rwandan genocide suspects.

17 December 2009 (Maputo):

The Secretaries-General of the Parliaments of Angola and Mozambique see as positive the implementation of a cooperation agreement between the two legislative branches. Signed on 27 November 2007, the protocol establishes several actions in order to strengthen the capacity of the parliaments in public relations, protocol and foreign policy.

17 December 2009 (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza – who is also Chairman of the South African Development Community (SADC) security troika – received from Jacob Zuma, South Africa's President and SADC mediator for Zimbabwe's crisis, a preliminary report on the Harare negotiations. Both South Africa and Mozambique, as well as other key SADC nations began to give signals of impatience with the course of negotiations.

28 December 2009 (Maputo):

The Mozambican Constitutional Court validated the results of the 28 October general election, giving President Armando Guebuza from FRELIMO, victory over his direct opponent, Afonso Dhlakama, from RENAMO. Furthermore, the Court also criticized the role of the National Elections Commission regarding bureaucratic obstacles for some smaller political parties.

31 December 2009 (Maputo):

Mozambique's Constitutional Court set 14



January as the date for Armando Guebuza to be sworn in for his second term of office as President of the Republic.

Portugal

1 December 2009 (Lisbon):

The European Union celebrated the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in the Portuguese capital. Several heads of state and government were present in the celebration ceremony.

2 December 2009 (Madrid):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended a working dinner to prepare the EU Spanish Presidency, which was hosted by his counterpart, Miguel Angel Moratinos.

3 December 2009 (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended NATO's meeting on the Afghan mission. Amado reminded that, in spite of recent requests for troop increase, Portugal had already anticipated the decision and authorized the sending of more Portuguese military personnel in the summer.

4 December 2009 (Geneva):

The Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie submitted to the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva a report on the overall situation of human rights in Portugal and the state of compliance with international obligations in this area, with the purpose of discussing it with other member states at the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) Working Group meeting and with interested NGOs and national human rights institutions.

7-8 December 2009 (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the General Council for European Affairs and the European Union Foreign Affairs Council.

7-16 December 2009 (Lisbon):

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation (SENEC), João Gomes Cravinho, undertook an official visit across Asia for political contacts and the strengthening of bilateral relations with Indonesia, Timor Leste and Australia.

12 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Chief of Staff General Pinto Ramalho said the scheduled dispatch of a commando company to Kabul next month was a prior decision, unrelated to U.S. President Barack Obama's announcement of U.S. forces' increase in Afghanistan and his appeal for allies to do the same.

14 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met in Lisbon with his Palestinian counterpart, Riyad al-Malki.

14 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva said the Portuguese mission in Kosovo will be maintained until the first trimester of 2010, but admits it may decrease in the next fall.

15 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Prime Minister José Sócrates met the new European Union President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy.

15 December 2009 (Shama):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva visited the Portuguese troops stationed in the Lebanon.

19 December 2009 (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado postponed his four day visit to Chad, Burkina Faso and Mali to a date to be announced. This visit is a follow-up of the EU-Africa Summit that took place in Lisbon during the Portuguese Presidency of the EU's Council in 2007.

22 December 2009 (Madrid):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie travelled to Madrid to meet with his Spanish counterpart, Diego López Garrido, and with secretary-general of the presidency of the government Bernardino Leon. The meeting focused on the main priorities of the Spanish EU Council Presidency, which will begin on 1 January.

of U.S.\$5 million to São Tomé and Príncipe, as well as a grant of U.S.\$1 million for setting up an institute for the small sector industry, after the visit of São Tomean Foreign Minister Carlos Alberto Pires Tiny.

7 December 2009 (Muserata):

President Fradique de Menezes met with Libyan leader – and current African Union (AU) president – Muammar al-Gaddafi and discussed ways and means to consolidate the processes of the AU and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).

17 December 2009 (Copenhagen):

Maria Cristina Dias, São Tomé's Minister of Environment, met with her CPLP counterparts, Cape Verde's Carlos Veiga, Mozambique's Alcinda António Abreu, Portugal's Dulce Pássaro and Timor Leste's Abílio Lima, to discuss matters related to environmental cooperation.

19 December 2009 (São Tomé):

President Fradique de Menezes assumed the presidency of the *Movimento Democrático Força da Mudança – Partido Liberal* (MDFM-PL) party, in its IVth Congress.

22 December 2009 (Abuja):

Prime Minister Rafael Branco ended a two-day official visit to Nigeria, centered on the creation of a Bilateral Military Commission (BMC) to safeguard the joint exploration of the rich resources of the Joint Development Zone (JDZ) between the two countries.

24 December 2009 (São Tomé):

The National Assembly approved the State Budget for 2010, U.S.\$157,33 million dollars, which will now be analyzed by the several specialized commissions.

30 December 2009 (São Tomé):

The MDFM-PL, now led by President Fradique de Menezes, decided to pull its four ministers from the fragile government coalition ruled by Prime Minister Rafael Branco after increased criticism from all other political parties over Fradique's decision to assume the presidency of his party.

31 December 2009 (São Tomé):

The governor of the Central Bank of São Tomé and Príncipe, Luís de Sousa, announced that São Tomé's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had a growth of between 4% and 5% in 2009; for

São Tomé and Príncipe

2 December 2009 (New Delhi):

India announced the extension of a line of credit



2010 the São Tomé banking authority projects economic growth of between 4% and 5%, and a drop in annual inflation to between 10% and 11%.

Timor Leste

3 December 2009 (Díli):

The International Crisis Group (ICG) called for United Nations police to hand over control to the local authorities. In a report, the ICG argues that the United Nations should stop providing security and focus on support and training operations in Timor Leste.

5 December 2009 (Díli):

The United Nations transferred control of policing operations in the district of Viqueque to the National Police of Timor Leste (PNTL), as a step towards lessening its direct control.

10 December 2009 (Canberra):

Australia has announced a plan to cut the number of troops deployed in Timor Leste. The current 650 soldiers will become closer to 400 over the next couple of months.

10-11 December 2009 (Bali):

Prime Minister José Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmão attended the Bali Democracy Forum II, a meeting where delegations from 36 countries exchanged information about their experience in implementing democracy.

14 December 2009 (Amman):

President José Ramos-Horta participated in The Pathways to Reconciliation Summit, an international gathering composed by more than 300 experts in reconciliation with the purpose of dealing with cultural, racial, religious and political differences.

14 December 2009 (Díli):

Timor Leste National Police (PNTL) has resumed control over the country's Maritime Unit from the United Nations.

19 December 2009 (Díli):

The UN handed over further policing responsibilities to Timor-Leste as part of the gradual transfer of the security functions it assumed in 2006. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Deputy Special Representative Takahisa Kawakami and Timorese Secretary of State for Security, Francisco da Costa Guterres, presided over a ceremony in Díli in which the PNTL resumed responsibility over the Police Intelligence Service, the seventh police entity that the United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste has handed back.

21 December 2009 (Díli):

The Spanish Agency for Cooperation and International Development (AECID) gave a contribution of €600,000 to the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in the district of Baucau.

22 December 2009 (Kuala Lumpur):

The Malaysian High Court ordered the government to compensate 29 rights activists for wrongful detention over a controversial gathering to discuss Timor Leste 13 years ago.

Reading List

Damien Kingsbury, "Lessons Learned in Timor-Leste" (*World Politics Review*, 8 December 2009).

Geoffrey Robinson, "If You Leave Us Here, We Will Die": How Genocide Was Stopped in East Timor (*Princeton University Press*, 2009).

International Crisis Group, "Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste's Police" (*ICG, Asia Report 180*, 3 December 2009).

James DeShaw Rae, *Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice in East Timor* (*FirstForumPress*, 2009).

Lisa Hultman, "Lisa Hultman, 'The Power to Hurt in Civil War: The Strategic Aim of RENAMO Violence'" (*Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 4, Dec. 2009): 821-834.

Mark Sedra, "Timor-Leste" (*Security Sector Reform Monitor*, No. 1, December 2009).

Paula Roque, "Angola's Façade Democracy" (*Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 20, No. 4, October 2009): 137-150.

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IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin is a publication of IPRIS.

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