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- 24 BEIJING'S PERSPECTIVE ON UN SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM:
IDENTITY, ACTIVISM AND STRATEGY
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Chapters in books: Manuel Ennes Ferreira, "China in Angola: Just a Passion for Oil?", in Christopher Alden, Daniel Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), *China Returns to Africa: A Rising Power and a Continent Embrace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 295-317.

Articles in journals: Paulo Gorjão, "Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975-2002" (*Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 5, September/October 2002), pp. 754-771.

Articles in newspapers: Paulo Gorjão, "UN needs coherent strategy to exit from East Timor" (*Jakarta Post*, 19 May 2004), p. 25.

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Beijing's perspective on UN Security Council reform: identity, activism and strategy

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The Premise

In the discourse on the expansion of permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)¹ pragmatism prevails over any pretence of reformism. This pragmatism entails (a) a set of legal barriers; (b) power rivalry between the existing Permanent Five (P-5) and prospective members; and (c) a range of global issues. While Germany, India, Japan and Brazil, popularly identified as G-4 countries, are generally considered as the natural frontrunners for UNSC permanent berths, the African countries have a different take on the matter, with explicit support of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The PRC backs the African countries as representing the developing world: but it does this without recognizing India's bid explicitly in a parallel category, both at the bilateral and global level. The PRC has broadly stated that the issue of UNSC reform should be dealt with in a "rational" and "consensus" mode with greater representation from the "developing world", particularly from Africa. For instance, China's ambassador to the UN, Li Baodong, stated that "Security Council reform should give top priority to increasing the representation of developing countries, in particular that of African countries and give more small and medium-sized countries access to the Council and its decision-making process".² This article scrutinizes China's current position on UNSC reform and membership expansion; and debates it out in the Indian context.

Explaining Beijing's official stance

On December 11th 1992, the 47th UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution titled "Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Related Matters", which catalysed the UNSC reform debate.³ UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in his report titled *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (2005) proposed two options for UNSC reform (see Table 1).⁴ The US and China strongly opposed the proposal,⁵ with the Chinese ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, even describing the proposal as "immature".⁶

Broadly, the issue of UNSC reform involves five technicalities: *membership categories*; *veto*; *regional representation*; *size*; and *working methods and modules*. The expansion process and granting veto to new members requires amendment of the UN Charter (Art. 108), official approval of two-thirds of UNGA, ratification by two-thirds of member states, and explicit endorsement of the P-5.

For the Chinese, expansion of UNSC membership is the core issue of UN (*lianheguo*) reform, for which currently “various political forces are engaging each other in white-hot tussles”.⁷ In the Chinese perspective, reform of both the UNSC and UN needs to be seen as an integrated exercise. UN reform needs to be mainly directed towards enhancing the UN’s authority for an effective global governance structure. On UNSC reform, however, China’s approach remains conservative and sceptical (see Table 2). The Chinese logic rests on the premise that the UNSC should not create abruptly “new permanent members”, but should slowly bring “semi-permanent members” to the setup.

Table 1 - Kofi Annan’s Proposal on UNSC Reform and China’s Reaction

Model A						China’s reaction: “The proposal of an immature plan has deviated UNSC reform from a right track and has seriously undermined the overall development of the UN reform process and the preparation work for the September UN summit meeting”. (Liu Jianchao, <i>China Daily</i> , 10 June 2005.)
Region	No. of States	Existing Permanent seats	New Permanent seats	New two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total	
Africa	53	0	2	4	6	
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6	
Europe	47	3	1	2	6	
Americas	35	1	1	4	6	
Total	191	5	6	13	24	

Model B						China’s reaction: “UNSC is not a board of directors and its composition should not be decided according to the financial contributions of its members”. (<i>China Daily</i> , 22 September 2004.)
Region	No. of States	Existing Permanent seats	New four-year renewable seats	New two-year seats (non-renewable)	Total	
Africa	53	0	2	4	6	
Asia and Pacific	56	1	2	3	6	
Europe	47	3	2	1	6	
Americas	35	1	2	3	6	
Total	191	5	8	11	24	

“The reform of the Security Council involves a wide range of issues, which concern various parties. We believe that this issue should be dealt with in a gradual manner under the consensus reached by various parties. There should not be a rigid timetable for it”. (Kong Quan on Japan’s bid, *China Daily*, 22 September 2004.)

Table 2 - China's Current Proposition on Reform of UNSC Membership

**Perspective by Chen Jian, President of the United Nations Association of China
(Interview in Beijing Review, 30 September 2010, pp. 10-13.)**

On Reform

- UNSC reform involves the interests of various parties.
- Multipolarization in the world community is still in an early stage and has yet to become the norm.
- It is extremely difficult and even impossible to shape the pattern of the UNSC for the next half century.

On Membership Expansion

- A "transitional solution" is possible.
- UNSC should create "semi-permanent members" instead of "new permanent members".
- "Semi-permanent members" means "non-permanent members who do not enjoy veto power but could be re-elected".
- If non-permanent members win majority support, their term can be renewed and extended indefinitely. Though they may not hold the "permanent member" status, eventually they will enjoy the status and privileges of the existing P-5 states.

On Dividing UNSC Membership

- 1st category: The existing P-5 nations: the US, the UK, China, Russia and France.
- 2nd category: "Semi-permanent members" that will include India, Japan and others.
- 3rd category: Other non-permanent members who can serve only one term.

The Chinese *Position Paper on UN Reform*, released in June 2005, outlines five fundamentals: (a) UNSC reform should enhance the "authority and efficiency of the council"; (b) representation of the developing countries should be given priority; (c) rotating basis partaking in the decision-making process for small and medium-sized countries; (d) geographic representation symbolizing cultures and civilizations; and (e) regional groups should build a consensus on reform proposal with respect to their region and rotation method.⁸ The *Position Paper of the People's Republic of China at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly* (2010) speaks about "enhancing the authority and efficiency of the UNSC" and "representation of developing countries, African countries in particular".⁹ It also states categorically that "reform of the Security Council is part and parcel of UN reforms". Three fundamentals discernible in these position papers are: (a) China does not see UNSC reform in isolation and links it with UN reform as a whole; (b) it calls for reform of the working methods of UNSC along with greater representation of the African and developing world; (c) it opposes placing any specific time limit in reforming the UNSC.¹⁰ Beijing explicitly advocates dialogue on globalization and multipolarity and asks for greater democratization of world affairs,¹¹ particularly in global institutions like the UN. This discourse is advocated at a time when the Chinese are convinced about declining US influence in global affairs, with the shrinking of unipolarism (*danji*) largely.¹² China also identifies BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as part of the developing world, perceives the emergence of BRICS as an opportunity to prune US hegemony, and welcomes rhetorically the recent inclusion of India and South Africa in the UNSC.¹³

Media and scholarly dialogue

China is aware that the US does not believe in democratic accountability for its global actions; it also does not trust the US advocacy of UNSC reform. Ye Hailin and Yang Xiaoping at the Chinese think-tank SASS (Shanghai Academy of Social Science), for example, make light of Barack Obama's recent rhetorical support in the Indian Parliament for India's candidature in UNSC,¹⁴ but this state of affairs suits China. An influential expert in Shanghai says: "the course of P-5 in the UNSC should not be diluted, because if UNSC expands to the level of P-10, the influence of China and the US will diminish slowly".¹⁵ Therefore, the fundamental slogan that Beijing promotes with regard to UNSC reform is associated with its dialogue of establishing a "just and democratic international order on the basis of international law and multilateral cooperation and negotiations".¹⁶ The strategy is to expose American hegemonic behaviour which is unilateral and dismissive of both the global rules and the UN as a body for world governance.¹⁷ Among multilateral institutions, the UNSC offers China the veto as the most useful weapon to restrict US predominance in global issues.

Nuances of Beijing's position

On collective G-4 inclusion

Officially, China objects to the collective insertion of G-4 candidates in the UNSC as "faulted".¹⁸ While reacting to the G-4 members' deadline for UNSC reform, Wu Miaofa, the former counsellor with the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations stated categorically that "(T)he process should be made with democratic consultations. If they want to force their way in, then it will probably end in a failure".¹⁹ Beijing's official objection is that (a) the group does not have representation from Africa; and (b) Japan and Germany are not developing countries; the non-stated perception is that both Japan and Germany are US allies and India is increasingly becoming one.

On Japan

Japan's candidature was supported by several countries on the basis that the Japanese have been contributing a substantial amount to the UN budget. The Chinese objection is that global responsibility and prominence should not be defined in terms of how rich financially a country is, but on its contribution and posture with regard to the peace and developmental objectives of the UN: the UNSC is "not a board of directors" and its composition should not be decided "according to the financial contribution of its members".²⁰ For Beijing, Japan's historical wartime baggage of atrocities raises questions on its credentials.²¹

On Germany

Germany's consistent support to the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause, its critical attitude towards the Chinese human rights violations, and promoting the "China threat" theory are some of the factors that have annoyed Beijing over the years. The emerging

imbalances in Sino-German economic relations and political changes in Germany have contributed to the fractious relations.²² Germany is seen in the Chinese diplomatic circles as a proactive European nation which is critical of China's global interests. Besides, Germany is a developed country, while Beijing has its theory of involving the developing world in UNSC membership.

On Brazil

Most worried about the Sino-Latin American relationship is the US, which is trying to gauge the Chinese strategic policy intents and direction in the Latin region. The US is mainly concerned about the influence of the "China model" over Latin countries and the impact of China's "soft diplomacy" which has hugely eroded US influence in the region, particularly on Brazil. China has been trying to reach Latin America in a big way in recent times, concentrating on Brazil as the gateway to the region's resources. The Chinese have the advantage in that they usually do not preach – unlike the US and EU – about human rights, good governance, fiscal reforms, non-proliferation, etc. Brazil seems to appreciate the Chinese friendship and the principle of non-intervention.

As regards Brazil's UNSC membership, the Chinese agenda is to facilitate greater space for Brazil rather than buy it a permanent berth. Just as Japan and India have been directly or indirectly checked by other countries – Japan by South Korea and China; and India by Pakistan and Italy – Brazil is opposed by Mexico.²³ This suits Beijing's formulation that regional groupings should have their own consensus through closed-door meetings to decide their prospects of UNSC membership.²⁴

On India

The Chinese formulation with regard to India's case is conflicting. The Chinese experts themselves acknowledge it. Zhang Li writes that "Beijing has held an ambiguous attitude towards India's desire to enter UNSC as a permanent member whereas, as a standard expression, China backs India's expanding role in ongoing global affairs and within the UN".²⁵ Hong Lei, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, said once that "China values the role India plays in international affairs, and China understands and supports India's willingness to play a bigger role at the UN".²⁶ Beijing's stance on India's case is a blend of its past rivalry with India on the boundary dispute and plans to deny India the opportunity of becoming a global power.

In March 2010, India's Minister for External Affairs, S.M. Krishna, stated that the time had arrived for China "to review previously held positions [on UN reform] and welcome the presence in the Security Council of a nation with which it has much in common".²⁷ In response to the comment of India's ambassador at the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri in an interview that China would not be an obstacle to India's candidature, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said in a media interview that "China has always attached importance to India's role in international affairs either as an emerging economy or a

large developing country”.²⁸ He added that “China understands and supports India’s desire to play a bigger role in the UN, including its Security Council”. The joint statement between China and India during Premier Wen Jiabao’s recent New Delhi trip also talks about the bilateral relationship acquiring certain “global and strategic significance”.²⁹ India’s hope for Chinese support partly rests on the fact that India supported China’s candidature for both the UN and UNSC.

China’s perspective on the matter rests on some of the following parameters. *First*, India possesses the strength to become a global power that could eventually challenge the Chinese pre-eminence in Asia. *Second*, India’s global profile as “US supporter” is counter to China’s global interests. China’s discomfort in the matter was clearly demonstrated during the India-specific waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Indo-US nuclear deal.³⁰ *Third*, Washington is vocally promoting a larger strategic role for India at the global stage in response to China’s rising global ambitions.³¹ *Fourth*, if China supports India’s case, there will be a likely expansion of UNSC and African representation has to be there in the developing-world category. As opposed to its rhetorical statements, Beijing’s real intention is to act as Big Brother to the African world to exploit the oil, gas, energy and trade benefits in the name of advocating the African world for a greater space in world politics, not a permanent seat at the UNSC. *Fifth*, China mixes India’s membership issue with the whole debate of UN reform. Experts play it safe by stating that “If India manages to get two-thirds of the UN General Assembly support, China will support India’s case”,³² but consensus is lacking in the international community on the matter.³³ *Sixth*, China does not want to grant any leverage to India in the UN as it is aware of India’s influence as a “peace loving nation”; India’s credibility and record in UN peacekeeping operations are impressive. China may even counter India’s quest, citing allegations that India has violated the UNSC resolutions over Kashmir.³⁴ China’s dialogue on Kashmir does suggest that.

It is possible that Beijing would have supported India’s case a few years ago under a developing-country formula when both were rising and the US still used to be the superpower in a unipolar world order. Today, with the arrival of a multipolar world order and with the gravity of global attention focusing increasingly on China and India, the tide has turned. Not only has China arrived as the Number Two economy of the world, India’s global presence is not too far behind China. China cannot realistically add to that advantage by supporting India’s UNSC candidature in any way. Nonetheless, Chinese discourse of reforming the UNSC for developing-world representation without placing India in that category becomes a paradox. More so because India is clubbed with China in the BRICS formulation both as a “developing country” and “emerging economy”, prompting many to ask what prevents China from lending its support to India openly for UNSC permanent membership. Indeed, it is India which suffered in the 1962 war despite the *Bhai-Bhai* (brotherly) understanding between the two and should hold the grudge against China, not vice-versa. It may be recalled that the Chinese were

seen together with India in the 1950s as part of the Third World countries formulations. Surely, China's dialogue on UNSC reform for greater developing-world representation invites closer scrutiny.

PRC, UN and the Developing World

The Historical Parameters

History suggests that there is a close linkage between China's tryst with the UN and its global strategy and discourse of advancing the interest of the developing world. Beijing's current backing for greater representation for the African nations in the UNSC is a result of historical dynamism and its steadfast developing-world strategy. Mao Zedong's newly established PRC in 1949 saw the developing world as an option to maximize Chinese political objectives in global fora such as opposing great-power interference, recovery of Taiwan, and regaining the lawful seat for the Chinese at the UN.³⁵

Since its establishment in 1949, PRC has always identified and placed its interests quite closely with "Third World" countries, in the belief that the globe is divided because of imperialist tendencies rather than ideological differences between the capitalist and socialist worlds.³⁶ Due to decades of fighting civil wars and struggle against foreign invasion and occupation, the Chinese economy faced a difficult task of recovery in 1949. Mao's China had also to face the long-term US blockade and embargo. The Chinese revolution was a new putsch for worldwide revolution, and as such it was the focus of imperialist assault.³⁷ Both the Vietnam and Korea wars were launched by the US against China to halt the rising radical trend in Asia. Further, factors like the US-Japan military alliance and constant threat and antagonism from the US made the Chinese more conservative, competitive and quite resolved to face any possible eventual assault.³⁸ Most notably, in order to stop any imperialist assault, Beijing went one step ahead in breaking all the ideological barriers to have a momentous agreement with India in the historic formulation of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence", widely known as the *Panchasheel* agreement of April 1954.³⁹

Panchasheel

In April 1955, Zhou Enlai opened a smart diplomatic enterprise using *Panchasheel* at the Bandung Conference⁴⁰ to garner "more respected and responsible role for the PRC in the international community". Zhou advocated the political philosophy that nations with diverse social systems can attain non-violent coexistence and resolve disputes through dialogue.⁴¹ The *Panchasheel* principles were the ideal platform on which the developing world established cooperation within itself, putting aside social, political and ideological differences. The *Panchasheel* accord was the hallmark of the 1955 Bandung Conference and tried to revive the spirit of the UN at a time when the UN's very survival was doubtful because of the existing Cold War politics. Both the spirit of the Bandung Conference and the underlying *Panchasheel* agreement were the common ground for

Asian and African countries to collaborate since then and they have thereafter worked on building consensus on the basis of “non-aligned” paths and “South-South” cooperation. The Chinese have concentrated on this path over the years in winning the smaller and developing nations’ support in various degrees and on various issues. Except for a brief time during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese diplomats have always used these underlying principles as the standard diplomatic practice against which the leaders and officials evaluate PRC’s relationship with the US and other non-Socialist countries.⁴² A Chinese commentary notes that *Panchsheel* “is the basic norm in handling country-to-country relations”.⁴³

Zhou Enlai’s formulation at the Bandung Conference was the turning point in both Chinese history and global politics. Eventually, it worked in China’s favour in 1971 when the support and votes of the “Third World” countries helped the PRC attain its legitimate membership of the UN and permanent membership of the UNSC.⁴⁴ The sentiment of fighting against imperialist power and against colonial powers is mentioned in the Chinese constitution where it states that “the Chinese people have yet to fulfil their historical task of overthrowing imperialism and feudalism”.⁴⁵

The contemporary path

Since then the PRC has capitalized on the developing world.⁴⁶ The recognition it received from them for UN membership assisted it in normalizing its relations with the US and formulating its global strategy accordingly. Strengthening solidarity and cooperation with developing countries is considered a “basic point” in Chinese foreign policy.⁴⁷ From the time it acquired permanent UNSC membership, China’s global ambitions have unfolded rapidly. In his now-famous speech in 1974, Deng Xiaoping advocated a united fight against the hegemonism and superpower aggression of the US.⁴⁸ In course of time, this speech has been elaborated as the Chinese strategy of the *Three Worlds theory*.⁴⁹ Experts in China currently believe that the global multilateral institutions like the UN security system, the Bretton Woods monetary system and the world trading system are mostly dominated by the industrial countries under US supremacy.⁵⁰ PRC’s discourse on UNSC reform is linked to its past and current global activism, its association with developing nations and primarily against American hegemony.

To preserve its identity as a developing country, China makes it a point to take the initiative to protect and promote to some extent the interests of other developing countries.⁵¹ Fu Ziying, the Vice Commerce Minister, has been quoted saying that “China is the world’s largest developing country and to strengthen relations with developing countries is a focal point of China’s foreign policy”.⁵² The developing world is generally in agreement that the American power is adverse to its global agenda and interests,⁵³ and the Chinese have realized the depth of this conviction to use it in their own favour. Though on one hand China should have shown courage in supporting India’s case for UNSC permanent membership, it is unable on the other hand to do that as it sees India as a country close to the US.

UN as a path to power

Reforming the UNSC and its membership is not going to be easy; and China is likely to play a vital role in shaping the future direction of the UN. The UN remains an adventurous body in the Chinese formulation, but over UNSC reform China remains unadventurous. It advocates greater representation of the developing world, though hesitant to dilute the veto power or to relax its clutch over the UNSC. At the same time, China has moved a long way with the UN when it officially replaced Taiwan in 1971. Since then, it has slowly adjusted to the global conditions and with the opening of Deng Xiaoping's economic reform and "open door foreign policy" in 1978, has socialized itself greatly with the global society, particularly through the UN. Gradually since then, the matter of the UN has been special in the Chinese foreign policy device.

Not long ago, Hu Jintao pioneered the "Harmonious World" (*hexie shijie*) slogan that was parallel to the UN sentiments and goals of peace and common prosperity. This idea was also endorsed widely. At a time when the "China threat" theory was at its peak, developing countries in particular appreciated this Chinese strategy which reflected the common concerns of the people of the emerging world. In course of time, China has showed an immense aptitude to learn and adapt to the international conditions and has arrived at a stage of massive global engagement and promoting multilateral "active diplomacy", where the UN is taken as the fundamental and appropriate base. PRC's current institutional diplomacy is clearly visible in the UN system.⁵⁴ There is a greater interest among the Chinese today to "fulfil the duties and responsibilities imposed by the UN Charter and more than 300 international conventions it joined".⁵⁵

In the period after the events of September 11th 2001, Chinese officials and experts have constantly reiterated the UN's unique position with regard to the evolving global politics. Discussion in China has focused continuously on "consolidation of the authority of UNSC" in managing global crises and consolidating China's position. While earlier China used to be reactive to UN multilateral diplomacy, it is more proactive today, taking a leading role on various delicate fronts. For example, the PRC took the lead in proposing the first ever UNSC P-5 summit in September 2000 where President Jiang Zemin introduced a "new security concept".⁵⁶ Notably, China has shown flexibility in being with the rest of the P-5 nations at times and followed a practical approach by using its veto power judiciously. For example, China backed officially the recent British/French-led UNSC measure to impose limited sanctions on the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi.⁵⁷ For several years, Beijing has backed the UN sanctions against Iran to curb that country's nuclear programme.

Classical studies note that the UN has always been a "constant factor" in China's foreign policy.⁵⁸ While the UN has responded positively to China on various issues, it has equally accommodated the Chinese interests and its rising weight in multilateral diplomacy.⁵⁹ For example, in 2005 the UN established the China-African Business Partnership and China-Africa Business Council after working very closely with officials of China and Africa. Officials in China have continually stressed the fact that economic cooperation

with Africa should be carried out in accordance with an approach of “give more and take less”, which is also conducive to the UN ethos for developing societies.⁶⁰ In 2006, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) took the initiative to establish the International Poverty Reduction Centre in Beijing. The main aim of this centre has been to transmit the Chinese success pattern of development to other developing countries.⁶¹ Further, the PRC has taken special interest in donating to the UNDP's Voluntary Trust Fund for the support of South-South Cooperation.⁶²

The UN has not only been shown as a “constant factor” in China's global agenda, but has equally been used to advocate China's principal stance on various sensitive global issues. For example, China has used the presence of the UN to advocate its position and stance on the issue of international terrorism after 9/11.⁶³ Similarly, Beijing sees its presence in and alignment with the UN as an opportunity to showcase its greater presence in global politics and as a “responsible power”. The Chinese role in UN peacekeeping operations has grown over time, and has been quite impressive in comparison with the other P-5 countries.⁶⁴ Beijing holds the distinction of being the fourteenth-largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping with nearly 2140 soldiers and police in various missions like Haiti, Lebanon, Liberia and Sudan.⁶⁵ It has also brought some domestic legal reforms to match the UN conventions and improve its human rights record. Enforcement has often trailed behind enactment, but the number of legal initiatives of which China is signatory today is impressive. Globally, China has signed and ratified the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (2001) and is on way to ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1998). In the Chinese perception, the Western approach or even the UN system to human rights is biased currently, being rooted entirely on Western norms, ideas and institutions. Several UN programmes, plans and policies now have explicit democratic conditions attached to them.⁶⁶ Hence, China contests that there is need for not only UNSC reform but also for general UN reform.

In the meantime, India which has returned to the UNSC after a gap of twenty years, is conducting its own diplomatic exercises. In April 2011 India planned to host a large group of foreign ministers and UN envoys from the least developed countries (LDCs) which are a powerful bloc in the UN. Though India's future prospects for the UNSC permanent membership will most heavily depend on China's support, the Chinese approach towards India remains problematic. India is not seen positively in the Chinese foreign policy stratagem, as it shelters China's biggest enemy the Dalai Lama. Beijing has a tradition of being severe diplomatically with countries that support the Dalai Lama. The Chinese have already prompted a strong public opinion that New Delhi is uncomfortable with China's rise, on lines of the following comment: “India has long held contradictory views on China. Another big Asian country, India is frustrated that China's rise has captured much of the world's attention. Proud of its ‘advanced political system’, India feels superior to China”.⁶⁷ China's formulation on the discourse on UNSC reform has multiple attached meanings and diverse objectives. It would be exciting to see how the new Chinese leaders like Xi

Jinping and Le Keqiang, who will take over power in China in 2012, see the evolving global politics and other powers including India. Beijing's position and strategy would be among the deciding factors in UNSC reform. In sum, China's current stance on UNSC reform is linked broadly with three key strategies: to reduce the impact and pre-eminence of USA; reforming the UN; and greater democratization of the decision-making process with the voice of the developing world having an edge. Beijing's formulation of placing Africa vis-à-vis the developing world for UNSC consideration is a plan of its global preparation, and should be seen in the context of restraining the global activism and the remaining supremacy of the US.

* A shorter version of this paper appeared as a Policy Brief of the Institute for Security & Development Policy, Stockholm, in March 2011.

(Endnotes)

- 1 The UNSC is currently composed of five permanent members with veto powers – the US, Russia, China, France and Britain, the victors of World War II – and ten members elected for two-year terms. Japan has held temporary membership of UNSC for more than ten terms; Germany, Brazil and India among others are currently serving two-year terms.
- 2 "China urges increased representation of developing countries in reformed UN Security Council" (*People's Daily*, 12 November 2010).
- 3 To address UNSC reform an open-ended working group has been set up. The UNSC was expanded only once in 1963, with the membership expanded from 11 to 15.
- 4 "Strengthening the United Nations", in *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All (2005)*, Report of the Secretary General: United Nations General Assembly, A/59/2005, Fifty-Ninth Session, Agenda Items 45 and 55, 21 March 2005.
- 5 Gustaaf Geeraerts and Chen Zhimin, "China, the EU and the UN Security Council Reform" (*Asia Paper (BICCS Background Paper)*, Vol. 2, No. 6, 1 November 2007), p. 2.
- 6 "China rejects pepped-over UNSC reform plan" (*China Daily*, 10 June 2005).
- 7 Jiang Zhenxi and Fei Xiaojun, "A retrospect of the UN reform and its prospect" (*International Strategic Studies* (translated by Gu Dong), Issue 2, 2006), p. 86.
- 8 See "Section IV: Full text of China's position paper on UN reforms" (*Xinhua*, 7 June 2005).
- 9 "II: UN Reform" (*Position Paper of the People's Republic of China at the 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly*), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 13 September 2010.
- 10 "China urges increased representation ...", n. 2.
- 11 Rosemary Foot, "Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating and hedging" (*International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, 2006), p. 92.
- 12 Yin Chengde, "Rise of the emerging powers and restructuring of the international order" (*Foreign Affairs Journal*, Issue 92, Summer 2009), p. 47. Yin Chengde writes: "The United States is declining in status as the only superpower, and it is greatly baffled in carrying out the strategy of mono-polar world, while the process of world multipolarization is advancing speedily".
- 13 On 1 January 2011, Colombia, Germany, India, Portugal and South Africa entered the UNSC as non-permanent members.
- 14 Author's interaction with Chinese think-tank scholars in Beijing and Shanghai, 13–17 December 2010. (His visit was part of an IDSA initiative to send a delegation to Beijing and Shanghai to interact with various scholars and experts on bilateral and global issues.)
- 15 Ibid. This view belongs to Dr. Zhao Gancheng of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS). Dr. Zhao is a leading South Asia expert at SIIS.
- 16 Xu Jian and Guo Zhenyuan, "Major threats and dangers facing China" (FBIS-CHI-2003-0730, from *Liaowang*, 21 July 2003); see also see Li Xuejiang, "The pursuit of unipolar world order by the US will only boost US hegemony, not peace" (FBIS-CHI-2003-0728, from *Renmin Ribao*, 28 July 2003).
- 17 Foot, "Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order ...", n. 11, p. 92.
- 18 Jiang and Fei, "A retrospect of the UN reform and its prospect", n. 7, p. 92.
- 19 Al Yang, "China calls for unity on reform of UNSC" (*China Daily*, 14 February 2011).
- 20 "FM spokesman: UN is not a 'board of directors'" (*China Daily*, 22 September 2004).
- 21 Jenny Clegg, *China's Global Strategy: Towards a Multipolar World* (New York: Pluto Press, 2009), p. 182. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan stated in 2004: "... we understood Japan's expectation to play a greater role in international affairs. But we also believe that if a country wishes to play a responsible role in international affairs, it must have a clear understanding of the historical questions concerning itself." See *ibid.*

- 22 Mei Zhaorong, "A Review of China-Germany Relations in 2009" (*China.org.cn*, 1 January 2010).
- 23 Italy and Pakistan together are leading a Uniting for Consensus Group (UCP) that opposes expansion of UNSC permanent membership. UCP urges expansion in the non-permanent category. See Kamran Yousaf, "Italy opposes India bid for UN council membership" (*Express Tribune*, 12 November 2010).
- 24 Wu Miaofa, "Taichi master at the helm" (*Beijing Review*, 18 January 2007).
- 25 Zhang Li, "China-India relations: strategic engagement and challenges" (*Asie.Visions*, September 2010), p. 22.
- 26 China supports rational UN Security Council reform" (*Xinhua*, 11 September 2010).
- 27 Ananth Krishnan, "China calls for 'patient consultations' on UNSC reforms" (*The Hindu*, 9 November 2010).
- 28 "China supports greater representation of developing countries at UNSC: spokesman" (*Xinhua*, 17 January 2011).
- 29 India-China Joint Communiqué, 16 December 2010, Ministry of External Affairs.
- 30 Jagannath P. Panda, "China's Posture on the Indo-US Nuclear Deal" (*IDS Comment*, 10 October 2007).
- 31 Tony Karon, "India's Security Council seat: don't hold your breath" (*Time*, 10 November 2010).
- 32 Author's interaction with Chinese think-tank scholars in Beijing and Shanghai, 13-17 December 2010. This view particularly belongs to Dr. Zhao Gancheng of SIIS.
- 33 Ananth Krishnan, "China doesn't favour G4 call on UNSC reforms" (*The Hindu*, 15 February 2011).
- 34 Karon, "India's Security Council Seat ...", n. 31.
- 35 Mel Gurtov, "Changing Perspectives and Policies", in Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (eds.), *China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic* (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 2010), p. 14.
- 36 Clegg, *China's Global Strategy ...*, n. 21, p. 49.
- 37 *Ibid.*, p. 50.
- 38 Tan Chung writes: "China's response to colonial repression was the decisive factor shaping China's rise as a modern state ..." See Tan Chung (edited by Patricia Oberoi), *Rise of the Asian Giants: Dragon-Elephant Tango* (London: Anthem Press, 2008), p. 40.
- 39 Jerome Alan Cohen and Hungdah Chiu, *People's China and International Law*, vol. 1 (Princeton, MA: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 119.
- 40 Alfred D. Wilhelm, *The Chinese at the Negotiating Table: Style and Characteristics* (Washington, DC: National Defence University Press, 1994), p. 181. In Wilhelm's view, the Bandung Conference, officially known as the Asian-African conference, was the perfect forum for Zhou Enlai's political skills.
- 41 Selected passages from Zhou Enlai's speech found in Yuan-li Wu, *China: A Handbook* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 829-830.
- 42 Cohen and Hungdah, *People's China and International Law*, n. 39.
- 43 Yang Wenchang, "Part IV: Adherence to an Independent Foreign Policy of Peace is the requisite of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" (*Foreign Affairs Journal* (special issue to mark the 30th anniversary of China's reform and opening-up), December 2008), p. 36.
- 44 The PRC gained UN membership and UNSC permanent membership on 25 October 1971. PRC's representatives attended the UN and UNSC meetings on 23 November 1971 for the first time. Previously, all the seats in the UN organs were held by the Republic of China (RoC).
- 45 "Preamble" (*Constitution of the People's Republic of China*, adopted on 4 December 1982).
- 46 See, for example, "China steadily consolidates and strengthens its relations with other developing countries" (Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Beijing 1999).
- 47 Xu Bu, "Achievement and experience of new China's diplomacy" (*Foreign Affairs Journal*, autumn 2009), p. 9.
- 48 See Deng Xiaoping, "Speech at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly", 10 April 1974.
- 49 *Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds is a Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977). Mao's Three Worlds Theory was based on the politico-economic evaluation of international relations. The theory was based on three entities: First World (mainly the superpowers the US and the Soviet Union), the Second World (mainly the superpowers' allies) and the Third World (non-aligned countries). It may be noted that in the Western theory of Three Worlds, the US belongs to the First World; the USSR to the Second World; and the neutral and non-aligned countries to the Third World.
- 50 Ye Yu, "The G20: new multilateralism with new challenges" (*Foreign Affairs Journal*, summer 2009), p. 24.
- 51 Gregory T. Chin, "China's evolving G8 engagement: complex interests and multiple identity in global governance reform", in Andrew F. Cooper and Agata Antkiewicz (eds.), *Emerging Powers in Global Governance: Lessons from the Heiligendamm Process* (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), pp. 83-114. Several other experts also hold a similar view.
- 52 "Developing countries meet in Beijing, discuss financial crisis" (*Renmin Ribao*, 20 May 2010, OSC Transcribed Text, *World News Connection*), dialogue.com, 201005201477.1_c38600645a591869, accession number 299200180.
- 53 Andrew Hurrell, "Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be great powers" (*International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 2006), p. 18.
- 54 Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China change the rules of global order?" (*Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2010), p. 128.
- 55 Wu Jianmin, "What international responsibilities should China take?" (*People's Daily*, 16 February 2011).
- 56 Jianwei Wang, "China's multilateral diplomacy in the new millennium", in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds.), *China Rising: Power and Motivation in Chinese Foreign Policy* (Lanham, BO: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 164-165. See also "Section IV: Full text of China's position paper on UN reforms", n. 9.
- 57 "Libya sanctions: China's new role at the UN" (*Christian Science Monitor*, 28 February 2011).
- 58 Byron S.J. Weng, *Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 3.
- 59 Chin and Thakur, "Will China change the rules of global order?", n. 54.

- 60 Yang Wenchang, "Part IV: Adherence to an Independent Foreign Policy of Peace ...", n. 43; also see Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China change the rules of global order?" (*Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2010).
- 61 "From across the globe - Khalid Malik on China's unprecedented capacities to tackle poverty, development partnerships and the financial crisis" (*UN Development Programme: Capacity Building in Europe and CIS*, 14 April 2009); see Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, "Will China change the rules of global order?" (*Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, October 2010).
- 62 "China to play a more positive and constructive role", an interview with Zhang Yesui, China's Permanent Representative to the UN (*People's Daily*, 21 September 2009).
- 63 For a detailed analysis on this aspect, see Jagannath Prasad Panda, "China's position on international terrorism: a survey of government releases and papers" (*China Report*, Vol. 42, No. 2, 2006), pp. 199-207.
- 64 Yin He, "China's changing policy on UN peacekeeping operations", *Asia Paper* (Stockholm: Institute for Security and Development Policy, July 2007), p. 9; also see Wu Jianmin, "What international responsibilities should China take?", n. 60.
- 65 Chin and Thakur, "Will China change the rules of global order?", n. 54.
- 66 Bruce Gilley, *China's Democratic Future, How it will Happen and Where it will Lead* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), p. 79.
- 67 "India's unwise military move" (*Global Times*, 11 June 2009). For a detailed compilation of some of the Chinese media and public thinking on India, see Jagannath P. Panda, "Recent Important Chinese Writings and Views on India", in *China's Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition* (New Delhi: Pentagon Security International, 2010), pp. 213-216.



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