



IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin

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Editorial note

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With this issue, the IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin (ILCB) celebrates its first year of publication. Inspired by the absence of a regular publication on the Lusophone countries, the ILCB has been published on a monthly basis for the last 12 months, featuring exclusively the eight Portuguese-speaking countries. The ILCB has been reaching out to policy-makers, think tanks, to the academic community, the media, the private sector, and all those interested in Lusophone countries affairs.

The ILCB has been providing its readers with an up-to-date analysis of the political, diplomatic, economic and social issues of Portuguese-speaking countries. On average, each issue was composed of an in-depth lead article, three short analytical articles, as well as a monthly chronology of events.

Today, the IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin has more than 10.000 subscribers, an ever-growing readership that is evidence of this publication's pertinence and usefulness, and a stimulus to continue

divulging it. Indeed, answering our readers' demand for a rigorous breakdown of the issues surrounding Portuguese-speaking countries, in January 2011, the ILCB will publish a special edition reviewing the events of 2010 in each Lusophone country.

I truly hope that you will enjoy the next year of the ILCB as much as you did the first one and find it equally useful. If you have any comments or questions, or if you are interested in writing for the IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin, please contact the editor or consult the IPRIS website at www.ipris.org.

Last but not the least, I would like to emphasize that the publication of the ILCB would not have been possible without the contributions of Alex Vines, Alexandre Abreu, André Monteiro, André Saramago, Aslak Orre, Carlos Veiga, Cláudia Kover, Clinton Fernandes, David Zounmenou, Dennis Shoemith, Diogo Noivo, Gerhard Seibert, Inácio Valentim, Jeffrey Laurenti, João Domingues, José Francisco Pavia, Kai Thaler, Leonardo Paz Neves, Marcelo Valença, Marina Bicalana, Nuno Canas Mendes, Paul Christopher Manuel, Paulo Roberto de Almeida, Pedro Seabra, Sean Goforth, Shiguenoli Miyamoto, and Vasco Mar-

tins. I would like to express my deepest thanks to all the above.

Angolan security and the State of the Nation speech

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Researcher, IPRIS

In an unprecedented move in the history of Angola, President José Eduardo dos Santos addressed the Parliament by giving the country's very first State of the Nation speech. Among the various topics referred by the President, he focused specifically on a renewed stance on security and defense. Surprisingly, José Eduardo dos Santos only spoke about the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Cabinda, referring to recent developments in the region. The President identified as risks to Angola's security the "inter and intrastate conflicts in Central



Africa and the Great Lakes region, particularly in the DRC, where the existing conflict, due to its proximity to our borders, may easily affect or have consequences in our territory". Following this brief note, the President went on to say that external support to forces who attempt to destabilize the climate of peace in the country, especially in the Cabinda province, is blocking governmental efforts to achieve peace and reconciliation.

The nature and focus of this speech reopens two fronts in Angolan foreign policy. The first is a fresh look at the conflict in the DRC, which is intrinsically connected to Angola and to residual threats to its domestic security. The second is a renewed focus on security matters involving Cabinda. For a long time, the official line of the government regarding the enclave was to consider it 'pacified', hence no urgent issue. Now, it appears that due to external interference, the government was obliged to reopen the Cabinda file.

The DRC was the theatre of two major conflicts that left scars in the geopolitical landscape of Africa that are still very present today. Classic Cold War power games, empty pockets of power, failing governments, changing regimes and what has been characterized as Uganda's, Burundi's and Rwanda's disrespect for colonial borders, made Angola intervene in the Second Congo War in favor of late President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Today the war is over and the situation is much calmer, especially after Joseph Kabila and Paul Kagame united forces to arrest the Congolese dissident General Laurent Nkunda. However, there still exist thorny issues in relations between Angola and the DRC, namely fears of secessionist spillover and issues referent to Cabinda.

The historical struggle of the once unrecognized state of Katanga, today

divided in four provinces in southern DRC, remains a perilous influence on Angola. Bordering the Lunda North and South regions, Katanga is neighbor to the rich, self-claimed Kingdom of Lunda Tchokwe. The kingdom, in the name of his Majesty the King Don Carlos Manuel Muatxissenge Watembo has issued statements in 2008 and 2010 to President José Eduardo dos Santos, demanding greater autonomy for a regional government of East Angola, encompassing the Moxico, Kwando Kubando, Lunda North and South regions. However, it is in the Lundas that the Angolan diamond mines are located, which is why the King demands that 70% of the total GDP of the region stay within the 'kingdom' – the other 30% going to the Republic of Angola – while warning that any sabotage to the intentions of his people will result in unforeseen action of nefarious consequences. This is a direct threat to Angola's territorial integrity and regional economy. The risks of political comradeship and mutual support even without sharing ethnic kin, between both Katanga and the Lundas is very high, which further exacerbates the President's point that the conflict in DRC due to its proximity may have serious consequences for Angola. In the past, separatist groups in resource rich regions of Africa have proven to be very enterprising due to the availability of markets to buy their goods – mostly precious stones – used to fuel conflict. Although it is not clear whether there has been political agitation or popular mobilization in the Lundas, the 'resource curse' doctrine may very well empower small-armed secessionist groups, thus creating pockets of conflict in the future.

On the other hand, the issue of Cabinda is now reopened for a very particular reason. Despite renewed terrorist

activity from FLEC (*Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda*) – which targeted a Togolese bus transporting the national football team attending the African Cup of Nations in January 2010 – its claims still remain highly motivated by financial interests. The tiny enclave of Cabinda holds important oil fields in its coastal area, where the majority of Angola's oil reserves are located. The magnitude of this source of income to the Angolan economy is not strange to the region, which is why other players are demanding their share.

The DRC is attempting to delimitate its maritime borders with Angola, which encompass Cabinda and its offshore oil fields, thought to be suitable for oil drilling. On the other hand, the National Assembly of Angola authorized the government to negotiate an accord for the delimitation of the northern sea border, which predicts an extension from 200 miles off the coast to 350 miles of territorial waters.

The situation can prove to be potentially explosive, mainly due to grounded interests from all parties. Notwithstanding its recent actions, FLEC has been largely unable to fight Angolan rule in the region. In fact, Angola has not only retained administrative duties in the region, but has also dismissed any signs of peril or threats of secessionism. However, since President José Eduardo dos Santos' State of the Nation speech, a new threat to Angolan territorial integrity has been identified, one which considers the possibility of external support to the FLEC in order to better oppose Angolan interests in Cabinda. If in fact the DRC government is supporting the FLEC forces in any material or logistic way, the Angolan government will have to respond accordingly, thus eventually reigniting the conflict in Cabinda. Such a situa-



tion would have a negative impact on relations between Angola and DRC, the latter having found in the former a staunch supporter in the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

With regard to regional geopolitics, a spat between the DRC and any of the powers involved in the Second Congo War will only serve to destabilize the region once again. Although very rich, the DRC is not in a position to enter into a diplomatic argument with its former ally Angola, especially when it already had the Rwanda-Uganda-Burundi axis showing interest in its resources and invading its territory more than once. It is in times like these that Angola's new position of power begins to reveal itself.

Guinea-Bissau: Still in search of stability

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Following the evacuation of President Malam Bacai Sanhá on October 23rd, on the grounds of health problems, no incident of forceful seizure of power has been reported. On the surface, one might consider this a slow return to political normalcy in Guinea-Bissau. The possibility of a coup in the country has become a constant national dynamic, as from the time Guinea-Bissau gained independence in 1974, until the recent successive episodes of military coups and political assassinations. As it was hoped that the end of the civil war in 1999 would mark the end of the country's tumultuous past

– thereby instilling relative peace and stability in Guinea-Bissau – the double assassination of President João Bernardo 'Nino' Vieira and Army Chief of Staff Batista Tagmé Na Waié in March 2009 brought to the forefront the difficult quest for peace and socio-political cohesion in Guinea-Bissau. It has become clear that what was at stake was the survival of key political and military actors and hardly the restoration of the authority and the legitimacy of the state. Even the elections held shortly after this double assassination, with the rise to power of Malam Bacai Sanhá with 67% of votes, have not generated a sustainable pace for peace. Since his ascension to power, his relations with the Army have proved to be very complex to entertain.

The incident that took place on April 1st 2010 exposed the complexity of the politico-military dynamics that perpetuate the state of crisis in the country. A group of Army officers led by the Deputy Army Chief of Staff General António Indjai deposed Army Chief of Staff General José Zamora Induta. General Antonio Indjai subsequently proclaimed himself the new leader of the Army. His actions and those of his followers were intended to resolve two key issues. Firstly, Antonio Indjai's initiative was interpreted as disapproval for the ongoing reforms undertaken in the security sector under the leadership of General José Zamora Induta. Secondly, it was also seen as a maneuver to pressure the government into rehabilitating and reinstating former Navy Chief José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto, who was accused of plotting a coup in 2008. Bubo Na Tchuto returned to Guinea-Bissau after the assassination of President Nino Vieira and since then has been cleared by a military tribunal and reinstated by President Malam Bacai Sanhá.

April's incident sparked outrage in

the international community and resulted in drastic measures being taken by donors. Though the constitution (Article 59) gives him this mandate, such appointments raised a number of questions about the credibility of the President, his ability to lead Guinea-Bissau, the reliability of the newly appointed Army Chief of Staff, the future of Guinea-Bissau's Army and post-conflict reconstruction in the country.

There are a number of factors to take into consideration in understanding President Sanhá's decisions. In confirming, against international condemnation, the nomination of the new Army Chief of Staff and Navy Chief, President Sanhá has strategic concerns far beyond gaining control of the Army. In fact, it appears that the President lacked the stamina to exert his authority on the Army and the country. Here, the eventuality of Sanhá being deposed, if not physically eliminated, is not to be ruled out. This is why the apparent indifference or weakness of the President in addressing problems within the national Army and the particular event of April 1st that led the international community to take drastic measures have furthered complicated the post-reconstruction process in Guinea-Bissau.

Given the complexities of the national situation in Guinea-Bissau, the reactions of external actors, though understandable, are premature. As the US halted its military cooperation and the EU suspended its participation in the Security Sector Reform (SSR), many feared that this would likely heighten tensions within the Army, as the government's financial capacity would be reduced and the salaries of Army officers would not be paid. In fact, it should provide the opportunity for the country's leaders to look inward for solutions to their problems, par-



ticularly if ECOWAS and African Union (AU) take a greater role in the post-conflict reconstruction process. Moreover, one should see the recent diplomatic offensive of President Sanhá towards non-Western countries (Iran, China, Cuba, South Africa, Angola) as part of the strategy to diversify Guinea-Bissau's partners. For the American authorities, the fact that civilian authorities in Guinea-Bissau promoted General António Indjai to lead the country's Armed Forces weakens the principle of civilian control over Armed Forces, the rule of law and democracy. Therefore, President Malam Bacai Sanhá's call for the presence of a stabilization force in Guinea-Bissau is more than relevant. It is a call that provides an alternative to the current ambiguous relations that exist among the key state institutions, particularly the Executive, the Prime Minister's office and the Army. The latter is by far the most influential center of power and has enough resources derived from drug trafficking to impede the peace process. At a meeting with high-ranking security officers in July, President Malam

Bacai Sanhá voiced, without mincing his words, his condemnation of the impunity prevailing in the country. He said the state had been held hostage for too long by an undisciplined and aging Army and accused the military of being the principal facilitator and actor of drug trafficking in the country. This translated the dilemma of the President and other regional stakeholders.

Meanwhile, the suspension of EU and US support for SSR has not affected the government's resolve to complete the SSR by itself. The discussions on the pension funds and the identification of 6.000 military veterans by Guinea-Bissau's authorities as part of a push for SSR aimed at ending a cycle of coups by an overly-powerful Army seems to be put on hold. Yet, according to Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva, this census allows the country to have a reliable database to better manage the conditions of war veterans. It is agreed that better conditions could hopefully encourage veterans and older servicemen to leave the Army, which many are reluctant to do, and help the country to meet

its demobilization targets. The goal is to reduce the size of the Army from roughly 4.500 to 3.440 men, to reach conformity with the figures set by donors for reforming the Armed Forces. However, left alone, abandoned by the international community, the country cannot survive.

It is therefore with anticipation that many are expecting ECOWAS, the African Union and the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) to finalize discussions around the stabilization force or a consolidated regional response with a greater leadership. ECOWAS and its partners seem to have taken the issue seriously. Regardless of the controversies around President Sanhá's call, there is a consensus that vigorously tackling the SSR is an important step in consolidating peace in the country. This is likely to reinforce other initiatives to promote national reconciliation (national conference) and to create an environment conducive to socio-economic improvement for the citizens.



Portugal and the UN Security Council victory: Now for the hard part

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Ten years have passed since Portugal announced its intent to seek a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the 2011-2012 biennium. Ten years of intense campaigning throughout every possible and imaginable world stage, during which the pursuit of one of the most coveted decision-making positions in the current international structure galvanized Portugal's diplomatic corps and its external agenda.

Together with its direct competitors, Germany and Canada, Portugal waited painstakingly for the 65th General Assembly, where the final and decisive vote for two of the three countries' aspirations would be cast. While all parties were wishing for a clear win, prospects were still up in the air, as often happens in any tight race for such a high-valued seat.

However, any unease was promptly laid to rest when on October 12th, the 192 represented countries favoured Portugal's bid alongside Germany's, demonstrating that the country had played all its cards right, had earned outright and crucial support and, above all, convinced its peers of the credibility and strength of its candidacy.

With such a post-win context in mind, this article will therefore attempt to assess the Portuguese campaign for a seat on the Security Council, beginning with an overview of the candidacy's merits before the international community. It

will then be followed by a provisional analysis of the election procedures of October 12th, regarding actual support that the country managed to garner throughout the entire process, as well the campaigns of its direct competitors. Afterwards, it will conclude by acknowledging the sensitive international timeframe in which Portugal 'chose' to upgrade its foreign exposition and the inherent geopolitical ramifications implied.

The 2011-2012 bid

Although it has gone by rather unnoticed, Portugal already possesses a significant background within the UN Security Council, having effectively won two non-permanent seats in both the 1979-1980 and 1997-1998 bienniums. This last experience in particular was considered a triumph for Portuguese diplomacy, as it successfully showcased Portugal's far-reaching foreign policy and global interests.¹

Consequently, then Prime Minister António Guterres took point in 2000 by announcing that the country would pursue a new seat, this time for the 2011-2012 slot. Canada revealed its candidacy the following year, with a similar announcement by former Prime Minister Jean

Among the arguments presented in its pitch, Portugal relied on the need for a fair and balanced rotation in the UN executive organs. Secondly, Portuguese diplomacy also skillfully played the 'size card'. Third, the Portuguese candidacy also consistently highlighted its permanent commitment to the world's security needs.

¹ Paulo Gorjão, "Portugal and the Security Council: Is This Seat Taken?" (IPRIS, Policy Brief No. 1, April 2010).



Chrétien. At the time, a clean slate situation looked perfectly feasible for the election of the two members of the Western European and Other States (WEOG) group, without the necessity of a larger and costlier campaign, as there were two seats available for this regional cluster. As a token of good relations, both countries even went as far as to pledge bilateral support for their respective and corresponding objectives.

However, things got more complicated in 2006, when Germany surprised the international community by deciding to launch its own candidacy for one of the two available seats during the same timeframe chosen by both Portuguese and Canadian candidacies. The fact that Germany had just finished its fourth mandate in 2003-2004 and failed to consult with its peers only accentuated a certain diplomatic tension between all parties, especially between the two EU members. An active and full-blown campaign became suddenly necessary. In that order, Portugal's highest authorities – including the President of the Republic, the President of Parliament, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and multiple Secretaries of State – embarked on an arduous and intense lobbying effort throughout every major international capital and significant international organization, seeking to gather enough support for the national bid. Countries and institutions with whom Portugal had almost no prior contact or relations – like Laos or the Pacific Islands Forum, for example – were also included in this strategy.

Among the arguments presented in its pitch, Portugal relied primarily on the need for a fair and balanced rotation in the UN executive organs. Indeed, Germany and Canada had previously held six and four terms respectively, and in comparison with Portugal's two-time presence in the Council, the disparity in terms of successive representation was thus actively used as a valid point in Portugal's defense.²

Secondly, Portuguese diplomacy also skillfully played the 'size card'. By fully assuming its small/medium state con-

dition, the country officially took on the mantle of under-represented nations, often shoved aside in world forums. Coincidentally, both Germany and Canada are members of the G8 – and the G20, for that matter – and therefore belong to an international elite that Portugal sought to sideline/disturb while asking for more heterogeneous representation in the Security Council.

On the other hand, the Portuguese candidacy also consistently highlighted its permanent commitment to the world's security needs, namely through participation in multiple UN peacekeeping operations. As of September

2010, and even with its structural and natural constraints in mind, Portugal could still showcase its 41st place in the United Nations top contributors list with its 337 military and police personnel as opposed to the 293 and 200 deployment by Germany and Canada respectively during the same period.³ Additionally, Portugal also emphasized its commendable positioning as the first UN police contributor among Western countries, proving that it was capable of actively participat-

ing in international security efforts.

Furthermore, the attendance and membership to multiple multilateral institutions was equally employed as an added argument, with Portugal pointing out the concrete experience and influence obtained with such collaborations. The European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), OECD or the Ibero-American Summits, exemplified Portugal's strong investment in global dialogue, with distinct vectors of approach while the country promoted bridges between different cultures and peoples. The special relations with Africa, Asia and Latin America were thus significantly amplified.

Finally, Portuguese diplomacy also underscored the country's continuous support for the promotion of international law, effective multilateralism and the primacy of the United Nations in international affairs, as central cornerstones of its foreign policy.

When everything is taken into consideration, it is easy to

Although it was the last country to announce its intent, Germany had from the start garnered the status of front-runner. Still, observers were surprised by the reduced number of votes that the country collected on the first round.

2 "Portugal: Candidate to the United Nations Security Council 2011-2012" (Ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros).

3 "Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations" (*United Nations*, 30 September 2010).



understand why Portugal's campaign began to gain momentum; in the beginning of 2010, the country had already gathered over a 100 declarations of support, but more was still needed to win the coveted seat.

October 12th

As the final day grew near, all three candidacies resorted to last-minute efforts and lobbying to secure the necessary amount of votes. As expected, Prime Minister José Sócrates, Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Chancellor Angela Merkel took the opportunity that the podium at the 65th General Assembly presented to remind the various representations in session one last time of the merits and achievements of the three countries in world history.⁴ Indeed, if we were to take a closer look at such remarks, we would most certainly be confronted with a fierce 'who-did-what' contest: contributions to the UN's budget, participation in ongoing peacekeeping operations, commitment to the Millennium Goals, development aid promises and so on.

At the same time, all three diplomacies dispatched their top officials and Foreign Ministers to New York, taking advantage of the unusual concentration of dignitaries and Heads of State from all around the world, each holding a crucial vote – as even the most remote Pacific island has the same decisional power in the General Assembly as the US, for example.

With all their trump cards in place and every possible political backstage deals made, these three countries braced themselves for what promised to be a tight vote. And indeed it was.

As expected, Germany managed to win a seat after the first round. What was surprising however was the exact number of votes cast and their exact distribution. For its part, Germany only managed to secure 128 votes i.e. the minimum mandatory two-thirds of the countries represented at the UN, far from what many had predicted. What's more, Portugal immediately felt the wave of sup-

port behind its candidacy by achieving a surprisingly strong number of 122 votes – only five short of securing a seat right upfront – while Canada was relegated to third with 114 votes.

Any initial predictions were then set aside as neither Portugal nor Canada could, in most cases, be certain that the declarations of support they had collected would hold out through another voting stage. Shifting endorsements are only too common in these procedures, and despite certain second round assurances, all bets were off. Still, new voting favored Portugal one more time as it received another

113 votes, with Canada still lagging behind with 78. While still short of the 128 required, Canada quickly understood that it had failed to convince a majority of the international community and withdrew its candidacy, not wishing to prolong the public humiliation by participating in a third round where its core base would almost certainly be eroded as voting continued. Portugal would then win the desired seat with 150 votes in favor, in a formal subsequent third round.⁵

As for Canada, the shockwaves of this defeat have shed some light on the country's deteriorating image abroad. This is the first time in UN history that Canada's efforts to acquire a Security Council seat have not proven successful.

Nonetheless, to better understand these events, it is necessary to examine two important factors: on the one hand, it is essential to understand the basics behind both Germany's win and Canada's loss; on the other, the construction of a wide network of support around Portugal's candidacy was equally instrumental to this outcome, and must therefore be acknowledged.

The German victory and the Canadian defeat

Although it was the last country to announce its intent, Germany had from the start garnered the status of front-runner. That much was clear, as the international representations at the UN already considered the German victory a *fait accompli*. If we take into consideration the vast diplomatic network and the almost unlimited resources at their disposal, such predictions were not totally unreasonable. By promoting its image as the UN's third-largest contributor and the world's second-largest aid donor,

⁴ Chancellor Merkel addressed the General Assembly on September 21st, followed by Prime Minister Harper two days later and by Prime Minister Sócrates on the 25th.

⁵ Interestingly enough, Portugal's candidacy did not reach unanimity only because the Canadian decision was announced when the third round had already begun and votes were being casted. The President of the General Assembly, Joseph Deiss, had himself to remind the delegates of the ongoing procedure.



combined with its consensually recognized engagement in international affairs and its consistent push for an UN wide reform, a German seat was considered a sure win. Still, observers were surprised by the reduced number of votes that the country collected on the first round. Indeed, for all the self-advocacy of an international player seeking a permanent place at the table, the vote turnout was not as high as would be expected. The late candidacy announcement can be considered a possible explanation for such an outcome but nonetheless, a careful evaluation of Germany's foreign approach during this entire process will surely be in order for the country's authorities, in a near future.

As for Canada, the shock-waves of this defeat have shed some light on the country's deteriorating image abroad, coupled with internal accusations of who is to blame for this international debacle. Opposition leader Michael Ignatieff was quickly accused of being responsible for the breach in national political unity surrounding this goal, as he had previously cast some doubts on the merits of Canada's candidacy. But the true reasons go deeper. Since taking office, the Conservative Harper government had persistently shown little interest in the campaign launched by its Liberal predecessor and only appeared to recognize that competition was brewing when it was already too late. Furthermore, its pro-Israeli policies also brought about the outright opposition of the majority of the Islamic world, with particular focus to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who is said to have actively lobbied against Canada.⁶ A widely established perception of UN-detachment and an alleged cut of aid funding to the African continent – only the single biggest voting block in the General Assembly, with 53 votes – are also considered possible explanations for the abovementioned results, despite the 136 official written commitments of support

that the Canadian government had supposedly obtained.⁷ Either way, this is the first time in UN history that Canada's efforts to acquire a Security Council seat have not proven successful, which may have consequences for the country's own objectives within the larger context of the organization's long-stalled reform.⁸

Portugal's coalition of support

For its part, Portugal relied mostly on its soft power capabilities with significant but discreet contacts with several key partners who could prove useful in 'lending a hand' to the ongoing campaign. The extension and variety of support on voting day proved as much. And although

the majority of pledges of support are uncertain – since the actual vote is secret – it is already possible to mention certain indispensable allies.

For instance and right from the start, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) unanimously and publicly threw their support behind Portugal's bid, adding greater legitimacy to the country's aspirations. Even more importantly, by presenting a culturally unified front, the country managed to win crucial allies on several continents. Indeed, CPLP backing only further enhanced the already favorable relationship that Portugal holds with most

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of the African continent, who generally views the country as an honest bridge-builder – especially after Portuguese efforts to pull off the last two EU-Africa summits. On top of that, the Lusophone consensus also helped bring Brazil into the 'endorsement game'. This particular regional power proved to be invaluable as it engaged in considerable lobbying on Portugal's behalf with a natural focus on South America.

Portuguese diplomacy also focused on the Islamic world. Unlike Canada, Portugal has for years developed an image as a balanced and equitable interlocutor between Israeli and Arab interests, and in that sense had no clear

⁶ A bitter feud over airline routes and the UAE's demand for Canada to leave a military base that is used to supply Canadian forces in Afghanistan reached new heights during the decisive voting week.

⁷ One particular case concerns the US, who despite having voted for Canada, was later accused of not campaigning hard enough for its northern neighbor.

⁸ Ian Williams, "Canada on Ice: at the UN" (*Foreign Policy In Focus*, 26 October 2010).

'grudge' working against its campaign. Additionally, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho's last-minute efforts to woo the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) – officially representing 56 Islamic states – also helped deliver an overwhelming majority of the Arab world's votes.

Unconfirmed reports also indicate that two P5 members, Russia and China, as well as pivotal emerging powers, like India and Turkey, favored the Portuguese bid. Furthermore, the strategy of courting smaller states – either in the Pacific or in the Caribbean – with which Portugal had little, if any, previous bilateral relations, apparently proved a safe bet as well.⁹ Nevertheless, some unwanted surprises were also in store. For example, Japan allegedly backed down from its previously pledged support, much to the dislike of the Portuguese representation. Likewise, EU members' votes were far from united, even when it came down to only Canada and Portugal.

Finally, Cuba, Egypt and, more importantly, the 'indefectible' Spain – who arduously focused on gathering Latin American votes – are just a few other examples of the broad range and diversity of the core coalition that Portuguese diplomacy managed to quietly and effectively put together, a move that proved absolutely instrumental for the decisive win of October 12th.¹⁰

Final remarks

As expected, the international fallout of the Portuguese victory produced significant shockwaves between the many actors and observers who failed to see potential in the 'underdog' candidacy, when confronted with the likes of Canada and Germany. Outraged or surprised editorials soon followed, either wondering what the secret behind Portugal's campaign was, or actually questioning the role of the UN, when a powerhouse like Canada cannot even get elected against a small-sized and 'mildly irrelevant' European country.

But at the end of the day, Portugal played the Security Council game fair and square and successfully reaped the fruits of its hard labor. Without resorting to loud or expensive approaches, Portuguese diplomacy – backed by a unified internal political consensus – essentially relied on its soft-power and in its recognizable tendency to work on the diplomatic backstage in search of a fea-

sible consensus and compromise. Ultimately, this win corroborated Portugal's ongoing "reinforcement cycle of influence on the international stage"¹¹ – following the Presidencies of the EU, the Community of Democracies and CPLP as well as the upcoming NATO summit in Lisbon – while consolidating its image among its peers as an effective broker between multiple conflicting/opposing views present at the UN.

Nevertheless the country should be aware of the current international context, which will likely influence the upcoming Security Council term. Indeed, one should not forget that alongside Portugal and Germany, India, South Africa and Colombia also won seats for their regional groups. When coupled with the ongoing presence of Brazil, it is easily noted the presence of three quarters of the so-called G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) group as well as the full representation of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) forum. Given that both 'alliances' ultimate objective is to seek a greater permanent attendance in the UN's decision-making structures, this first-of-a-kind coincidence will only help reaffirm the growing dawn of new seats of power and the inevitability of a middle-term solution to include those same emerging voices in the present international consensus – most likely, through the means of a much debated and long-delayed comprehensive reform.

In this fast-paced context, Portugal will be faced with important challenges and difficult decisions that will require a clear understanding of the present international variables and a swift identification/recognition of the new, soon-to be indispensable, players. The overwhelming significance of this term is therefore undeniable, especially when compared with previous Portuguese participations in this institution. Moreover, although the relationship with Brazil already holds many promises, the country ought to be wise enough to look outside of its 'box' and use the influence, visibility and prestige conferred by a seat at the UN Security Council – temporary as it may be – to effectively take a stand and be an active part of this unstoppable process of unparalleled international change.

After a long and strenuous campaign, Portugal has finally achieved one of the primary foreign goals for the past decade. However, a seat at the table comes with several strings attached, international responsibility being one of them. Portuguese diplomacy must brace itself, because now truly comes the hard part.

9 For example, during the General Assembly, Prime Minister José Sócrates took the opportunity to meet with his counterpart from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Ralph Gonsalves, an active supporter of the Portuguese candidacy who sought to split the CARICOM vote, traditionally aligned with Canada.

10 Teresa de Sousa, "Portugal pode contar na ONU com a CPLP e alguns amigos estratégicos" (*Público*, 18 September 2010).

11 "Notáveis reagem à eleição de Portugal para Conselho de Segurança da ONU" (*Lusa*, 12 October 2010).



Timeline of Events

Angola

4 October (Luanda):

Nigeria's *chargé d'affaires* in Luanda, Yaswat Dahi Gukas, stated that his country wishes to strengthen cooperation with Angola, particularly in the banking and air transport sectors as a means to spur economic relations.

5 October (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos reshuffled his cabinet, changing the military top post as well. Influential State Minister for Economic Coordination Manuel Nunes Júnior left government and gave his place to Abraão Pio dos Santos Gourgel, former Central Bank Governor and now mere Economy Minister, with less powers than his predecessor. José Massano, of the African Development Bank, will now run the Central Bank. In the Army, second-in-command and former UNITA member Gen. Geraldo Sachipengo Nunda replaced Gen. Francisco Pereira Furtado and became Armed Forces Chief of Staff. These changes are widely understood as preparations for the 2012 elections.

6-11 Oct. (Moscow-St. Petersburg):

Speaker of Parliament Paulo Kassoma paid a five-day visit to Russia aimed at strengthening parliamentary cooperation between Angola and Russia. Kassoma also met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

8-9 October (Swakopmund):

The 17th ordinary session of the ministers of Angola and Namibia Joint Commission on Defense and Security took place, focusing on border and security issues. Namibian Defense Minister Charles Namoloh presided over the works alongside Angolan Defense Minister Cândido Van-Dúnem.

9-10 October (Sirte):

Secretary of State for External Relations, George Chicoty headed an Angolan delegation to the the I African Union-Arab League Summit.

12 October (Luanda):

Oil Minister Botelho de Vasconcelos explored areas of potential cooperation in the energy sector with his South African counterpart, Energy Minister Elizabeth Peters. One of the possibilities is to set up a joint venture between Angola's Sonangol and South Africa's PetroSA to construct and manage refineries.

13 October (Luanda):

Angolan and Russian officials met in the II Session of the Bilateral Commission, chaired by Angolan Foreign Affairs Minister Assunção dos Anjos and Russian Minister of Natural Resources Yury P. Trutnev. The meeting aimed to identify areas where bilateral cooperation could be strengthened, regarding investment, trade, economic, technical and scientific relations.

13-14 October (Luanda):

President of the Central African Republic François Bozizé was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos. Bozizé stated that he wished to strengthen friendship ties and re-launch bilateral cooperation. Foreign Affairs Minister Assunção dos Anjos signed a diplomatic consultations protocol and a general economic agreement with his counterpart, Antoine Gambia.

14 October (Vienna):

The Oil Minister Botelho de Vasconcelos attended the 157th OPEC ordinary meeting. Angola maintained its 1.65 million barrels quota, although it currently pumps 1.9 million barrels a day.

15 October (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos delivered a historical State of the Nation speech at the National Assembly on the opening of its parliamentary year – his first address of this kind in over 30 years of power. The President elected Brazil, Portugal, the US and China as strategic

partners, while blaming foreign meddling for Cabinda's instability.

19 October (Luanda):

Leader of UNITA Isaiás Samakuva reacted negatively to the President's speech to the National Assembly. Samakuva heavily attacked José Eduardo dos Santos, pointing out his total lack of electoral legitimacy and his blindness to the country's real situation.

19-21 October (Milan-Oslo):

Italian oil company ENI announced that it found oil in offshore Angola in a block jointly held with Angolan Sonangol. Statoil also announced a discovery in a different offshore block.

20 October (Milan):

Portuguese construction company Mota-Engil, which holds important operations in Angola, announced that it had partnered with Angolan oil company Sonangol to create a local subsidiary in one year's time – Mota-Engil Angola. Mota-Engil will retain a 51% stake in this new company, while Sonangol will hold 20% – the rest being divided between a bank and two investment funds.

20 October (Bissau):

Minister of Geology, Mining and Industry Joaquim Duarte da Costa David announced that Angola would open a US\$25 million credit line to Guinea-Bissau.

21-22 October (Luanda):

Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba, was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Affairs Minister Assunção dos Anjos. Mutaboba stated that Guinea-Bissau's situation is "very good", although he stressed that efforts are needed to stabilize the country.

**23-24 October (Abuja):**

Nigerian Minister for Foreign Affairs Aliyu Idi Hong received Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty. Among other issues, they discussed their bilateral relations, as well as Guinea-Bissau. Currently, Angola and Nigeria chair the CPLP and the ECOWAS, respectively.

24 October (Kinshasa):

According to the authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola expelled some 200 Congolese citizens.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by the Transparency International, Angola ranked 168th.

29 October (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Assunção dos Anjos met his counterpart from São Tomé and Príncipe, Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, and discussed ways to enhance bilateral relations.

Brazil

3 October (Brasília):

In the first round of the presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff had 46,9%, José Serra won 32,6%, and Marina Silva received 19,33% of the votes.

5 October (Brasília):

The ruling coalition – backing Dilma Rousseff's candidacy – managed to expand its presence in the Federal Senate by taking 57 out of 81 seats, while obtaining 72% of the 513 seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

18 October (Montevideo):

Foreign Minister Celso Amorim attended the XXVI Session of Mercosul's Parliament. Amorim took the opportunity to meet with his Argentinean counterpart, Hector Timerman, and Uruguayan President José Mujica.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Brazil ranked 69th.

28-29 October (Buenos Aires):

President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva traveled to Argentina to pay his respects to recently deceased former Argentinean President and current UNASUL Secretary-General Néstor Kirchner, husband of ongoing President Cristina Kirchner.

29 October (São Paulo):

Petrobras announced the discovery of vast untapped oil reserves in the Libra field, with the potential to hold between 3.7 billion and 15 billion barrels. The discovery is near the Tupi field, which contains up to 8 billion barrels of recoverable oil.

29 October (São Paulo):

Following previous talks between Argentinean Defense Minister Nilda Garre and her Brazilian counterpart, Nelson Jobim, Embraer announced that the Argentinean government may participate in the development of the new military transport aircraft KC-390 and could buy up to six aircraft.

31 October (Brasília):

In the second round of Brazil's presidential elections, Dilma Rousseff won with 56% of the votes cast, thus becoming the first female President of Brazil, and succeeding to current President Lula da Silva.

Cape Verde

8 October (Shanghai):

President Pedro Pires visited the Expo 2010 in Shanghai.

10 October (Sirte):

President Pedro Pires attended the First African Union-Arab League Summit. Cooperation between the two parties on cultural, economic and scientific matters was high on the agenda.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Cape Verde ranked 45th. Cape Verde ranked as the 3rd least corrupt nation in Africa.

Guinea-Bissau

3-5 October (Bissau):

Special Representative of the African Union in Guinea-Bissau Sebastião Isata held a series of talks with Bissau-Guinean officials, including President Malam Bacai Sanhá, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and Foreign Minister Adelino Mano Queta.

4 October (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá endorsed a letter to the Chair of ECOWAS, currently Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, asking the Organization for "support and assistance to relaunch the [security sector] reform".

7 October (Bissau):

Confirming last month's rumors, Rear Admiral José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto was reinstated, by presidential decree and under proposition from the government, as Navy Chief of Staff.

8 October (Bissau):

Bubo Na Tchuto's nomination caused uproar among the international community. The US embassy in Dakar stated that this appointment undermined "good governance, the rule of law, and the democratic principle of civil authority over the Armed Forces" and accused him of playing an important role in international drug trafficking. A spokesperson of EU High Representative Catherine Ashton stated that she deeply regretted this nomination and that this "decision constitutes a further setback in good governance (...) and a militarization of politics".

13 October (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá advised Bubo Na Tchuto during his swearing-in ceremony to prove the international community wrong and clear his name over drug accusations. He also reminded



Bubo Na Tchuto that he was following his constitutional duties, but that he would act if evidence arise connecting him to drug trafficking.

16 October (Bissau):

In an open letter, seven members of Parliament belonging to the ruling PAIGC party and some members of its political bureau accused Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior of being involved in the June 2009 killings of Hélder Proença and Baciro Dabó. The letter shows a clear divide within PAIGC, between those supporting the Prime Minister and those supporting the President.

18-20 October (Bissau):

Angolan Minister of Geology, Mining and Industry Joaquim da Costa David, and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty met Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and discussed ways to reinforce bilateral cooperation. They also met President Sanhá, and gave a message from the President José Eduardo dos Santos. Joaquim Duarte da Costa David announced that Angola would open a US\$25 million credit line to Guinea-Bissau, aiming to cover the US\$12 million budget deficit, as well as to spur business investments in both countries.

20 October (Lisbon):

Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho reacted to Bubo Na Tchuto's appointment with "deep consternation".

20 October (Brussels):

The former head of the EU SSR mission to Guinea-Bissau, Juan Esteban Verástegui, stated that the EU would not return to the country with another mission after the failure of the previous one.

21-22 October (Luanda):

Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba visited Luanda, where he was received by President José Eduardo dos Santos and Foreign Affairs Minister Assunção dos Anjos. Mutaboba stated that Guinea-Bissau's situation is "very good", although he stressed that efforts are needed to stabilize the country.

23 October (Dakar):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá was transferred to Dakar in a military flight due to health complications. Last December the President was forced to postpone his visit to Portugal also due to health problems, having then spent several weeks in Dakar, Paris and the Canary Islands.

25 October (Beijing):

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress declared that President Hu Jintao appointed new ambassadors, among them a new chief of mission to Guinea-Bissau. Li Baojun will replace Yan Banghua.

25 October (Dakar):

The US Embassy in Dakar released a statement reaffirming drug trafficking accusations made by the US Treasury Department against recently appointed Navy Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Bubo Na Tchuto, as well as against Air Force Chief of Staff Ibraima Papa Camará.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Guinea-Bissau ranked at 154th.

27 October (Bissau):

Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior suspended Interior Minister Hadja Satú Camará Pinto for disobedience.

28-29 October (Bissau):

The 12th CPLP Armed Forces Chief of Staff Meeting was held in Bissau. Guinea-Bissau's Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Gen. António In-djai, welcomed his CPLP counterparts, while Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva underlined the importance of defining a common joint defense policy. Guinea-Bissau's internal situation was also discussed.

29 October (Bissau):

In a modest sign of international support, the UNDP signed a three-year, US\$600 thousand deal with Guinea-Bissau's Foreign Affairs Ministry to support civil society projects geared towards achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

31 October (Dakar):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá left hospital, although he remained in Dakar under observation.

Mozambique

1 October (Maputo):

South Africa's Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim met with his Mozambican counterpart Henrique Banze. The consultations aimed to boost trade and investment, education, technology and mining, among other areas.

5 October (Maputo):

Following accusations by leader of Renamo Afonso Dhlakama in a recent interview, the Chief of Staff of the Mozambican Armed Forces (FADM), Paulino Macaringue, has categorically denied that the Armed Forces have been "politicized".

5 October (Maputo):

Minister for Planning and Development Aiuba Cuereneia and African Development Bank representative, Alice Hamer, signed an agreement to provide a donation of US\$350 thousand to support the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

9-10 October (Sirte):

President Armando Guebuza attended the First African Union-Arab League Summit. Guebuza also took the opportunity to woo several potential Arab investors for projects in Mozambique.

11 October (Maputo):

President Armando Guebuza reshuffled his cabinet, dismissing Agriculture Minister Soares Nhaca, Minister of the Interior José Pacheco – who now holds the Agriculture Ministry –, Health Minister Ivo Garrido and Minister of Industry and Trade, António Fernando.

18-21 October (Madrid):

President Armando Guebuza paid an official visit to Spain where he met with Prime Min-



ister José Luis Zapatero and King Juan Carlos. The strengthening of bilateral relations, the promotion of greater economic ties, a compromise to forgive €17 million of Mozambique's €22 million debt to Spain, as well as a mutual investment protection agreement, marked the visit's agenda.

19 October (Maputo):

Portuguese companies Corticeira Amorim and Visabeira announced they would be majority shareholders of a new commercial bank that will begin operations in Mozambique in 2011.

22 October (Maputo):

During a meeting with entrepreneurs to present a new €94 million support mechanism for investment in Mozambique, Portuguese Secretary of Treasury Carlos Costa Pina announced that Portugal may raise the value of the existing €400 million credit line for further investments in the country.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Mozambique ranked 116th.

26 October (Lisbon):

Portuguese bank Banco Espírito Santo announced that it had formalized an agreement to acquire 25.1% of Moza Banco de Moçambique for €7.1 million.

29 October (Pretoria):

President Armando Guebuza, accompanied by Foreign Minister Oldemiro Báloi, met with his South African counterpart Jacob Zuma, during the 14th Heads of State Economic Bilateral Forum (HOSEB). Among the topics covered were 57 agreements on matters such as cooperation on agriculture, health, tourism, trade and investment, water, environment and energy.

Portugal

1 October (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with his counterpart from Bangladesh, Dipu Moni Nawaz. The opening of a Bangladeshi embassy in Lisbon, the future signing of an agreement on double taxation, EU-Bangladesh relations and regional issues were high on the agenda.

4 October (Lisbon):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho met with the director of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Kandeh Yumkella. The role of Portugal in alternative energies was among the topics discussed.

4 October (Lisbon):

According to figures published by the Bank of Portugal, the official debt of Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) to Portugal in 2009 was €1.556 billion. The debt rose by €120 million.

4-5 October (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the 8th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). More than 40 European and Asian Heads of State were present. Global economic governance and international security were high on the agenda.

5 October (Brussels):

In an unusual blunt statement, Foreign Minister Luís Amado declared that Portugal would block any NATO intended reform that compromised the existence of the NATO Command in Oeiras, and reaffirmed the need for unanimity in such decisions.

6 October (Lisbon):

Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Dagoberto Rodríguez met with Foreign Minister Luís Amado. Rodríguez pledged Cuba's support to Portugal's candidacy to a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In turn, Portugal stated that it will vote in favor of an upcoming UN General Assembly resolution demanding the end of the US blockade on Cuba.

7 October (Porto):

The Spanish King Juan Carlos and Italian President Giorgio Napolitano attended, together with Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva, the 6th Cotec Europe Meeting.

7-8 October (Lisbon):

Namibian Foreign Minister Utoni Nujoma met with his Portuguese counterpart Luís Amado, seeking to strength bilateral relations at political, economic and cultural levels. EU-Namibia relations, regional integration issues and the international economic and financial crisis were also high on the agenda.

10 October (Sirte):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the I African Union-Arab League Summit, as an observing party.

11-12 October (London):

Secretary of State for European Affairs Pedro Lourtie met with his British counterpart David Liddington, as well as with Secretary of State responsible for Trade Policy Edward Davey, among others. Bilateral relations between Portugal and the UK, as well as current European issues, such as the European External Action Service, the implementation of the Europe Strategy 2020, European economic governance and the Common Trade Policy, were high on the meeting's agenda.

12 October:

After a hard-fought campaign, Portugal managed to succeed in winning one of the two non-permanent seats available in the United Nations' Security Council. In the first round, Germany won 128 votes, against Portugal's 122 and Canada's 114. In the second round, Portugal beat Canada one more time with 113 votes against 78. Canada would then withdraw its candidacy, allowing Portugal to achieve 150 votes in a subsequent formal third round.

14 October (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado and Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended the Joint NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers Informal



Meeting, on the eve of the upcoming NATO Summit in Lisbon in November.

18 October (Lisbon):

Romania's Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi met with his Portuguese counterpart Luís Amado. The strengthening of bilateral relations and the international economic and financial crisis were high on the agenda.

18 October (Lisbon):

Brazil's Secretary-General for External Relations, ambassador António Patriota, met with Portuguese Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho. Bilateral relations and multilateral issues, particularly within the CPLP, the Ibero-American Community and Mercosul, were among the topics discussed.

22 October (Brussels):

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation João Gomes Cravinho took part in the EU's Informal Council of Ministers for Development. The EU Policy for Development Cooperation objectives and priorities, as well as innovative financing for development aid were high on the agenda.

20-21 October (Nouakchott):

Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva and Armed Forces Chief of Staff General Valença Pinto traveled to Mauritania, where they met with President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz and Defense Minister Hamadi Ould Baba Ould Hamadi. The two countries signed a military cooperation agreement.

24 October (Viana do Castelo):

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez met Prime Minister José Sócrates. Naval building agreements as well as the purchase of Portuguese-made computers were high on the agenda.

25 October (Brussels):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado attended the EU's General Affairs Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. The preparations for the next European Council, Serbia's membership bid, Cuba, Georgia and the upcoming bilateral summits were among the issues discussed.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Portugal ranked 32nd.

26 October (Lisbon):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva announced that he would seek a second five-year term in the country's presidential election on January 23rd 2011.

28 October (Lisbon):

Sudanese Foreign Minister Ahmed Ali Karti met with his Portuguese counterpart, Luís Amado. The upcoming referendum in Sudan was high on the agenda.

28 October (Beijing):

The Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying announced that President Hu Jintao would visit Portugal in early November. Ying also expressed China's interest in Portuguese sovereign debt as a way to help the country overcome the current financial crisis.

28-29 October (Brussels):

Prime Minister José Sócrates attended the European Council. Future changes in the Lisbon Treaty and reforms regarding the European economic governance model were high on the agenda.

São Tomé and Príncipe

3 October (Sirte):

Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada met with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi. Preparations for the upcoming Afro-Arab summit, the III EU-Africa Summit, as well as a reinforcement of bilateral cooperation were high on the agenda.

5-7 October (São Tomé):

A delegation led by Angola's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs George Chicoty traveled to São Tomé and Príncipe as part of the strengthening of cooperation between the two countries.

9-10 October (Sirte):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada attended the African Union-Arab League Summit in Lybia.

10 October (Taipei):

President Fradique de Menezes attended Taiwan's National Day celebrations, and met with his counterpart Ma Ying-jeou. Bilateral aid was high on the agenda.

15 October (São Tomé):

According to representative of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Mamadou Lamine Kane, the institution plans to donate US\$7.5 million to develop the agricultural sector in the country.

18 October (São Tomé):

Head of mission of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to São Tomé and Príncipe Malik Chaka declared that the country may be elected this coming November for a new compact package.

22 October (São Tomé):

According to São Tomé's Minister of Finance and International Cooperation Américo Ramos, the World Bank will grant US\$4 million in direct financing to the country's 2011 state budget.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, São Tomé and Príncipe ranked 101st.

26 October (São Tomé):

Taiwanese Foreign Minister Timothy Yang met with Prime Minister of São Tomé and Príncipe Patrice Trovoada and his local counterpart Manuel Salvador dos Ramos, seeking to enhance the bilateral cooperation between the two countries.

29 October (Luanda):

Foreign Minister Manuel Salvador dos Ramos met with his Angolan counterpart Assunção dos Anjos to sign a cooperation agreement regarding health issues and a memorandum of mutual consultations on diplomatic and political areas.



Timor Leste

Ameerah Haq presented to the Security Council the latest report on the situation in Timor Leste.

1 October (Sydney):

Australian Oil Company Woodside has denied reports that it is willing to reconsider onshore processing of gas from the Greater Sunrise field, as told previously by Timorese officials.

26 October (Berlin):

According to the 2010 Corruption Perception Index, released by Transparency International, Timor-Leste ranked 127th.

1 October (Díli):

Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa and Deputy Prime Minister José Luís Guterres have been indicted over the appointment of Guterres' wife to a diplomatic post.

31 October (Shanghai):

Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão met with his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao. Expanded cooperation in agriculture, oil and gas exploration, mining and investment, were high on the agenda.

5 October (Díli):

According to the newly released UN report "Facing the Future", Timor Leste has strengthened its security and justice sector, a move which has in turn enhanced its human rights status.

5-7 October (Brussels):

President José Ramos-Horta met with President of the European Commission José Manuel Durão Barroso, and with President of the European Parliament Jerzy Buzek, seeking to enhance ties between Timor Leste and the EU.

11 October (Díli):

President Ramos-Horta outlined a set of conditions that would be imposed on any deal regarding a possible processing center of refugees to be built in Timor Leste. Among other requirements, Díli would only consider it to be a temporary solution, and it must be funded by Australia.

12 October (Díli):

President Ramos-Horta met Australian Immigration Minister Chris Bowen to discuss the establishment of a regional refugee processing center in Timor Leste. They agreed to establish a bilateral high-level working group to further address the issue, although Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa warned that the project could "take a bit longer" than Australia initially desired.

19 October (New York):

Special representative of the UN Secretary-General to Timor Leste and head of the UNMIT



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