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- 16 JAPAN'S FOREIGN AID POLICY AND THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL FACTORS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE TICAD SECURITY AND POLITICAL ROLE
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Articles in journals: Paulo Gorjão, "Japan's Foreign Policy and East Timor, 1975-2002" (*Asian Survey*, Vol. 42, No. 5, September/October 2002), pp. 754-771.

Articles in newspapers: Paulo Gorjão, "UN needs coherent strategy to exit from East Timor" (*Jakarta Post*, 19 May 2004), p. 25.

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Japan's Foreign Aid Policy and the Influence of External Factors: Implications for the TICAD Security and Political Role

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During the Cold War Japan's African policy was limited by the East-West ideological confrontation and Tokyo's involvement with apartheid South Africa. As a result the African bloc denied Tokyo political support to gain a seat on the Security Council as non-permanent member. Japan had no choice but to support Western interests in Africa, leaving it without political space to advance its own African diplomacy or economic interests in some resource-rich African countries.¹ A preliminary argument is that over time the influence of international factors led to a reappraisal of Japan's foreign policy from a passive and reactive stance to a more proactive role in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of translating more of its economic strength into political and diplomatic power within the international system.

Accepting that the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) is the centerpiece of Japanese foreign policy, mostly through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), to advance Japan's national interest and simultaneously promoting its new development strategy toward Africa in the post-Cold War,² this article considers whether Japan's decision of organizing the TICAD is motivated by changes in the international system or instead the foreign policy decision is motivated by the impact of external events such as international pressures. Assuming that TICAD was not expected to solve all the economic and political problems of Africa, then why, from the international cooperation point of view, did Japan organize TICAD in the first place? International pressures might not be sufficient to explain Japan's ambition to operationalize the Agenda for Peace doctrine³ that is related to Japanese foreign policy of middle power ambitions trying to help establish liberal norms in the international donor community. Such norms include ownership and partnership, peace building and human security within the TICAD. Finally, to what extent has the adoption of these norms in the TICAD changed Japanese foreign aid policy and development assistance toward Africa? This perspective focuses on people rather than on the state and explains why Japanese government shifted quite easily from a "comprehensive security" policy that required the coordinated application of

economic, commercial and political initiatives for securing Japan's peace and security⁴ towards a "human security" policy that is based on a non-military dimension for cultivating international political influence without contravening its peace constitution.⁵ One point in common between the two policies is the increase of official development assistance (ODA) for political and strategic purposes to Africa.⁶ This article examines the influence of international factors on Japan's aid policy and the TICAD Process such as the constitutional limits and other obstacles that prevent the articulation of a close link between global security as an objective and foreign aid as a policy instrument. In this context it examines Japan's "securitization" of aid under the "new" peacekeeping operations (PKO) law on the one hand, and the development thinking through the TICAD on the other hand, by emphasizing the consolidation of peace through peace building and human security as a pillar of Japanese foreign policy.

Japan's Aid Policy: Political Implications for the TICAD

Japan's consolidation of peace in the TICAD includes a strong ODA component as a way to circumvent its military limitations and constitutional constraints. During the Cold War Japan's foreign policy naturally placed emphasis on ODA to fulfill its interests of peace and prosperity and to conciliate the antagonisms resulting from its trade surplus with African regimes. According to William Nester Japanese aid to Africa was nothing but an extension of Japan's commercial interests.⁷ However, John Hickman and Scarlett Cornelissen contest the mercantilist thesis stating that, excluding South Africa, Japan always had a small volume of trade with Africa.⁸

The ending of the Cold War system, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Gulf War of 1991, to which Japan contributed with US\$13 billion, intensified the national debate about Japan's inactive international security role by calling into question whether the Yoshida Doctrine remained sufficient to ensure Japan's vital interests. Furthermore, in 1991 Japan was the world's first donor in bilateral aid and a major donor in Africa after France, Germany and the United States. Thus, Japan had three central problems. How to relate ODA to support foreign policy goals beyond "checkbook diplomacy", how to respond to the "new" political situation in Africa, and how to invert the aid fatigue among the donor community. The absence of an overall ODA philosophy to link Japan's "comprehensive security" policy with its consolidation of peace approach⁹ and legislation that would allow Japan's participation in PKO highlighted the need to rethink Japan's African policy.

Japan responded with three different policies to meet growing domestic and international criticisms. First, it passed the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 to enable overseas dispatch of Self Defense Forces (SDF) troops to join specified peacekeeping operations (PKO) under the aegis of the United Nations and related activities, such as disaster relief and humanitarian operations. Under the PKO Law, Japan sent electoral observers to Angola (1992), and SDF to Cambodia (1992), Mozambique (1993-1995), and

Rwanda (1994). Second, as part of Japan's diplomatic attempts to play a more active role in post-Cold War international affairs, Tokyo adopted the ODA Charter in 1992, which for the first time outlined official policy linking aid and security, thus breaking away with the past political non-intervention in the recipient's internal affairs. Third, to prevent the marginalization of Africa in the fast-progressing trend toward globalization, Japan hosted the TICAD in 1993. At first MOFA and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) did not know how to deal with African security issues within the framework of TICAD, because until the mid-1990s Japan's involvement in African conflict issues was limited to few areas of providing humanitarian assistance through the United Nations (UN) in Africa.¹⁰

The objectives of TICAD expanded the scope of Japan's peace building activities, bringing into question the controversial issue of Japan's Article 9.¹¹ Still, Japan's lack of experience in dealing with conflict prevention issues was reflected at the final 1993 Tokyo Declaration.¹² However, strong requests from African leaders prior to TICAD II (1998) resulted in the inclusion of the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA) in various guidelines concerning peace and security in Africa. As a response to Japan's technical assistance to strengthen the capacity of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1993, the OAU created the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution to deal with African conflicts comprehensively. But, the exclusion of the OAU from the TICAD Process as a full partner was highly criticized by the OAU official executive. As a result from 1996 to 2000 Japan contributed to the OAU support initiatives with US\$1.604 million.¹³ Japan's government, feeling the pressure, invited Joaquim Chissano, President of Mozambique and Chairman of the OAU, to TICAD III. As a follow-up to TICAD III Japan, along with the UN, the Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), the UNDP, and the World Bank, held the "TICAD Conference on the Consolidation of Peace in Africa", in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (February 2005). At this conference Japan materialized the security role with ODA for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and community development focused on human security in Africa, which was announced in the G8 Summit in 2005.

The African Union (AU), acknowledging Japan's role in Africa in October 2004, decided to institute a high-level policy dialogue between both parties to strengthen cooperation at the UN, and promote the Asia-African partnership,¹⁴ which had a different meaning for Japan and Western donors. For the West partnership means a deeper involvement in the domestic affairs of recipient countries to implement through ownership what they had agreed.¹⁵ For Japan partnership means to enlarge the donor community to partner with Africa through the ownership (or self-help efforts) by African countries.¹⁶

The activities of the UN Peace Building Commission chaired by Japan since 2007 reinforced the idea of Japan as a peace builder in Africa through the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center. Ahead of TICAD IV, Tatsuo Yamasaki, Deputy Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, at the 43rd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the 34th Annual Meeting of the African Development Fund (AfDF) held in

Mozambique on 15 May 2008, welcomed African “self-reliant” efforts to accomplish the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), and the establishment of the Fragile State Facility (FSF) to help in ending conflicts for which 7.5% of the funds of the AfDF were allocated.¹⁷

Influence of International Factors on Japan's Aid Policy and the TICAD

After the Cold War Japan's determination to play a prominent role in international affairs via the TICAD Process cannot be underestimated. However, the influence of international factors on Japan's aid policy cannot be offset either. Taken together, it is assumed that during the Cold War external factors, which Japan did not control, like the oil crises created an opportunity for Japan to rethink its diplomatic relations with Africa.¹⁸ Japan did not change its aid policy. It simply readapted it to the Cold War circumstances. To understand the extent of outside pressure in Japanese aid policy it is necessary to examine the interaction of the systemic change with pressures at the multilateral and bilateral level.

OECD: The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) aid norms have exerted stronger influence in some OECD countries than in others. Until the late 1970s, though the share of African developing countries in bilateral ODA has increased, DAC pressures were ineffective at making Japan adopt a geographical reorientation of its ODA from Asia to Africa. During the 1980s international criticism mounted against Japan for being too commercially oriented and highly tied and for not focusing on basic human needs. Under DAC's pressure in June 1989, Japan extended more aid to African countries through a three-year US\$600 million untied grant program in support of structural adjustment efforts for low-income sub-Saharan African countries.

In December 1991 the DAC High Level Meeting advocated members to promote human rights, democratization, accountability and the rule of law and reduction of excessive military expenditures.¹⁹ In 1992 Japan adopted the ODA Charter that matched the above principles.

UN and World Bank Pressure: During the 1980s under the critical economic situation and food crisis in Africa, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in its Resolution 39/29 of December 1984 urged donors to increase emergency relief aid and ODA to ease the debt burden of African countries.²⁰ At the request of the President of the UNGA, Japan accepted a coordinator's role on the issue of emergency assistance. Also, Japanese Foreign Minister Abe's proposal of increasing support for the establishment of a special task force under the UN Officer for Emergency Operations in Africa was accepted.²¹ By 1990 Japan's financing support through the World Bank's Africa Fund reached 25% of its commitment to sub-Saharan Africa's structural adjustment.²²

G8: The Japanese government was sometimes urged by G8 countries to increase its support to Africa. At the G8 Summit in Cologne in 1999, Japan has cancelled debt, though reluctantly, for low-income countries because, according to representatives of Japan at

the summit, the cancellation of debt relief would cause a moral hazard and undermine self-help efforts. Japan, as a member of the Paris Club, had no option but to reluctantly follow the G8 momentum in supporting African countries on the enhanced heavily indebted poor countries (HIPC) debt relief scheme.²³

US: The US pressure on Japan's African policy for aid policy changes was based on three factors. First, in 1955 the US pressed Japan to participate at the Conference of Bandung.²⁴ Japan was expected to assume a leadership role at the conference among the anti-Communists while ensuring that American interests were not affected. According to Kweku Ampiah the TICAD can be seen as an extension of the Bandung commitments as Japan's unfinished business.²⁵ In 1965-1966 Japan, pressed by the US and Western powers, rejected the UN General Assembly economic sanctions against the white minority regimes.²⁶ Second, in the 1970s Japan was pressed to increase its aid to other regions outside of Southeast Asia in terms of contribution to global security.²⁷ During the 1980s Japan's ODA to Egypt, Sudan and Kenya is linked more to their place in US strategic thinking than to their economic importance to Japan. Third, the US also urged Japan to emphasize basic human needs in its foreign aid program as a way to disperse concerns of tied aid. In the mid-1980s the US also pressed Japan to support the World Bank's and the IMF's structural adjustment programs. Here Japan did participate, though reluctantly, because its support for adjustment conflicted with its own history of economic development and the policies embedded in adjustment.²⁸

The Cold War ended but not US pressure. The US requested that Japan adopt its political conditionality in terms of legal and institutional guarantees for human rights and democracy and also "softer" assistance modalities such as environment support for NGOs, basic education, and population projects,²⁹ which Tokyo did in the ODA Charter in 1992.³⁰ In the later half of the 1990s, the US began reducing ODA toward Africa and even discussed the abolition of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Japan's deeper engagement into Africa is partly explained by American disengagement reflected in the argument that Africa needs to take responsibility for its own self as the continent lost geopolitical importance.³¹ However, the war on terrorism again put Africa on USAID agenda, and in 2002 the US created a new government agency, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which emphasizes good governance, human resource development, and sound economic policies. These issues clearly influenced changes on Japan's aid policy and played a significant role in the launch of TICAD and on the following conferences.

China: Though China's presence in Africa goes back to the 1950s, it is after the 1990s that Beijing began competing with Japan and Western donors by promoting its own mode of development by emphasizing co-operation between China and Africa rather than one-sided aid.³² Accordingly, China does not really care about the development and democratization of African countries but about buying African leaders political support with economic cooperation.³³ China being less understanding about DAC norms and policies regarding the content and use of ODA is challenging Japan and Western mode

of development in Africa, both bilaterally and through new regional frameworks such as the Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). Because of China's strengthening presence in Africa through FOCAC and from the viewpoint of resource security, Tokyo decided at TICAD IV to double its ODA loan to Africa.

Africa: During the Cold War African countries introduced, through the OAU, many resolutions in the UN against South Africa, Japan and the Western countries. However, Japanese government's attitude toward these resolutions was one of indifference. Until the late 1980s the OAU did not have the capacity to balance the aspirations for liberation, peace and development because of the organization's limited capabilities and juridical sovereignty. This induced levels of both internal conflict and external involvement. This consigned the OAU itself to virtual impotence,³⁴ and it explains the distance between Japan-OAU relations from the 1960s to early 1990s as the Japanese government interacted with Africa preferentially through bilateral relations.

In the post-apartheid era African leaders, acknowledging the political importance of TICAD in Japan's African diplomacy, placed specific pressures on Japan to step up aid, reduce debt relief, and increase trade and direct foreign investment in Africa. TICAD's mixed diplomatic approach, combining a multilateral level conference with bilateral meetings with each of the African leaders, changed Japan-OAU relations.

With regard to specific pressures within the TICAD framework, in 1990 African leaders through the OAU/AHG (Assembly of Heads of State and Government - Res. 196-XXVI) put pressure on the World Bank and all developed nations in general to support the creation of a Global Coalition for Africa (GCA), renamed Coalition for Dialogue in Africa – CoDA in March 2009, to build a new international partnership in order to support Africa's development.³⁵ The GCA was launched in 1991 as a North-South Forum to gather African leaders and Africa's principal external partners. The GCA is based on the premise that Africa can only develop with its own self-efforts, but to do so it needs sustained support and coordinated partnership from western donors to match Africa's commitment to economic and political change.³⁶ The World Bank became the main supporter of the GCA and began pressing Japan to increase support to African development in the post-Cold War era.³⁷ Meanwhile, Botswana, which chaired the GCA, dispatched its Foreign Minister to Japan to convey the message of the GCA. In October 1993, in support of the UN New Agenda for the Development of Africa (UN-NADAF) and the GCA, Japan sponsored a global conference on Africa development, the TICAD.

The UN-NADAF in the 1990s acknowledged Japan's response to the GCA appeal, stating that Japan, working jointly with the UN and the GCA, organized the TICAD to promote high-level policy dialogue among African leaders and their development partners.³⁸ Though TICAD attempts to build an alternative framework to that of the Washington Consensus, it ended sharing common elements like applying conditional ties. As a result TICAD's applicability of the Asian development model to Africa has proved difficult because of the international pressure to adhere to Western donor standards.³⁹ TICAD III

(2003) emphasized poverty reduction through economic growth to achieve development, however the focus of the international community was on achieving the MDG.⁴⁰ Hence, at TICAD IV (2008) the projects had to involve more support for social development and achievement of MDGs.

TICAD

At TICAD I (1993) the participants committed to increase foreign aid, which created greater expectations for the future of Japanese-Africa cooperation. Aside from the conference, Olusegun Obasanjo, the Nigerian President stated that Japan is an economic giant that should at least provide 25% of its ODA to Africa.⁴¹ Additionally, at the GCA meeting held in Maputo in October 1997, the Mozambican Campaign Against Landmines urged both the GCA and Japan to support the treaty banning the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of anti-personnel landmines. Subsequently Mozambique and the GCA lobbied Japan to sign the treaty, which Japan did in December 1997, in Ottawa, Canada.⁴²

At TICAD II (1998) the pressures from African leaders for Japan to increase its ODA to Africa mounted once again. Specifically, they expressed disappointment that the Agenda for Action did not present solutions to the debt burden of African countries. Though TICAD is a non-pledging conference, Kunio Katakura, the Japanese government's special envoy to TICAD, recalled Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's pledge at the conference opening reiterating that Japan would expand the number of eligible countries and the amount of debt subject to such relief.⁴³

The overall message from African leaders at TICAD III (2003) was that while appreciating the ongoing efforts by Japan and other Asian countries in support to Africa, there remained a call to Japan to increase aid, investment and trade, including greater access to developed country markets for African exports. The pressure worked, and at TICAD III Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi declared that Japan would promote investment loans in Africa and other measures amounting to US\$300 million over five years.⁴⁴

At TICAD IV (2008) African leaders asked Japan to encourage more private companies to invest in the continent. For example, Tanzania's President Jakaya Kikwete stressed the importance of Japan's ODA to help improve infrastructure and the need for Japanese investments to take into account all countries on the African continent not only South Africa and Egypt (which absorb 85% of Japanese investment in Africa).⁴⁵ As a result Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda pledged to double Japan's ODA to Africa by 2012 including providing up to US\$4 billion in low-interest soft loans. These would be used to improve African infrastructure to stimulate pro-poor growth through increased regional trading.

Human Security: Implications for Japan's Foreign Aid Policy

The roots of human security policy in Japanese foreign policy go back to the 1980s when Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira outlined a Comprehensive Security Strategy Report

within the non-military dimension of security.⁴⁶ Subsequently, Prime Minister Obuchi turned human security as an element of Japan's foreign policy agenda (which is similar to that of the UNDP Human Development Report of 1994). Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori created an International Commission on Human Security at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, established by Kofi Annan in 2001, and Japan committed itself in establishing human security in Africa.⁴⁷ Later, Prime Minister Koizumi formally incorporated human security as a key component of the new ODA Charter adopted in August 2003.

As a political agenda, the great strength of human security is that it has the potential to bring together fields traditionally kept apart such as human rights, humanitarian affairs, development issues, and security of persons, property and assets as a vital base for development.⁴⁸ Human security became a policy instrument flexible enough for Japanese aid policy makers because it matched its constitutional limitations as Japan's *de facto* "comprehensive security".⁴⁹

Following the G8 Miyazaki Initiative on Conflict Prevention of July 2000, Japan officially introduced aid policy for conflict prevention to assist reconstruction and development in fragile states.⁵⁰ This shift is also visible in JICA's development activities regarding transition situations between conflict and peace in fragile states. Specific actions for conflict prevention are support for governance, emergency humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction plans, partnership with NGOs, assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), and regulation and collection of small arms.

After 2001 human security and ODA became linked with Japanese development assistance as a tool of counter-terrorism. The revised ODA Charter (August 2003) reflects this thinking, which Japan endorsed in the "Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship", in Stockholm, June 2003,⁵¹ and identifies peace building as a priority to address security concerns. It also notes that Japan's security is directly concerned with global threats such as terrorism, disasters and drug-related crimes.⁵²

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006) went further and applied the concept of human security more in strategically and political interests such as the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan as part of the American global war-on terror.⁵³ The 2002 Diplomatic Bluebook averred that conflict and poverty is the "hotbed of terrorism",⁵⁴ linking human security with the UNSC/RES/1269 (1999) norm against the "increase in acts of international terrorism which endangers the lives and well-being of individuals worldwide as well as the peace and security of all states",⁵⁵ and with the 1997 Revised US-Japan Defense Guidelines. However, the exploitation of the concept with the "war on terror" began shifting the emphasis back from "soft" (or human security) to "hard" (or state) security, and it had implications for Japan's pursuit of human security on the international stage.⁵⁶

In order to clarify on issues relating to terrorism and development, DAC donors began pushing for security sector reform (SSR) toward Africa, as a key component of the

broader human security agenda, in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.⁵⁷ To reduce the negative effects of the nexus human security-terrorism TICADs III-IV presented important opportunities for the MDGs to match human security as the key concept of Japan's ODA policy through consolidation of peace.

Human Security and the TICAD Process

Japan, as a significant practitioner of "soft power" politics, endorses a more comprehensive definition of human security based on "Asian values" and greater focus on the ideal to protect people from threats to their livelihoods and dignity while supporting self-empowerment.⁵⁸ Japan's "soft power" projection on the international stage depends how its role in the international community is accepted and recognized.⁵⁹ As TICAD projects a broader conception of national interest – including security, economic and social and developmental objectives – toward the most problematic region in the world it turns Japan's role more internationally acceptable. Because African countries were not able to find any alternative development approach they have accepted the TICAD development approach.⁶⁰ The acceptance of TICAD's development approach boosted even more Japan's "soft power" in the UN and increased credibility in the international stage *vis-à-vis* the United States. To reinforce the legitimacy of human security in Japanese assistance to Africa and to make it consistent with the revised ODA Charter (2003) and Medium-Term Policy on ODA (2005), the concept was included in the TICAD III 10th Anniversary Declaration.

In 2003 Japan strengthened the human security perspective in its bilateral Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects (GGP) and renamed it as the Grassroots Human Security Projects (GHSP). It should be highlighted that the proportion of the GHSP targeting post-conflicting countries is on the rise in addition to the fact that projects with the objectives of "peace building and reconstruction" have increased since 2002.⁶¹

In line with the human security concept, Japanese assistance to Africa since TICAD III has placed priority on such areas within the TICAD's three pillars. The first pillar is human-centered development (water security, health care, medical care and education); the second pillar, poverty reduction through economic growth (food, agriculture, rural development, infrastructure and debt relief); and the third pillar is consolidation of peace (ODA linked to peace building and human security).

At TICAD IV Japan included again the third pillar in Africa as one of the priority issues. However, Japan's gross bilateral disbursements to conflict peace and security between 2004 and 2010, as a proportion of its total aid, remain low at 0.7% or US\$789 million.⁶² Humanitarian aid that, according to Setsuko Kawahara is the very basis to ensure human security,⁶³ in the same period received a larger proportion of Japan's total aid with 2.9% or US\$3.2 billion.⁶⁴ Between 2006 and 2009 Sudan (US\$97.8 million) was the largest recipient followed by Afghanistan (US\$65.6 million), Pakistan (US\$38.8 million) and DRC (US\$27.7 million).⁶⁵

Conclusion

This article showed that from the 1960s to the late 1980s and the early 1990s, Japan's foreign policy was strongly influenced by international factors which led to gradual changes in Japan's aid policy. Through TICAD Japanese policy makers have begun to see the potential of Africa beyond the economic and diplomatic aspects of ODA. TICAD became a political opportunity for Japan to raise its international status and to show its altruism for Africa's development. The overall influence of international factors was more a "voluntary" cooperation rather than a "forced" concession of Japan. This was evident in Japan G8 diplomacy. Gradually, after the Cologne Summit in 1999, the G8 leaders began to emphasize the importance of human security to achieving democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance and human development. After the ODA Charter (2003) MOFA and JICA began to emphasize consolidation of peace, suggesting that Japan prefers to address African conflicts through peace building that does not involve prolonged deployment of military peacekeepers.

This justifies why Japanese government objected to Canada's human security policy of allowing humanitarian intervention via the use of military power. It is also a clear example of how two middle powers, though projecting the same concept of "human security" differently, employ politics as an instrument of "soft power" to capitalize on their capabilities and redefine their foreign policy in the 21st century. In this context TICAD has been instrumental for Japan's reframing its foreign policy. This "soft power" can be measured by the influence that Japanese ODA through TICAD has achieved on international development,⁶⁶ as not only TICAD participants endorsed Japanese leadership, but also China and India have convened similar international conferences centering on Africa, on the one hand, and to reassess human security after the 9/11 within the securitization of the development agenda, on the other hand.⁶⁷ This is best seen in Japan's support for sSouth-sSouth cooperation, its emphasis on self-help, economic growth and peace building within the concept of human security.⁶⁸ So far the Japanese government has been able to bring about a convergence between its own interests and those of the international community around the TICAD. However, as seen in this article, international factors have influenced changes in the allocation of Japan's ODA to Africa.

(Endnotes)

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