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Mozambique: leaning on a external defense umbrella

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As the world's 35th largest country, Mozambique possesses vast natural and porous borders with all of its six territorial neighbors, which in turn inevitably reflects upon the country's own defense predicaments. Still, none is harder to secure or more challenging than its inescapable eastern limits, i.e. the Indian Ocean. More so, if one takes into account the latest security developments that emerged in this particular region throughout the first months of 2011 and more precisely, the apparent spread of acts of piracy from the Horn of Africa down below to the Mozambican Channel's immediate surroundings.

Although at first resistance among Mozambican governing officials to formally recognize the brewing problem looming on their 2.470 km coastline was clear, a series of successive attacks on passing vessels – such as

the Vega 5 on December 27th, 2010 – helped raise national awareness about such a potential menace, which could not be ignored for much longer. Disruption of seaborne trade, unsecured international communication lines – 30% of the world's oil supply goes through the Mozambique Channel and around the Cape – and a general feeling of unchecked mayhem are serious issues to take into consideration.

Nevertheless, Mozambique's response was contingent on its own logistical shortcomings as investment on the country's naval assets over the years has been scarce, to say the least. In fact, in an initial stage, Mozambique could only go so far as to request South Africa's assistance. Operation Hopper was then initiated in mid-February and South African Navy frigate SAS Mendi – meanwhile replaced by SAS Amatola – was deployed to operate outside of the northern Mozambican city of Pemba.

If at first, such inclination towards external support could have appeared overly dismissive of its own internal responsibilities, it soon became clear that Mozambique's best chances of providing a coherent and preemptive approach to this matter relied precisely on including third interested parties in any joint response.

Further examples of these intended designs soon followed. On May 30th, Norway's State Secretary in the

Foreign Ministry Erik Lahnstein announced in Maputo his country's interest in patrolling the coast of Mozambique to help fight piracy. More importantly, Lahnstein disclosed that in the next Fall, a maritime station would be set up in an East African country yet to be defined – with Mozambique ranking high as a likely choice – that will act as a base for sea and air patrols, scouring the Indian Ocean for signs of pirate activity and providing increased patrol capabilities to the Mozambican coast. This is in addition to the US\$5.6 million that Norway already allocates to the United Nations for international combined efforts in the nearby area. Soon afterwards, on June 2nd, Mozambican Defense Minister Filipe Nyussi traveled to Pretoria where, alongside South African counterpart Lindiwe Sisulu, he signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to fight piracy bilaterally, with a main focus on joint patrols along their respective coasts, in broader Southern African Development Community (SADC) waters and more specifically, in the Mozambique Channel. Joint training, sharing of information, intelligence and ongoing support in military developments was also included. For all purposes, Sisulu's words at the time could not have been more explicit: "what touches Mozambique touches South Africa". However, there was still another



partner whose efforts needed to be included in this overall cooperation. By all accounts, India holds several strategic interests in the surrounding oceanic area and its focus on Africa has steadily increased over the years. It was therefore only to be expected that the country assume a significant role in addressing existing security issues in the area. Indeed, it was an Indian anti-pirate patrol who engaged the Vega 5 in a gun battle on March 12th, overwhelming the pirates and setting free 13 of the original crew, 12 of which were Mozambicans citizens. That much explains Filipe Nyussi's five-day visit on June 28th to New Delhi and the contacts with Indian officials. For his part, India's Defense Minister A. K. Antony promptly expressed his country's willingness to work more closely on anti-piracy fighting while building on previous commitments. As it happens, in 2006 India had already signed a comprehensive MoU on defense cooperation – the first ever with a major African nation – with Mozambique, which comprised mutual training in military institutes, supply of defense equipment and services, establishment of partnerships, transfer of knowhow and technology for assembling and repairing vehicles, aircraft and ships, and rehabilitation of military infrastructure. Periodical maritime patrolling of the Mozambique coast was also included. It is therefore presumed that such collaboration will increase and intensify under this setting.

All in all, the path chosen by Mozambican authorities has become perfectly clear. Fully aware of constraints in terms of actual military manpower and means, as well as the fragilities in projecting its influence on the country's shorelines, Mozambique has sought to involve several external partners in creating a diffused security architecture with enough responsibilities and capabilities to effectively guard and protect the targeted area. In sum, Mozambique appears to be keen on developing a defensive umbrella around its waters that could preemptively tackle the disrupting effects of

pirate activity emerging in its vicinity. The final piece of this strategy is up to the SADC's own long awaited Maritime Safety Strategy, whose future approval will certainly reinforce the multilateral efforts and commitments that Mozambique so actively desires.

Naturally, such a cooperative framework is only possible due to a notorious convergence of interests between all parts and, as such, questions regarding the sustainability of these arrangements in the long run are bound to arise. Moreover, such formal partnerships will be rendered meaningless if they do not produce serious cooperation among members, and perhaps more importantly with other international forces already present up north, patrolling the Horn of Africa. Be it as it may, for the time being Mozambique appears perfectly comfortable with these arrangements, as they not only present a dynamic and engaging approach before a greater demanding international community, but are also a consistent response to fledgling piracy activities. In that sense, as the boldness and length of piracy acts increases, Mozambique is likely to lean more and more on outside assistance and collaboration to respond to this pressing security issue.



Timor Leste's bet on Lusophone peer-to-peer cooperation

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Small countries with few comparative trade advantages, generally the consequence of small territories and little overall natural resources, tend to apply other variables to their political and economic foreign policy when attempting to craft deals regarding cooperation with larger, wealthier states. In the special case of Timor Leste this is even truer. Timor Leste is one of the world's youngest states, its independence dating back to May 2002, even though small pockets of internal political violence and occasional skirmishes have scarred the country's short independent history. With little infrastructure to speak of, wide ranging poverty, political conflict and low capacity to explore whatever natural resources it possesses, Timor Leste was obliged to look into its friends in order to jump-start its development. A clear Lusophone component emerged, characterized by a great dedication to all countries with Portuguese as their official language, a component which should not be disregarded in favor of simplified, one sided, purely realpolitik examinations. Combining a joint sphere of economic interest and opportunities with a strong Lusophone inclination for cooperation, Timor Leste has over the years remained a notable state in the region it is inserted, in the sense that it does not look solely for regional support to solve its issues, but rather complements this geographical concept with a cultural and historical component, the Portuguese language.

Countries with Portuguese as an official language, besides demonstrating heavily marked differences between them, as of yet do not possess an organization with comprehensive mechanisms and instruments to ensure the integrity and unity of these states as a community. The Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP), although strong in the education and cultural domains, has so far been devoid of decision-making and interaction capabilities, consequently excluding any multilateral Lusophone approach, pushing these countries to have to interact on bilateral platforms. Nevertheless, Timor Leste has proven its commitment to these kinds of relationships, even suggesting multilateral Lusophone

approaches to some of the specific problems of its member-states.¹

Finding rooted support in some Lusophone states, especially in Brazil and Portugal at the time of its independence, Timor Leste has not felt the depressive drag of the creation of a properly functioning multilateral organization to besiege its aim of enhancing Lusophone cooperation. On the contrary, it has carried on its pro-Lusophone objectives while taking into account its own needs and interests. In an era when economic development has ambushed classic notions of state prowess and even diplomacy, Timor Leste's young statehood, its scarce resources and damaged infrastructure have transformed its foreign policy into an apparatus of trade and cooperation on economic investments.

Lusophone cooperation

The Lusophone space appears to be making its way into a booming market of natural resources and raw materials, particularly due to Angola and Brazil's late exponential economic development, circumstances which have not left Timor Leste's leaders idle, on the contrary. In the first half of 2011, Timorese Prime Minister José Alexandre 'Xanana' Gusmão and President José Ramos-Horta have already visited Brazil and Angola, on March 3rd and June 27th, respectively. In the past few years, there has already been substantial interaction between Timor Leste and these two countries. In 2008, President Ramos-Horta visited Brazil and former President Luiz Inácio 'Lula' da Silva visited Timor Leste, meetings heavily influenced by the attempt on President Ramos-Horta's life. In 2009, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão went to Luanda, where a meeting was held with President José Eduardo dos Santos in order to discuss details for cooperation, with a particular focus on the energy sectors, specifically oil and gas.

The high frequency of these visits is not arbitrary. Diplomatic relations between countries are often slowed or enhanced depending on the cultural, historical,

¹ Timorese President José Ramos-Horta suggested that Angola, Brazil and Timor Leste could help Portugal by buying parts of its foreign debt, in order to restore market confidence in that country.



geographical and even religious heritage of each of them, not simply because of economic or political motivations alone. The European Union was formed due to political and economic reasons. Yet, its historical, cultural and religious underpinnings cannot be ignored in any serious analysis. The same rationale applies to the CPLP, the UK's relationship with the US, Greece and Turkey's animosity toward each other or India's troubled relationship with Pakistan. In the case of Timor Leste, its foreign policy vectors are certainly geographical – with great emphasis on the ASEAN community – perhaps by choice or even out of necessity, yet its practical foreign policy endeavors are filled with historical and cultural – linguistic – segments. In sharing a common history with distant peoples and more importantly a common language, Timor Leste – like many other Lusophone countries – benefits from a comfortable and progressive business environment amid these cultural similarities. When such a *modus operandi* is joined by potentially fruitful trade relations and collaborations, Timor Leste found in the Lusophone world – mainly in Angola, Brazil and Portugal – the perfect opportunity to kick start its economic development, rebuild its social fabric and infrastructure after decades of stagnation.

Angola is already an energy export superpower to be reckoned with on the global scale. Petroleum products and diamonds account for 80% of the country's exports, which have increased threefold between 2006 and 2009. With this reasoning in mind, on June 27th Timorese President Ramos-Horta visited Luanda, where a meeting was held with Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos. The agenda included the attribution of the 'Grande Colar da Ordem' of Timor Leste to José Eduardo dos Santos – an award dedicated to all Angolans by the President – an invitation for the Angolan President to visit Timor Leste – which was promptly accepted – and an analysis of several domains of cooperation. At the end of the meeting, both Presidents signed two cooperation agreements, relating to the petroleum and defense domains. Luanda advanced the possibility of cooperating with Díli in sector specific areas, especially in petroleum exploration² – an area where Angola is gaining experience and know-how at a fast pace – basic infrastructure, roads and communications, all sectors Angola has been revitalizing with great success since the end of the civil war. Since the date of pacification for both countries is coincidental – both achieved an acceptable degree of peace in 2002 – their reconstruction needs became remarkably similar, although Angola is much further ahead in its national reconstruction program. Furthermore, besides the building of infrastructure and communications, Timor Leste will also be able to draw on Angola's know-how on

energy exploration, since the former already possesses extraction facilities in its maritime territory – believed to be underproductive – accounting for the greatest source of the country's revenue, much like Angola.

To be sure, Angola and Timor Leste have more similarities than what appears at glance. Besides sharing a parallel yet close history, a common language and similar pacification dates, both countries' economic and social needs tend to form a perfect match, factors which highlight the potential for growth and collaboration in their relationship. The Lusophone link was also central during the meeting. Both countries' leaders manifested a willingness to include their relationship in the broader Lusophone cooperation framework and contribute to its continued evolution. Currently holding the Presidency of the CPLP, President José Eduardo dos Santos stated that the consolidation of past events between CPLP member states constitutes one of the pillars of mutually advantageous cooperation between all members, signaling the opening of new economic yet culturally oriented development perspectives within the Community.³ Understanding that this fruitful relationship would develop even further on a multilateral framework, both Ramos-Horta and José Eduardo dos Santos' statements seemed to approve and attempt to platform the contents of their relationship and cooperation into the broader Lusophone community, thus underpinning the productive yet limited potential of simple bilateral relations.

Shifting its foreign policy focus across the Atlantic to Latin America, Timor Leste has always found in Brazil a faithful ally, understanding and supportive of its causes. Brazil was a keen supporter of Timor Leste's 1999 referendum for independence and a strong backer of the country's 2002 independence, having had a fundamental role in its self-determination. Following the outbreak of violence in Timor Leste after the referendum, Brazil was one of the few countries to send troops to integrate the UNMISSET, the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor. Politically, there were several meetings between Xanana Gusmão and former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, resulting in the opening of a Brazilian office of representation in Díli in June 2000.⁴ Already in 2001, one year before Timor Leste's *de jure* independence, Fernando Henrique Cardoso visited the country in order to reaffirm Brazil's interest in cooperating with an independent Timor Leste, thus working to guarantee its right to self-determination. Brazil was also one of the first countries to recognize Timor Leste's ambition to become independent, and since then has been an avid supporter of the country's

2 The exchange of experience and know-how concerning petroleum exploration had already been discussed during Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão's visit to Luanda in 2009, although no concrete agreements were reached at the time.

3 "Distinção abrange todo o povo Angolano – Presidente da República" (*Angop*, 27 June 2011).

4 "Escritório de Representação do Brasil no Timor Oriental" (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Press Briefing, Note No. 30, 4 February 2000).



independence, democracy and overall development. Cooperation between these two states currently ranges from a variety of domains, including critical areas such as defense, security, justice and fisheries, aquaculture, infrastructure projects, social inclusion and with a special focus on education. Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão's visit to Brazil on March 2nd and meeting with Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff bore fruit on several levels. Besides strengthening institutional bonds and the affirmation of Lusophone dedication in terms of recognition and assistance, both leaders signed accords targeting Brazilian assistance in the Timorese justice sector, social inclusion with the implementation of the "Casa Brasil-Timor Leste", the enhancement of the technical capacity of the Timorese national police and a complementary assistance on the implementation of a framework of qualification and education of teachers of Portuguese language.⁵ From the list of collaborations announced at the joint declaration by both leaders, it is clear that the cooperation assumes a rather intense focus on security and education, refraining from positioning the relationship on purely economic terms.

It is however noteworthy that all visits were made at the highest political level possible, which reveals truths about the dedication these countries have to the Lusophone concept. Although President Dilma Rousseff can be seen visiting old partners and friends of Brazil while opening new diplomatic channels with other states, it is true that Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos rarely leaves the country, usually sending top diplomatic officials instead and receiving state leaders in Luanda whenever possible. Yet, the prompt acceptance of President Ramos-Horta's invitation to visit Timor Leste represents a clear sign that Lusophony is and will remain a strong pillar in Angola's rapidly diversifying foreign policy.

Both Brazil and Angola have much to offer Timor Leste if relations continue at this steady pace. With the help of Angola, Timor Leste is beginning to acquire important know-how on how to develop its meager, yet proportionally adequate, resources in terms of population, while in Brazil it appears to search for the technical know-how to mount a properly functioning, socially oriented, state apparatus, supplied by fully operational and progressive education, justice and security sectors. The rationale behind Timor Leste's Lusophone foreign policy inclination with Angola and Brazil seems to be based on a very straightforward solution: find assistance to explore its natural resources with Angola and learn how to set up a socially oriented state system with Brazil. Obviously, Angola and Brazil are not the only states with whom Timor Leste is holding talks in order to favor cooperation. However,

these recent meetings between leaders begin to lay a pattern that would suggest the degree of cooperation and development opportunities is evolving within the Lusophone world, pushing it to become an emerging space of economic development based specifically on language, with Timor Leste at the forefront of bilateral negotiations, consequently broadening and making way to other projects and institutional developments. Nevertheless, frameworks of cooperation in the CPLP already exist, although this organization has not yet been able to absorb these bilateral developments. There is a window of opportunity for the CPLP to begin folding these bilateral deals into its own institutional framework. Representing the Portuguese speaking community at the institutional level, the development of multilateral cooperation might reside on this organization's ability to pick up where Timor Leste left off and continue developing the Lusophone space by providing it with working multilateral components. The political will of Lusophone leaders to embrace the notion of cooperation through a strong language basis has been constantly present at each of their meetings. Yet, post-Cold War globalization is beginning to show the products of South-South development. Emerging economies like Brazil – a member of the BRICS – and Angola must be the target of a special devotion by the CPLP, as the number of state connections these countries have is rapidly growing, threatening to shift the focus and inclination of their foreign policy from the Lusophone world to a more realistic approach based on economic reasoning.

Practical approaches to development in the Lusophone space

Exchanging know-how to develop natural resource exploration capabilities in conjunction with the provision of other services available within the Lusophone world would allow smaller states like Timor Leste to hasten the pace of their development through either bilateral or preferably multilateral cooperation, increasing the prowess, importance, capacity and well-being of the community and its populations. Due to discrepancies in wealth and GDP, mainly between Angola, Brazil, Portugal and Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor Leste, there is room to enhance trade between these countries in order to craft profitable deals for all. Brazil, Angola and Timor Leste's energies could become available to Lusophone consumers requiring such energy supplies, in exchange for other comparative advantages in communications, electric grids, education, infrastructure, industry, agriculture and fisheries all in the spirit of using cultural and historical advantages to promote healthy and prosperous business environments. The exchange of know-how is a good start to publicly or privately project the idea of multilateral interaction in the Lusophone space. The alternative energy sectors in

5 "Visita do Primeiro-Ministro da República Democrática de Timor-Leste, Xanana Gusmão, ao Brasil - 2 a 5 de Março de 2011 - declaração conjunta" (Ministério das Relações Exteriores, Press Briefing, Note No. 86, 3 March 2011).



Brazil and Portugal are a good example of extending this know-how to countries with sufficient alternative energy resources lacking the capacity for exploration. The handful of examples provided above are but a few of the possible cases where Lusophone cooperation targeting economic or social development could produce win-win situations for all sides. Politically, there already exists a strong union between Portuguese speaking countries. There have been several occasions when these countries have counted on each other's support, be it Brazil's project of reforming the United Nations Security Council, Portugal's election to that same body, Angola's presidency of the CPLP, Cape Verde's economic approach to the European Union and ultimately the entire process of Timorese referendum and posterior independence and pacification.

There is enough political and economic will to realize these expectations. Although some areas remain brutally underdeveloped – especially concerning immigration issues – there appear to exist many segments to be explored. If the necessary institutional input were to be provided by the CPLP and each member-state, the Timorese path to Lusophone cooperation would indeed become a textbook example of inter-state development based not on classical notions of international trade, but rather on the political will invested into similar concepts of culture, in this case language.

Conclusion

Timor Leste is currently opening new paths of inter-state interaction, supported not purely by economic and political reasons but rather by changing the traditional scope of economic trade imported from the latter part of the 20th century, into a culture-based approach to international trade and cooperation. Seizing the opportunity of having an established community of Lusophone countries, supported by all its state leaders, Timor Leste appears to want to capitalize on this notion of friendship and solidarity to find assistance in wealthier Lusophone countries, in order to continue its own reconstruction and development, latently pushing forward the very idea of economic cooperation in the Lusophone world, a cultural and political space with proved potential and a willingness to collaborate. The wealth and resource discrepancies that draw dividing lines between the countries of the Lusophone community can also be beneficial to smaller states like Timor Leste, Cape Verde, or São Tomé and Príncipe. The Brazilian economy alone, one of the largest in the world still showing signs of continued growth, possesses enough maneuvering space to create beneficial win-win situations in its interaction with these smaller countries.

Timor Leste leaders have been visiting both Brasília and Luanda intermittently. Having been continuously well received at the highest political level is in itself a cultural manifestation of dedication and respect to the Luso-

phone concept. Furthermore, Timor Leste also falls into the South-South cooperation category, an element with strong presence in Brazilian foreign policy. The sheer fact that all Lusophone countries apart from Portugal can be inserted in this South-South dichotomy represents an added gateway for collaboration, a concept easily found in most southern countries' foreign policy goals. This said, crafting deals in the energy, justice, education and security sectors – to name but a few – could eventually create a contagious domino effect, influencing other Lusophone countries to find economic, political and social development not in other organizations and countries, but in the Portuguese speaking world. For now, Timor Leste's young statehood is the revolving component spurring new forms of collaboration based on culture in the Lusophone space.



Timeline of Events

Angola

1 June (Luanda):

US Navy Secretary Ray Mabus visited Angola, where he was received by Defense Minister Cândido Pereira Van-Dúnem and Angolan Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Gaspar Rufino. Mabus seized the occasion to reaffirm what had already been said by State Secretary Hillary Clinton in Luanda in 2010: Angola is one of the three strategic US partners in the continent.

2 June (Luanda):

According to the IMF's World Economic Outlook, Angola will register one of the world's fastest economic growth rates in 2012, estimated at 10,5%.

2 June (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos appointed 32 new ambassadors. This quasi-revolution is framed in a broader effort by Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty to reform the Foreign Affairs Ministry. José Eduardo dos Santos appointed new ambassadors to Cape Verde, Mozambique, São Tomé and Príncipe and Brazil, as well as the US, Canada, China, Italy, and South Africa. A new Embassy will be opened in the United Arab Emirates.

2-3 June (Brazzaville):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó' represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the Summit on the Three Rainforest Basins (Amazon, Congo, and Borneo-Mekong). Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty was also present at the Summit. The Mayombe Forest (a historical MPLA base against the Portuguese) is part of the Congo Basin and is situated in the Cabinda enclave, which explains the high-level Angolan representation at this Summit.

3-7 June (Luanda):

Mozambican National Assembly speaker Verónica Macamo traveled to Angola accompanied by a parliamentary delegation. She met with her Angolan counterpart Paulo Kassoma, and both decided to reinforce parliamentary cooperation initiatives.

7 June (Luanda):

President José Eduardo dos Santos received in separate audiences special envoys from Cape

Verde and Guinea-Bissau. The content of the messages was not made public.

7 June (Vienna):

Ahead of the OPEC meeting, Angolan Oil Minister José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos said that the Organization could supply more oil to the world market if needed.

8 June (Luanda):

The IMF concluded a visit it started on May 25th to review the US\$1.4 billion loan it granted Angola.

8 June (Kinshasa):

Angola and the DRC signed an agreement over the repatriation of some 40.000 Angolan nationals still living as refugees in the DRC. This agreement was mediated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who determined that at the end of the year Angolan nationals would no longer have access to the refugee status.

11-12 June (Sandton):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Summit in South Africa. The main topics discussed were the political situation in Zimbabwe and Madagascar, as well as economic prospects for the region, including the creation of a trade zone between SADC, the Common Market of East and Southern Africa and the Eastern African Community.

15 June (Luanda):

Chinese ambassador to Angola Zhang Bolun presented his regards to President José Eduardo dos Santos as he ended his three-year mission in the country. Bolun stated to the press that the last years have witnessed the strengthening of economic and political relations between the two nations.

19-20 June (Luanda):

Namibian President Hifikepunye Pohamba paid an official two-day visit to Angola. Pohamba held meetings with National Assembly Speaker Paulo Kassoma and with Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó'. He was also received by President José Eduardo dos Santos, with whom he discussed the current status

of bilateral relations and regional issues. Namibia is currently the head of SADC and will be substituted by Angola in August.

20-22 June (Luanda):

A Russian parliamentary delegation, headed by Vice-Speaker of the Duma, Nadejda Vassilieva Guerassimova, visited Angola with the aim of strengthening bilateral relations. A parliamentary protocol was signed, aimed at sharing legislative and juridical experiences.

21 June (Lusaka):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty traveled to Zambia where he participated in SADC's Ministerial Commission of the Organ of Political, Defense and Security Cooperation. The main topics on the agenda were the situations in Zimbabwe and Madagascar.

21 June (Nairobi):

Kenyan Foreign Affairs Minister George Saitoti informed that his country would open an Embassy in Luanda.

23 June (Luanda):

Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Adolphe Muzito met with Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó'. The two officials discussed current bilateral relations, including difficult issues like Congolese illegal immigration and its forced eviction from Angola, the status of Angolan refugees in DRC and the delimitation of the maritime border between the two nations. Muzito denied the existence of any conflict with Angola related to this issue.

25-27 June (Luanda):

President of Timor Leste José Ramos-Horta paid an official visit to Angola. Ramos-Horta was honored with an extraordinary solemn session of the National Assembly and was received by his counterpart José Eduardo dos Santos. The visit aimed to strengthen bilateral cooperation, especially in the area of oil exploration. Accords were also signed in the fields of defense and social communication.

26-27 June (Malabo):

Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty attended the ordinary session of the executive council for the preparation of the 17th ordinary conference of the African Union.

**27 June (Washington):**

The IMF released some preliminary conclusions of its mission to Angola. The Fund stated that Angola's economic perspectives are positive thanks to high oil prices and that "the authorities are also committed to further strengthen foreign reserves as a buffer against oil revenue volatility, a key program objective".

29-31 June (Malabo):

Vice-President Fernando da Piedade Dias dos Santos 'Nandó', accompanied by Foreign Affairs Minister George Chicoty, represented President José Eduardo dos Santos in the 17th ordinary conference of the African Union.

30 June (Soyo):

Oil Minister José Maria Botelho de Vasconcelos stated that Angola and the DRC initiated talks to jointly explore an oil field. Negotiations should be concluded by 2013.

Brazil

1 June (Washington):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota met with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton under the 2nd Brazil-United States Global Partnership Dialogue. The follow-up of President Barack Obama's visit to Brazil, the situation in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as cooperation on trade and investment, education, science, technology and innovation, energy, environment were high on the agenda.

2 June (Rome):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota represented the Brazilian government during the 150th anniversary celebration of Italy's unification.

6 June (Brasília):

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez traveled to Brazil where he met with his counterpart Dilma Rousseff, with new initiatives for regional cooperation high on the agenda.

7 June (Brasília):

After weeks of battling the opposition's demands for a full parliamentary and judicial investigation, Dilma Rousseff's Chief of Staff Antônio Palocci resigned due to corruption charges.

8 June (Brasília):

Brazil's Supreme Court rejected the extradition to Italy of former far-left militant Cesare Battisti and ordered his immediate release in a move that will likely heighten tensions

with Rome. For its part, Italy immediately denounced the ruling with a cabinet minister calling it "the umpteenth humiliation" of the victims of Cesare Battisti, who has been sentenced to life for the murders of four persons in the 1970s.

8-10 June (New York):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota accompanied by Health Minister Alexandre Padilha took part in the General Assembly High-level Meeting on HIV/AIDS.

9 June (Brasília):

Peru's President-elect Ollanta Humala met with President Dilma Rousseff as part of his South American tour visiting several heads of state to foster regional unity. For her part, Rousseff confirmed that she would attend Humala's inauguration on July 28th.

13 June (Panama City):

In his first visit to a Central American country, Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota traveled to Panama where he met with President Ricardo Martinelli and with local Foreign Minister and Vice-President Juan Carlos Varela Rodríguez, aiming to enhance bilateral relations.

14 June (São Paulo):

According to figures published by Brazil's Development, Industry and Foreign Trade Ministry, trade between Brazil and Portuguese-speaking African countries (PALOP) fell sharply in May. Brazilian exports to Angola fell 15.2% to US\$69.7 million against the previous month. Moreover, sales to Mozambique fell 62.5% to US\$4.1 million in May, to Cape Verde they fell 26.7% to US\$2.9 million, to Guinea Bissau they fell 59.5% to US\$382,000, and to São Tomé and Príncipe they fell 2.3% to US\$124,000.

16-17 June (Brasília):

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon traveled to Brazil where he met with President Dilma Rousseff, Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota, President of the Senate José Sarney and President of the Chamber of Deputies Marco Maia. Global governance reform, preparations for the Rio+20 CBD Conference in 2012, Brazil's role in Haiti and pressing international issues were high on the agenda.

17 June (Brasília):

Mozambique's Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói met with his Brazilian counterpart Antônio Patriota, seeking to enhance bilateral relations and deepen the ongoing projects of cooperation on education, health, agriculture, food safety and energy.

20 June (Brasília):

UN General Assembly President Joseph Deiss traveled to Brazil where he met with Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota. International security issues, human rights, the UN reform and preparations for the Rio+20 CBD Conference were high on the agenda.

21-22 June (Brasília):

British Vice-Prime Minister Nick Clegg paid an official visit to Brazil where he met with Vice-President Michel Temer and Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota. Greater cultural cooperation and a partnership for global development were high on the agenda.

22 June (Brasília):

Brazil became the latest target of international cyber attacks as the federal government, presidency, and tax collection agency's websites were shutdown due to an attack claimed by Lulz Security group of hackers.

24 June (Bogota):

Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim met with his Colombian counterpart Rodrigo Rivera, in order to start negotiations on a bilateral agreement on border security and the protection of natural resources in the Amazon region. Afterwards, Jobim also took the opportunity to meet with President Juan Manuel dos Santos.

26 June (Rome):

The United Nations Food Agency Organization (FAO) elected Brazilian José Graziano da Silva as its director-general.

28 June (Asunción):

Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota took part in the ordinary meeting of the Mercosul.

29 June (Asunción):

President Dilma Rousseff traveled to Paraguay where she met with President Fernando Lugo. Remuneration for the Itaipu hydropower and implementation of a new joint electric distribution system were high on the agenda. Enhanced border cooperation as well as greater economic ties were also addressed.

29 June (Asunción):

President Dilma Rousseff attended the Mercosul Heads of State and Government Summit. A plan for social action, the new rules on the full resumption of duty of the Mercosul Parliament and joint projects among member countries on research, education, health and biotechnology were high on the agenda. Afterwards, Foreign Minister Antônio Patriota announced that Bolivia and Ecuador would be invited to join the organization.

**30 June (Brasília):**

After attending the Mercosul Summit, Japan's Foreign Minister Takeaki Matsumoto visited Brazil where he met with his local counterpart Antônio Patriota. Matsumoto took the opportunity to witness the signing of a new financing agreement by the Japan International Cooperation Agency regarding cooperation projects on hydro resources and urban transportation.

Cape Verde

6 June (Lisbon):

According to the report "Economic Outlooks in Africa 2011" published by the Africa Development Bank (AfDB), Cape Verde was one of the ten sub-Saharan countries of the 30 African nations that "most improved" in terms of economic governance in 2010.

8 June (Praia):

Former PAICV militant Joaquim Jaime Monteiro formalized his candidacy for the August 7th presidential elections in Cape Verde. He will then run against Aristides Lima, MpD-backed Jorge Carlos Fonseca and PAICV official candidate Manuel Inocêncio de Sousa.

15 June (Rhode Island):

President Pedro Pires met with the Cape Verdean emigrant community in the US and well as Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee.

20 June (Praia):

According to Cape Verdean Director-General for Global Affairs, Carlos Semedo, Cape Verde and five other African countries are due to start gathering seismic and hydrographical data in October as part of a project to extend their continental shelves beyond 200 nautical miles. Norway will provide technical and financial assistance.

22-23 June (Lisbon):

President Pedro Pires paid his last official foreign visit to Portugal, where he met with President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and received a honoris causa degree from the Lusófona University. Pires also took the opportunity to meet with the Cape Verdean community in Portugal.

23-24 June (Praia):

A delegation from China including officials and businesspeople from Macau – headed by the Chinese Deputy Trade minister, Jiang Yaoping

and the Secretary for the Economy and Finance of the Macau Special Administrative Region, Francis Tam Pak Yuen – visited Cape Verde as part of the economic and technical cooperation between the two countries and to meet with Prime Minister José Maria Neves. Education, renewable energy, water and health and well as bilateral trade opportunities were high on the agenda.

Guinea-Bissau

2 June (Bissau):

The World Bank signed-off some US\$2.2 million to support Guinea-Bissau's water and energy sectors. Economy Minister Helena Embaló reiterated her appeal for the international donors to continue supporting the country in this area, which still needs some US\$10 million in emergency interventions.

2 June (Washington):

The World Bank agreed to grant US\$7 million to support the country's rice production, crucial to feed Guinea-Bissau's population. This grant is part of a larger financing program to the ECOWAS members.

3 June (Bissau):

President Malam Bacai Sanhá received the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.

3 June (Bissau):

The AFP reported that the judicial case related to a coup attempt in June 2009, when presidential candidate Baciro Dabó and former Defense Minister Hélder Proença were assassinated by a soldier, has been dropped by the Courts. General Attorney Amine Saad stated that "nothing new" was found from the beginning of the investigation two years ago. This decision adds to a general feeling that the Armed Forces have total impunity in the country, something the EU has noted on several occasions.

7 June (Lisbon):

At the margins of the African Development Bank's Annual Assembly, Sunita Pitamber, who heads the Bank's Fragile States Unit, stated that international donor cooperation is needed to support Guinea-Bissau because it will be impossible to make any difference there by acting alone.

8-11 June (Bissau):

An IMF assessment team led by Paulo Drummond, visited Guinea-Bissau and met with Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior and other officials. The team analyzed the progress made in the fiscal sector and structural reforms.

9 June (Lisbon):

Economy Minister Helena Embaló declared in the African Development Bank's Annual Assembly that Guinea-Bissau could regress to "situations no one desires" if the EU budget support is not resumed, although she recognized the EU maintains some development support. Embaló defended that her country needs "consistent help".

15 June (Bissau):

CPLP Executive Secretary Domingos Simões Pereira met President Malam Bacai Sanhá. After the meeting, Pereira declared that Guinea-Bissau had finally reached some stability and that the bases for a solid consensus between the country's population and institutions were being created.

15 June (Bissau):

The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba was received by President Malam Bacai Sanhá with whom he discussed the Priority Plan for Peace Consolidation in Guinea-Bissau for 2011-2013. Mutaboba stated afterwards that even if Guinea-Bissau has avoided a crisis during the last year, it could still "behave" better and that the country's situation can improve.

16 June (Bissau):

After two rounds of failed negotiations, the EU and Guinea-Bissau reached an agreement to renew its Fisheries Agreement for a year. This will allow 60 EU vessels, mostly from Spain, to continue their activities in Guinea-Bissau's waters. Bissau requested some €11 million per year, instead of the current €9 million, but the final value was not made public.

16 June (Bissau):

Guinea-Bissau's National Assembly approved the Convention to Avoid Double Taxation with Portugal, which was signed in 2008, after several months delaying it for political reasons.

17 June (New York):

The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba presented the Priority Plan for Peace Consoli-



dition in Guinea-Bissau for 2011-2013 to the UN Peacebuilding Fund.

17 June (Bissau):

According to the Economy Ministry, Guinea-Bissau's economy is projected to grow 4.3% in 2011.

28 June (New York):

The UN Security Council discussed the situation in Guinea-Bissau. The UN Secretary-General's Special Representative to Guinea-Bissau Joseph Mutaboba transmitted to the Council what he considers improvements in the Security Sector in the country, in particular efforts to strengthen institutions and signs of political dialogue. However, on a negative note, Mutaboba casted doubts over the political leader's ability to deal with the country's military leadership. Drug trafficking remains a major challenge to Guinea-Bissau's stabilization and further efforts should be made in justice and defense reforms as a means to underpin and support economic growth. The UN Security Council called for enhanced civilian control over Guinea-Bissau's military.

28 June (New York):

Defense Minister Aristides Ocante da Silva announced to the UN Security Council that Guinea-Bissau's government would start paying military pensions next September. To finance this program, some US\$4.5 million will be put forward by Guinea-Bissau while US\$13 million will be handed-out by the EU and other donors. The goal will be to cut Army numbers from the current 11.000 to 4.000.

29 June (Lisbon):

Bissau-Guinean Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior met with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho. Passos Coelho took the opportunity to reaffirm Portugal's commitment to the development, growth and stability of Guinea-Bissau.

Mozambique

1 June (Maputo):

According to Mozambican daily newspaper Notícias, Germany's development bank KfW will donate €15.5 million in direct budgetary aid and sector programs to Mozambique under the terms of a financing contract signed in Maputo with the Bank of Mozambique. Of that amount, €13 million have been earmarked for the State Budget and €2.5 million for other

priority areas such as the Administrative Courts and Mozambique's Tributary Authority, which will receive €1.7 million.

1 June (Pretoria):

Mozambican Defense Minister Filipe Nyussi and his South African counterpart Lindiwe Sisulu signed a memorandum of understanding that makes provision for joint training, sharing of information and intelligence, joint patrols and ongoing support in military developments, with a particular focus on the growing piracy in the Indian Ocean and especially in the Mozambique Channel and the broader Southern African Development Community (SADC) waters.

2-7 June (Beijing):

Mozambican Foreign Minister Oldemiro Balói paid an official visit to China, seeking to boost bilateral ties in a number of cooperation endeavors. Balói also took the opportunity to meet with Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang and Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.

11-12 June (Johannesburg):

President Armando Guebuza attended the SADC Heads of State and Government of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tripartite Summit, with the stalemate in Zimbabwe high on the agenda. Together with his counterparts from Zambia and Namibia, Guebuza took the opportunity to meet personally with Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe.

27 June–1 July (New Delhi):

Mozambique's Defense Minister Filipe Nyussi visited India where he met with his counterpart A. K. Antony, seeking to discuss such issues as piracy in the East African coast, training for its security forces and maritime patrolling.

Portugal

1 June (Lisbon):

Foreign Minister Luís Amado met with former Libyan Foreign Minister and representative at the UN Ambassador Abdel Rahman Shalgam, who is now a member of the National Transition Council. The ongoing operation in Libya, the efforts of the international community and the role of Portugal as head of the UN Sanctions Committee

as well as of Libya's Contact Group, were high on the agenda.

5 June (Lisbon):

Portugal's center-right party PSD and its leader Pedro Passos Coelho emerged as winners of the country's legislative elections – with nearly 39% of the votes – beating out caretaking Prime Minister José Sócrates, who resigned as head of the PS after securing only 28% of the votes.

5-6 June (Budapest):

Caretaking Foreign Minister Luís Amado took part in the 10th meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The official agenda included cyber crime, food security, management and use of water, disaster-preparedness and management, as well as threats related to terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime. Regional issues, like the situation in the Middle East, the role of the G8 and G20 in global economic governance, the prospect of the future enlargement of ASEM and other initiatives to strengthen ASEM's visibility among citizens, were also addressed.

7 June (Lisbon):

The Foreign Ministry announced that it would send a mission led by Minister Plenipotentiary Bernardo Futscher Pereira to Benghazi in order to establish contacts with the Libyan National Transitional Council leaders.

8 June (Brussels):

Caretaking Defense Minister Augusto Santos Silva attended NATO's Defense Ministers gathering, where a final decision was made regarding the reform of the Organization's structure. In that sense, Portugal's strategic command in Oeiras will be downgraded to a maritime operational command in charge of Strikfornato, the Alliance's rapid response maritime force. Portugal will also receive NATO's Communication Systems and Information School.

9 June (Lisbon):

The Foreign Ministry announced that the country officially supported Ban Ki-moon's bid for a second term as Secretary-General to the United Nations.

15 June (Lisbon):

President Aníbal Cavaco Silva formally appointed Pedro Passos Coelho as Portugal's new Prime Minister.

16 June (Lisbon):

Newly appointed Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho signed a coalition agreement with CDS



leader Paulo Portas that will give them absolute majority in Parliament. Afterwards, Cabinet names were also disclosed: Paulo Portas will become Portugal's new Foreign Minister.

21 June (Lisbon):

After failing to elect PSD's first choice Fernando Nobre, the Portuguese Parliament chose Assunção Esteves as its President for the next four years, the first woman to hold such a position.

23-24 June (Brussels):

Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho attended the European Council in Brussels where he sought to reassure his peers of the newly-elected government's resolve to tackle the ongoing crisis. Passos Coelho also announced that new austerity measures would soon be announced in order to calm the markets.

29 June (Lisbon):

Bissau-Guinean Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior met with Portuguese Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho. Passos Coelho took the opportunity to reaffirm Portugal's commitment to the development, growth and stability of Guinea-Bissau.

22 June (São Tomé):

The list of official presidential candidates for São Tomé's upcoming elections rose to 14, now comprising: Aurélio Martins, Evaristo Carvalho, Filinto Costa Alegre, Francisco Rita, Jorge Coelho, Maria das Neves, Gilberto Gil, Manuel Deus Lima, Carlos Bené, Manuel Pinto da Costa, Elsa Pinto, Delfim Neves, Liberato Moniz and Helder Barros.

22-24 June (Porto):

Prime Minister Patrice Trovoada traveled to the north of Portugal to launch a Luso-Atlantic Axis Chamber of Commerce focused on São Tomé and Príncipe and other remaining Gulf of Guinea countries.

30 June (São Tomé):

The Supreme Court excluded four candidates from the upcoming presidential elections due to irregularities found in their candidacies, while another excused himself from the race. Consequently, only Manuel Pinto da Costa, Filinto Costa Alegre, Helder Barros, Aurélio Martins, Evaristo Carvalho, Elsa Pinto, Jorge Coelho, Maria das Neves and Manuel de Deus Lima will appear on the ballot.

Tam Pak Yue – Timor Leste's Economy and Planning Minister João Gonçalves announced that his country was considering opening an economic cooperation office in Macau to promote and coordinate investments not only in the territory but also in mainland China.

20 June (Díli):

During an official visit to the country, China's Deputy Trade Minister Jiang Yao Ping signed a new agreement with Foreign Minister Zacarias da Costa that foresees the expansion of Chinese aid to Timor Leste's development and the increase of cooperation in the construction of local infrastructures.

26-28 June (Luanda):

President José Ramos-Horta visited Angola, seeking to strengthen cooperation ties in the energy and defense fields. Ramos-Horta met with President José Eduardo dos Santos and attended a special session of the country's National Assembly

São Tomé and Príncipe

2 June (Brazzaville):

President Fradique de Menezes attended the Summit on the Three Rainforest Basins (Amazon, Congo, and Borneo-Mekong).

Timor Leste

7 June (Díli):

After a meeting with a Macau business delegation – headed by Macau's former chief executive and current Vice-President of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Edmund Ho and by Secretary for Economy and Finance Francis

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